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ABSTRACT & KEYWORDS 
The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the constitutional principles entrenched in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to mean that everyone in Canada has a 
constitutional right to access necessary medical treatment without fear of criminal 
sanction. The latest research suggests cannabis (marihuana) provides a unique medicinal 
benefit that, for some individuals, is necessary. The federal criminal prohibition of 
cannabis deprives many individuals of a potentially beneficial medicine and stigmatizes 
them with a criminal record. 
Without a valid medical cannabis access system, the criminal prohibition is invalid. The 
current Marihuana Medical Access Regulations were recently struck down. Parliament is 
considering substantive changes and will propose new Regulations in late 2012.  
There are a range of regulations that would meet the requirements of the Charter. Based 
on the best available medical evidence and constitutional analysis, I recommend a 
regulatory system that will maximize legitimate access and minimize attendant harm.  
Keywords: 
Constitutional law, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, medical marihuana, marihuana, 
cannabis, cannabinoids.
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Researchers have discovered that chocolate produces some of the same reactions in the 
brain as marihuana. The researchers also discovered other similarities between the two 
but can't remember what they are.  -­‐ Matt Lauer1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although cannabis has been used as a medicine around the world for millennia, in the 
early 20th century a policy of broad drug prohibition took root in North America.2 In 
Canada, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) currently prohibits the 
possession, trafficking, importing/exporting and production of cannabis.3 The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has had a significant impact on the development of the 
criminal law in this area.4 
Prior to the first successful Charter challenge in 2000 and the resulting enactment of the 
initial Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) in 2001,5 individuals suffering 
from serious medical conditions defended criminal charges of possession and production 
of marihuana using the common law defence of necessity.6 The purpose of the 2001 
MMAR was to “establish a framework to allow access to marihuana by individuals 
suffering from grave or debilitating illnesses, where conventional treatments are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matt Lauer, Finest Quotes: Marihuana Quotes - Matt Lauer, online: 
<http://www.finestquotes.com/select_quote-category-Marihuana-page-
0.htm#ixzz1y9j1g5FL>. 
2 The historical accounts of cannabis are fascinating and detailed but beyond the scope of 
this paper. For a comprehensive account of marihuana’s ancient history see Chris 
Bennett, “Early/Ancient History” 17 at 17 [Bennett] in Julie Holland, ed, The Pot Book: 
A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park Street Press, 2010) [Holland].  In Canada, 
cannabis (marihuana or marihuana) was declared illegal in 1923 pursuant to The Opium 
and Narcotic Drug Act, 1923, SC 1923, c 22. 
3 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19 at ss 4-7 and Schedule II [CDSA]. 
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
5 Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001-227 [MMAR]. 
6 See R v Parker, [2000] OJ No 2787 at 26 [Parker]. The decision was based on the 
common law defence of necessity found in Perka v The Queen (1994), 14 CCC (3d) 385. 
	   	  
	  
2	  
inappropriate or are not providing adequate relief.”7 After the MMAR were enacted, 
problems gaining access to the program and an inadequate legal supply of marihuana led 
to a series of constitutional challenges and regulatory amendments. In 2011, the Ontario 
Superior Court struck down the MMAR for being unconstitutional.8  
Currently, Parliament is considering substantive changes to bring the MMAR in line with 
the Charter. Public consultations occurred between June and November 2011 and the 
results have now been published.9  Based on this information, Parliament will publish 
new MMAR in the Canada Gazette in late 2012 for further input.10  
In this paper, I take up the challenge of developing constitutionally permissible 
regulations governing medical access to marihuana. The term marihuana is derived from 
Mexican slang and refers to the dried flowers (buds) of the plant genus cannabis.11 
Although cannabis plants may be cultivated for food, fiber, fuel, medicine and shelter, the 
dominant purpose for cannabis cultivation in North America is for its psychoactive 
properties.12 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three major parts. Part One summarizes the 
available research on cannabis to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis. Part Two reviews 
the development of the relevant constitutional principles and traces the chronology of 
challenges and the ensuing amendments to the MMAR. Part Three applies the medical 
evidence and Charter analysis to the MMAR. Canada is uniquely positioned to lead the 
world in providing an evidence-based medical marihuana access program. Based on my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Health Canada, “Drugs and Health Products: Fact Sheet – Medical Access to 
Marihuana” (08 February 2008), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
mps/marihuana/law-loi/fact_sheet-infofiche-eng.php> [Medical Access]. 
8 R v Mernagh, 2011 ONSC 2121 [Mernagh]. 
9 Health Canada, “Drugs and Health Products, Medical Marihuana Regulatory Reform 
2011: Consultations Results” (30 May 2012), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/consultation/marihuana/_2011/program/consult_reform-eng.php> 
[Consultation Results]. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Lyle E Craker & Zoe Gardner, “The Botany of Cannabis” 35 at 35 in Bennett, supra 
note 2. 
12 Ibid. 
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research and analysis, I suggest an optimal medical marihuana access program that 
balances individual rights with those of broader society.  
The primary sources of data for this project include: scientific monographs and articles, 
Canadian and international news articles, legislation, jurisprudence, and publicly 
available official literature.  
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PART ONE: THE PLANT-BRAIN CONNECTION 
Part One is divided into four major subsections. The first subsection deals with the 
evidence on the risks and medicinal benefits of cannabis.13 The second subsection deals 
with cannabis and chemistry, to explain how and why cannabis exerts its effects. In the 
third and fourth subsections I review the scientific literature on the risks and medicinal 
benefits of cannabis. I discuss areas for future development before drawing conclusions 
on the medical evidence.  
I: The Evidentiary Basis 
There are various sources of evidence on the risks and benefits of marihuana use. The 
primary sources of information are the human experience and empirical studies, where 
controlled variables are scientifically manipulated to produce replicable results.  
The available anecdotal evidence suggests that many people using marihuana experience 
significant relief from serious symptoms, with little report of adverse physical, mental or 
moral consequences in adult users.14 An anecdotal account of marihuana’s effects 
recently appeared in the New York Times.15 
Gustin Reichbach is a sitting judge of the State Supreme Court in Brooklyn. He uses 
marihuana (illegally) to treat Stage 3 pancreatic cancer. In an op-ed piece, he shared the 
pain of enduring “months of chemotherapy, radiation hell and brutal surgery.” After a 
relapse, his treatment got worse: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Cannabis is the scientific name for the plant and a more accurate term in the medical 
context. I use the term and spelling of marihuana in many parts of the paper to mirror 
Canada’s legislative provisions. 
14 The Indian Hemp Drugs Report (1893-1894), reprint (Maryland: Jefferson Press, 
1969), online: <http://digital.nls.uk/indiapapers/browse/pageturner.cfm?id=74908458 >. 
15 Gustin Reichbach, “A Judge’s Plea for Pot”, The New York Times  (17 May 2012) A27, 
online: NY Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/opinion/a-judges-plea-for-
medical-marihuana.html> [Reichbach]. 
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Every other week, after receiving an IV booster of chemotherapy drugs that 
takes three hours, I wear a pump that slowly injects more of the drugs over 
the next 48 hours.  
Nausea and pain are constant companions. One struggles to eat enough to 
stave off the dramatic weight loss that is part of this disease. Eating, one of 
the great pleasures of life, has now become a daily battle, with each forkful 
a small victory. Every drug prescribed to treat one problem leads to one or 
two more drugs to offset its side effects. Pain medication leads to loss of 
appetite and constipation. Anti-nausea medication raises glucose levels, a 
serious problem for me with my pancreas so compromised. Sleep, which 
might bring respite from the miseries of the day, becomes increasingly 
elusive.  
Inhaled marihuana is the only medicine that gives me some relief from 
nausea, stimulates my appetite, and makes it easier to fall asleep. The oral 
synthetic substitute, Marinol, prescribed by my doctors, was useless. Rather 
than watch the agony of my suffering, friends have chosen, at some 
personal risk, to provide the substance. I find a few puffs of marihuana 
before dinner gives me ammunition in the battle to eat. A few more puffs at 
bedtime permits desperately needed sleep. 
Canadian courts have accepted and relied on this type of anecdotal evidence when 
adjudicating Charter challenges to the prohibition on marihuana contained in the CDSA.  
…[T]he courts, relying on evidence of individuals’ personal experiences 
and anecdotal evidence have determined that some seriously ill persons 
derive substantial medical benefit from the use of marihuana. The 
pronouncements in these cases reflect the normal process of judicial fact-
finding made in the context of an adjudicative process based on the 
evidence and arguments led by the parties in a given case. These factual 
findings have in turn provided the basis for the legal conclusion that s. 7 of 
the Charter requires that a medical exemption be carved out of any criminal 
prohibition against the possession of marihuana.16 
Although the human experience is essential to understanding some of the effects of 
marihuana, unscientific studies make it difficult to control potential bias, confounding 
factors or interactions with tobacco, alcohol or other drugs. Although there are also 
methodological limitations of empirical evidence,17 it is more reliable.18 Double-blind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hitzig v Canada, [2003] OJ No 3873 at 9 [Hitzig ONCA]. 
17 Lester Grinspoon & James Bakalar, Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine (United 
States: Yale University, 1997) at 226 [Grinspoon & Bakalar].  Previous cannabis 
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randomized control trials (RCTs) are the most reliable way of determining predictable 
effects that can be generalized.19 However, these studies are expensive and it can be 
difficult to gain legal access to cannabis even for research purposes.20 
Although scientists understand the biological mechanism that precipitates marihuana’s 
effects, the research evidence leaves much to be desired. To date, no prospective 
epidemiological studies examining the long-term effects of marihuana consumption have 
been undertaken.21 This lack of empirical evidence can neither support nor refute the use 
of cannabis for medicinal use. Additionally, research on marihuana’s effects for 
recreational use is limited in its application to medical users.  
The conclusions must be treated with caution because it is not clear whether 
the use of medical cannabis has similar safety concerns as recreational use. 
The quality and amounts used are different. The existence of co-morbidities 
is different in the two populations. Moreover, medical cannabis users have 
entirely different expectations regarding the adverse events from those of 
recreational users, meaning that one must use caution when assuming that 
adverse effects of recreational cannabis will be relevant for medical use.22 
When developing policy and law, one must look to both the individual experience and 
empirical evidence. These two sources are complementary. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
areas of research based on individual experience and scientific inquiry attempts to 
provide an explanation for that experience by systematically manipulating dependent and 
independent variables to determine a causal or correlational link between them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exposure, potential confounding factors and the choice of control groups make it more 
difficult to parse the effects attributable to cannabis. 
18 Tongtong Wang, Methodological issues in the assessment of the safety of medical 
cannabis (DPhil Thesis, McGill University Faculty of Medicine, 2009) [unpublished] at 4 
[Wang]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See generally Sharon Kirkey, “Doctors refuse to authorize pot use, leaving patients in 
pain”, Postmedia News (30 October 2011) online: 
<http://www.canada.com/health/Doctors+refuse+authorize+leaving+patients+pain/56304
88/story.html>. 
21 Wang, supra note 18 at 4. 
22 Ibid at 64. 
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This paper emphasizes “evidence-based medicine derived from knowledge and 
experience informed by rigorous scientific analysis, as opposed to belief-based medicine, 
which is derived from judgment, intuition, and beliefs untested by rigorous science.”23 It 
is necessary to first understand how and why cannabis has its effects before considering 
the law. The empirical evidence will provide a foundation for understanding the risks and 
medicinal benefits of marihuana and in what circumstances a criminal prohibition on this 
plant-drug will violate the Charter. 
II: Cannabis & Chemistry 
Our understanding of how cannabis affects the brain is relatively new and premised on an 
ever-increasing understanding of neurology. A basic knowledge of how marihuana works 
is important to understand its therapeutic potential and to ascertain whether it can be 
considered a necessary medicine for the purposes of section 7 of the Charter, which 
guarantees all Canadians the right not to be deprived of their life, liberty or security of the 
person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Security of the 
person has been violated when the government imposes significant barriers to access a 
necessary medicine. The analysis depends on the facts of each case. The duration and 
intensity of the Charter violation also factor into the analysis. The principles of 
fundamental justice are rapidly evolving, with legal analysis becoming increasingly 
evidence-based. Whether the violation accords with the principles of fundamental justice 
is a legal question. Whether cannabis has therapeutic properties is a scientific one. The 
answer begins in the brain.  
Within the central nervous system there are more than 100 billion neurons.24 Each of 
these neurons contains receptors responsible for sending and receiving information, 
resulting in physical and sometimes psychological change in the individual whose brain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Janet Joy, Stanley Watson Jr and John Benson Jr, eds, Marihuana and Medicine: 
Assessing the Science Base (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999) at 12 [Joy, 
Watson & Benson]. 
24 Arthur C Guyton & John E Hall, Textbook of Medical Physiology, 11th ed 
(Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier Inc, 2006) at 555 [Guyton & Hall]. 
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is affected.25 “Neurons in the brain are activated when a chemical binds to its receptor. 
Employing the most common analogy used by neurologists to explain neurological 
functioning, consider the chemical as a ‘key’ and the receptor as a ‘lock.’”26  
 Neurons send and receive electrical signals in a networked fashion. 27 Neurons are living, 
growing cells but unlike electrical circuits they are not fixed. Almost every neuron is 
constantly changing its function by adapting to bodily demands, sensations and 
environmental influences.28 Neurons act as regulators, releasing or inhibiting the 
production of neurotransmitters that cause various experienced effects. Receptor cells 
form part of a neuronal network. When a cell in a network is activated by its chemical 
key, it responds by doing a variety of things: sending a chemical signal to other cells, 
switching a gene on or off, or becoming more or less active. 29 Different neurons contain 
different numbers of connections to other neurons; some have as few as one hundred 
connections, whereas others contain upwards of 200,000 incoming connections.30 
One principle of neurology is that if a synthetic drug stimulates brain receptors, then the 
brain likely produces a similar chemical that stimulates the same receptors by producing 
similar effects.31 In the lock and key analogy, cannabinoid receptors are the lock and 
cannabinoids are the key. 
Although two cannabinoids, cannabinol (CBN) and cannabidiol (CBD) were isolated and 
identified in 1895 and 1934 respectively, it was not until 1964 when the primary 
psychoactive ingredient, delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC or THC) was isolated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 
26 Matt Stolick, Otherwise Law-Abiding Citizens: A Moral and Scientific Assessment of 
Cannabis Use (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2009) at 8 [Stolick]. 
27 Paul Gahlinger, Illegal Drugs: A Complete Guide to Their History, Chemistry, Use, 
and Abuse (New York: Plume, 2004) at 134 [Gahlinger]. 
28 Ibid at 137. 
29 Glen Hanson, Peter J Venturelli & Annette Fleckenstein, Drugs and Society, 7th ed 
(Boston: Jones and Bartlett Pub, 2002) at 118 [Hanson]. 
30 Guyton & Hall, supra note 37 at 555. 
31 Stolick, supra note 39 at 8. 
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and synthesized.32 Mapping the chemical structure of THC led to the discovery of the 
endogenous mammalian cannabinoid receptor system in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when Allan Howlett discovered two receptors for THC, named CB1 and CB2.  
The cannabinoid receptors Howlett found showed up in vast numbers all 
over the brain (as well as in the immune and reproductive systems)… They 
were clustered in regions responsible for the mental processes that 
marihuana is known to alter: the cerebral cortex (the locus of higher-order 
thought), the hippocampus (memory), the basal ganglia (movement), and 
the amygdala (emotions). Curiously, the one neurological place where 
cannabinoid receptors didn’t show up was in the brain stem, which regulates 
involuntary functions such as circulation and respiration. This might explain 
the remarkably low toxicity of cannabis and the fact that no one is known to 
have ever died from an overdose.33 
The CB receptors are activated by the brain’s naturally occurring cannabinoids.34 
Cannabinoids produced by the body are called endogenous cannabinoids or 
“endocannabinoids.” Sometimes referred to as the “brain’s own marihuana,” 35 
researchers have discovered two endocannabinoids, named arachidonyl glycerol (2-AG) 
and anadamide.36 The word “anadamide” comes from the Sanskrit word meaning 
“bliss.”37 For 500 million years, all vertebrate species have been utilizing 
endocannabinoids using a complex signaling system in various regions of the brain.38  
The endocannabinoid system appears to have a large role in pain modulation, appetite 
and movement control.39 The endogenous cannabinoid system also “appears to help 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See P Robson, “Therapeutic Aspects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids” (2001) 178 
British Journal of Psychiatry 107. 
33 Michael Pollen, The Botany of Desire: A Plant’s-Eye View of the World (New York: 
Random House, 2001) at 153. 
34 Wang, supra note 18 at 9. 
35 Roger Nicoll & Bradley Alger, “The Brain’s Own Marihuana”, Scientific Am (22 
November 2004) at 68, 73 [Nicoll & Alger]. See generally Ruth Stern & Herbie DiFonzo, 
“The End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marihuana in the New Century” (2009) 
27(4) Quinnipiac L Rev 673 at 695 [Stern & DiFonzo]. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Joy, Watson & Benson, supra note 23 at 28-34. 
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maintain homeostasis within the central nervous system.”40 Scientists have hypothesized 
that the release of endocannabinoids might constitute a protective response during injury 
to neurons.41 Endocannabinoid levels increase in response to skeletal muscle spasm, 
spasticity, and in response to inflammatory pain.42  The release of endocannabinoids 
apparently eases these symptoms.43 Endocannabinoids may also help to moderate phobias 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by “extinguishing the bad feelings and pain 
triggered by reminders of past experiences.”44  
In contrast to endocannabinoids, which are produced by the body, exogenous 
cannabinoids come from outside the body, either from the cannabis plant or from 
synthetic derivatives. When introduced into the body, exogenous cannabinoids bind to 
the receptors in the brain and mimic the properties and activities of the brain’s 
endocannabinoids.45  
Cannabinoid receptors are among the most ubiquitous neurotransmitter elements in the 
mammalian brain.46 They are present in almost every region and exist in many different 
types of neurons.47 Neurons are the fundamental functional units of nerve tissue. The 
diverse effects of marihuana are explained by the wide distribution of CB1 and CB2 
receptors in the body, with dense concentrations of cannabinoid receptors in certain areas 
of the brain.  
The CB1 receptors are found primarily in the cerebral cortex (psychoactive effects), the 
hippocampus (memory formation), the hypothalamus (appetite), the amygdala (emotional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 RG Pertwee, “Ligands that target cannabinoid receptors in the brain: from THC to 
anadamide and beyond” (2008) 13(2) Addict Biol 147, online: 
<www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18482430> [Pertwee]. 
41 Diego Centonze et al, The Endocannabinoid System in Targeting Inflammatory 
Neurodegenerative Diseases, (2007) 28 Trends Pharmacological Sci 180 at 182. 
42 Pertwee, supra note 40 at 14. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Stern and DiFonzo, supra note 35 at 696. 
45 Ibid at 695.  
46 Allyn C Howlett et al, Cannabinoid Physiology and Pharmacology: 30 Years of 
Progress, 47 Neuropharmacology 345 at 350 [Howlett]. 
47 Ibid. 
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responses), and the basal ganglia (movement control centres).48 The CB2 receptors have 
been found in the pancreas, thymus, tonsils, bone marrow, and spleen, which are the 
major tissues of immune cell production and regulation.49 Additional receptor sites are 
located in the spinal cord, digestive, reproductive, ocular and cardiovascular systems.50 
The mild euphoria, sleepiness, cognitive dysfunction, short-term memory loss, changes in 
perception and time measurement, motor incoordination, and food cravings are associated 
with areas of the brain that have high densities of CB receptors.51 
Cannabinoids are the precursors to chemical action in the brain.52 Different 
neurotransmitters and neurological reactions are apparent by looking at the effects these 
chemicals have on the brain.53 About 60 of the 483 chemical compounds in the cannabis 
plant are cannabinoids.54 The cannabinoid receptors in the brain mediate the effects of 
cannabis.55  THC is the only cannabinoid that produces any significant psychoactive 
effects.56  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Nicoll & Alger, supra note 35 at 71-72. 
49 Howlett et al, supra note 46 at 349.  See also Croxford, J Ludovic and Takashi 
Yamamura, “Cannabinoids and the Immune System: Potential for the Treatment of 
Inflammatory Disease?” (September 2005) 166 J Neuroimmunology 3 at 5. 
50 M Llanos Cassanova et al, “Inhibition of Skin Tumor Growth and Angiogenesis in 
vivo by Activation of Cannabinoid Receptors” (2003) 111 J Clinical Investigation 43 at 
43. 
51 Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 35 at 695. 
52 Joy, Watson & Benson, supra note 23 at 25. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Mahmoud A ElSohly, “Chemical Constituents of Cannabis” [ElSohly] at 28. In 
Cannabis and Cannabinoids: Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential, 
Franjo Grotenhermen and Ethan Russo (eds), (New York: The Haworth Integrative 
Healing Press, 2002). 
55 John McPartland & Ethan Russo, “Cannabis & Cannabis Extracts: Greater than the 
Sum of their Parts” (2002) 1 Journal of Cannabis Therapeutics 103 at 107 [McPartland 
& Russo]. 
56 Ibid. 
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The effects of cannabis are qualitatively similar regardless of whether it is inhaled or 
taken orally, but there are some differences in the onset and offset of the effects.57 
Because the lungs have a large surface area and many blood vessels 
leading directly to the brain, the onset of psychoactive effects produced are 
rapid, occurring within seconds. Due to this rapid onset, experienced 
smokers can easily titrate their dose to achieve the desired subjective 
effects… Typically, the effects following smoked administration are 
relatively short-lived, lasting no longer than one to two hours. By contrast, 
marijuana (or delta-9-THC) taken by mouth produces a slower onset of 
effects. After oral ingestion, the drug must move from the stomach to the 
small intestine, where it is absorbed into the bloodstream. Before reaching 
the bloodstream, however, some of the drug is metabolized (or broken 
down) by the liver. Once in the bloodstream, the drug moves to the heart 
and then to the brain. Because the drug does not travel directly to the brain 
following oral ingestion, the onset of psychoactive effects is delayed. Peak 
psychoactive effects (or subjective effects) following oral administration 
usually occur one-and-a-half hours after ingestion.58 
Current scientific understanding of cannabis has come a long way. Scientists are now 
able to assess the potential impact of cannabis use on various regions of the brain and 
body. It is clear from observational and anecdotal evidence that cannabis does have 
predictable effects. Identifying and locating the CB receptors allows researchers to 
understand how cannabis affects certain areas of the brain. 
Considering the relatively recent discovery of the CB receptors, and the difficulties 
gaining legal access to a controlled supply of marihuana, some researchers have 
published a considerable amount of scientific research on many aspects of cannabis, 
particularly THC. There is much less research on the other chemical compounds in the 
plant.  
There is a threshold that must be met in order to qualify for constitutional protection. Not 
all therapeutic benefits will be constitutionally protected. For instance, a person’s right to 
security of the person will not be violated if the prohibited treatment is only somewhat 
beneficial and there are better options available. Thus, in order to constitute an acceptable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Matthew G Kirkpatrick & Carl L Hart, “The Subjective Effects of Cannabis” 9 in 
Holland, supra note 2 at 13 [Kirkpatrick & Hart]. 
58 Ibid at 12-13. 
	   	  
	  
13	  
medical treatment, marihuana’s potential benefits as a medicine must outweigh its 
potential harms and it must provide a level of relief for a serious ailment that meets the 
standards for Charter protection.  
A neurological understanding of marihuana’s effects provides a solid foundation for 
scientific research that produces generalizable results. Below, I look at the research 
evidence of the risks and harms. Significant harms caused by a medical treatment 
undermine its therapeutic benefits.  
III: Harms 
This subsection examines the scientific evidence on the harms associated with the 
medicinal use of cannabis. Acute physiological and psychological harms are considered 
first, followed by the evidence of chronic harms. I review the evidence on tolerance, 
dependence and addiction before moving on to address cannabis use by specific 
vulnerable groups. The available research is often conflicting, reflecting the deep 
divisions in attitudes toward this plant-drug. 
One author remarked, “after being expelled from pharmacopoeiae, ignored by science 
and industry, and scapegoated by government and the establishment for so long, 
cannabis’ smooth re-entry into medical practice has proven impossible.”59 Others have 
claimed that, “The most contentious aspect of the medical marihuana debate is not 
whether marihuana can alleviate particular symptoms but rather the degree of harm 
associated with its use.”60 Physicians abide by the rule Primum Non Nocere, which 
means first, do no harm.  
The relative harms and benefits are particularly relevant in the Charter context. Laws 
limiting access to medical treatments that provide significant benefits and moderate risks 
are more likely to violate the Charter. Government-imposed barriers to accessing a 
medicine with significant benefits is a more severe infringement of security of the person, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Robin Steen, Marihuana as Scapegoat, Cannabis as Medicine: A Cognitive-Rhetorical 
Analysis of a Canadian Drug-Policy Problem (MA Thesis, University of British 
Columbia, 2010) [unpublished] at 4 [Steen]. 
60 Joy, Watson & Benson, supra note 23 at 56. 
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which encompasses an individual’s physical and psychological integrity. There must be a 
very close connection between the measures and the objectives.61 In contrast, greater 
harm will justify more restrictive government limits on accessing this medicine. I turn 
first to consider the potential acute harms.  
IV: Acute Harms 
The term “acute harms” refers to the negative consequences of short-term use. The acute 
physiological and psychological harms are dealt with below.  
Physiological 
THC has effects on the cardiovascular system, which includes the heart (cardiac system) 
and the blood vessels (vascular system). When people use cannabis it causes an elevation 
in their blood pressure and can cause orthostatic hypotension (head rush or dizziness) 
when standing up.62 This can have effects on many organs in the body including the 
heart, brain and kidney.63 In humans, cannabis causes enlarged-blood vessels 
(vasodilation) and an increase in heart rate related to the amount of THC consumed.64 
The risks of smoking are elevated for individuals with high blood pressure, heart disease, 
or those who have hardening of the arteries.65  
The acute toxicity of THC is low. Death due to cannabis toxicity has not been observed. 
In a rat study involving high doses of THC, the overall survival rate in the THC group 
was 70% compared to 45% in the untreated controls.66 The decreased mortality in the 
THC group was attributed to the lower incidence of cancer.67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Chaoulli v Québec (AG), 2005 SCC 35 at 40 [Chaoulli]. 
62 William Holubek, “Medical Risks and Toxicology” 141 at 146 in Holland, supra note 
2 [Holubek]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hanson et al, supra note 29 at 385. 
65 M Herkenham et al, “The cannabinoid receptor: biochemical, anatomical and 
behavioural characterization” (1990) 13 Trends Neurosci 420. 
66 PC Chan et al, “Toxicity and carcinogenicity of delta 9-tetracannabinol in Fischer rats 
and B6C3F1 mice. (1996) 30(1) Fundamental and Applied Toxicology 109 at 109-117. 
67 Ibid. 
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Psychological 
Some individuals report acute adverse effects on their mood including panic attacks or 
waves of paranoia. 68 These changes in mood are generally short-lived and most 
individuals can be talked through the experience.69 Of greater concern is the negative 
effect on cognitive performance in a variety of domains, including psychomotor control, 
attention and executive function.70 Memory performance is consistently found to be 
compromised following cannabis consumption.71 Impairment may continue even after 
discontinuing use for 24 hours.72 These findings are most evident in infrequent smokers 
and typically more limited in frequent users, perhaps due to developed tolerance and 
compensatory behaviour.73 
The physiological and psychological harms from short-term cannabis use are generally 
mild and appear to relate mostly to altered cognition and perception from the 
psychoactive chemical, THC. THC impairs perception, psychomotor performance, and 
cognitive and affective functions, which may contribute to a driver’s increased risk of 
causing a traffic accident or fatality.74 The consequences when individuals decide to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Oakley Ray & Charles Ksir, Drugs, Society, & Human Behavior, 7th ed (Toronto: 
Mosby, 1995) at 417 [Ray & Ksir].  See also Franjo Grotenhermen, “The Toxicology of 
Cannabis and Cannabis Prohibition” (2007) 4 Chem Biodiv 1744 at 1746 [Grotenhermen 
“Toxicology”]. 
69 Ray & Ksir, supra note 68 at 417. 
70 See e.g. Caroline Marvin & Carl Hart, “Cannabis and Cognition” in Holland, supra 
note 2 at 161. 
71 See generally EL Abel, “Retrieval of Information after Use of Marihuana” (1971) 231 
Nature 58. 
72 Hanson et al, supra note 29 at 378. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Grotenherman “Toxicology”, supra note 68 at 1750 (It is estimated that acute cannabis 
use doubles the risk of causing an accident, while regular users who are not acutely 
intoxicated seem to have no increased risk, the combined use of cannabis and alcohol or 
other drugs may increase accident risk considerably. However, chronic cannabis use (in 
the absence of acute administration) did not per se potentiate the effects of alcohol. In 
fact, regular cannabis users showed lower scores for dizziness and a superior tracking 
accuracy compared to infrequent users after alcohol.) 
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undertake divided attention tasks such as driving can be very serious. Impaired driving 
appears to be the biggest acute risk. 
In a 2003 report commissioned by Transport Canada entitled, “Impacts of Cannabis on 
Driving: An Analysis of Current Evidence With an Emphasis on Canadian Data” the 
authors conclude that: 
First, it appears clear that, in a laboratory situation, cannabis impairs the 
skills thought to be necessary for safe driving. This impairment is not 
restricted to high levels of the drug, and occurs at the dosage levels that 
result from typical use of the drug. Tolerance may occur with continued use, 
but even individuals who have acquired tolerance to some of the effects of 
cannabis may demonstrate impairment on task performance. Combining 
alcohol with cannabis will result in an increase in the effects of cannabis, 
and the interaction could be multiplicative.75 
After alcohol, cannabis is the drug most often found in dead and injured 
drivers. In Canadian samples, cannabis has been found in 10.9% to 19.5% 
of dead drivers, and one study found that 13.9% of crashed drivers admitted 
to a trauma unit were positive for cannabis. However, this evidence does not 
necessarily mean that cannabis was a causative factor in those collisions. 
For example, a general population sample may reveal similar proportions 
testing positive for cannabis.76 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Robert E Mann et al, “Impacts of cannabis on driving: An analysis of current evidence 
with an emphasis on Canadian data” (May 2003) Road Safety and Motor Vehicle 
Regulation Directorate Transport Canada at 61 [Mann et al]. 
76 Ibid.  Epidemiological studies employing control groups are necessary to identify more 
precisely the contribution of the drug to collision causation. Case-control studies, in 
which samples of injured or killed drivers are compared to control samples, do not yet 
provide conclusive evidence that cannabis contributes to collision risk. This is primarily 
because of the difficulties involved in obtaining an appropriate control group for these 
studies. While the small numbers of existing studies provide some indications of 
increased risk, methodological concerns preclude firm conclusions. Studies employing 
clinical samples provide an additional means for assessing collision risk among cannabis 
users, and some indications of increase in risk are appearing in these studies as well. 
Again, though, increased collision risk in these studies may be due to factors other than 
the effects of cannabis. 
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The number of Canadians who admitted to past year cannabis use in 2004 was 14.1%.77 
In 2010, it was 10.7%.78 The general consensus is that cannabis-impaired driving can 
cause serious negative consequences not only to the individual but unnecessarily puts 
others at risk.79 
The acute effects of cannabis can be unpleasant or disconcerting for some but are 
generally short-lived. Combining cannabis with alcohol, other drugs and driving elevates 
the risks. While the acute effects are an area of some concern, the effects of chronic use 
are a far greater health issue in Canada and worldwide. 
V: Chronic Harms 
The term “chronic harms” refers to the negative physiological and psychological effects 
of long-term cannabis use. Below is a summary of the evidence on the chronic harms of 
cannabis use.  
This evidence is pertinent in both the medical and legal context. Significant risks 
associated with long-term use would undermine marihuana’s value as a medicine and 
impact the court’s assessment of the appropriateness of restrictive laws. However, these 
long-term risks are not relevant to individuals with terminal illnesses or to individuals 
who are suffering from life-threatening seizures or similar conditions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Health Canada, “Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey: Summary of 
Results for 2010” (18 July 2011), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/drugs-
drogues/stat/_2010/summary-sommaire-eng.php> [CADUMS]. 
78 Ibid.  
79 See Mann et al, supra note 75.  Contradictory evidence based on US data concluded, 
“legalization [of cannabis] is associated with a nearly 9% decrease in traffic fatalities, 
most likely to due to its impact on alcohol consumption.”  D Mark Anderson & Daniel I 
Rees, “Medical Marihuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and Alcohol Consumption” Montana 
State University, University of Colorado Denver and IZA. Discussion Paper No 6112 
November 2011. 
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Cardiovascular Harms 
The composition of the combustion products in cannabis is at least qualitatively similar to 
that of tobacco smoke or that of the smoke generated from other dried plant material.80 It 
would make sense to expect similar damage from cannabis smoke as that of tobacco. 
Indeed, signs of airway inflammation were found in bronchial biopsies of cannabis 
smokers.81 Regular cannabis smoking in young adults was associated with wheezing, 
shortness of breath during exercise, and the production of mucus, known as sputum.82 
Another group found that heavy cannabis smokers had a significantly higher prevalence 
of chronic cough, chronic sputum production, wheeze and episodes of acute bronchitis 
compared to those who did not smoke.83 The prevalence of symptoms of chronic and 
acute bronchitis was not significantly different between cannabis and tobacco smokers.84 
There is a significant amount of tar in cannabis smoke, up to 50% more than an equal 
weight of tobacco.85 Smoking unfiltered cannabis cigarettes (“joints”) and holding the 
smoke in the lungs for longer periods of time increases the accumulation of tar.86 The 
carcinogen Benzopyrene is 70% more abundant in marihuana smoke than in tobacco 
smoke.87 Chronic cannabis users have a higher incidence of respiratory problems such as 
laryngitis, pharyngitis, bronchitis, asthma-like conditions, cough, hoarseness, and dry 
throat compared to non-smokers.88 
Biopsies from cannabis smokers have also yielded a higher rate of precancerous 
pathological changes compared to non-smokers, which is suggestive of an increased 
cancer risk of the respiratory tract and other cancers.89 It may take longer to see an effect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Grotenhermen “Toxicology”, supra note 68 at 1753. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Hanson et al, supra note 29 at 385. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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because heavy cannabis smokers do not smoke as much as heavy tobacco smokers. It is 
difficult to ascertain the number of individuals who consume cannabis and the amount 
they smoke because many people are reluctant to disclose their use of an illegal 
substance. 
So far, the epidemiological data is inconclusive. A review of two cohort studies and 14 
case-control studies by the International Agency for Research on Cancer did not find a 
clear association between cannabis use and cancer.90 Authors noted that sufficient studies 
are not available to adequately evaluate the impact of cannabis smoking on cancer risk, 
and available studies often have limitations including too few heavy cannabis users in the 
study samples. The causal relationship that has been demonstrated between cigarette 
smoking and cancer has not been reliably demonstrated for individuals who smoke 
cannabis only, though it may be due to a lack of data.91 
The largest epidemiological study conducted so far, with 1,212 cancer cases and 1,040 
cancer-free controls did not find a positive association between cannabis smoking and the 
investigated cancer types (mouth, larynx, lung, pharynx).92 There was no dose–effect 
relationship, and even heavy use was not associated with an increased risk.93 As time 
goes on, the long-term consequences will become evident. The cannabis smoking 
lifestyle only became popular in the 1960s.94 An individual who started smoking at age 
15 in the year 1960 would be 67 now. One would expect more conclusive evidence about 
the long-term effects of smoked cannabis to emerge shortly as more heavy cannabis users 
age. 
Smoked marihuana is “a crude cannabinoid delivery system.”95 Smoking delivers 
therapeutic cannabinoids to the body but also harmful by-products. Although cannabis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid. 
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can be consumed using a broad range of non-smoked methods, it would be wise to 
conduct clinical trials to continue developing rapid-onset, reliable, and safe cannabinoid 
delivery systems.96 
Currently, there is virtually no data on the long-term health consequences of providing 
marihuana for medicinal purposes.  
Cognitive Harm 
Cognitive damage is cause for concern in chronic users. The hippocampus is one area of 
the brain thought to be responsible for learning, memory and stress.97 CB receptors are 
densely concentrated in this area and it is no surprise that cannabinoid activity modulates 
a broad range of behaviours relevant to cognition. Despite intense research attention, 
there is limited consensus regarding cannabis’ effects on cognition.98 
The results of long-term cannabis use on cognition are nuanced and often inconsistent. In 
general, prolonged daily or near-daily use of cannabis places individuals at the greatest 
risk for adverse physiological and psychological consequences.99 The most consistent 
effects relate to impairments in learning, memory, attention and executive function, as 
well as increased risk of psychiatric symptoms.100 However, there is no evidence from 
human studies of any structural brain damage following prolonged exposure to 
cannabinoids.101  
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Tolerance, Dependence & Abuse 
Tolerance to marihuana’s effects, dependence on its use, and abuse of this drug are cause 
for concern.  
Tolerance refers to the phenomenon where, following repeated exposures to a drug over 
time, larger doses of the drug are required to achieve a desired effect, or the same amount 
of a drug has less of an effect than it once had. The term “substance abuse” is defined as 
“a maladaptive pattern of repeated substance use manifested by recurrent and significant 
adverse consequences.”102  Substance abuse and dependence are both diagnoses of 
pathological substance use.103 Dependence is the more serious diagnosis because it 
implies compulsive drug use that is difficult to stop despite significant substance-related 
problems.104 If users have to consume larger amounts of cannabis to get the desired effect 
or are unable to discontinue use, the inherent harms will increase over time.  
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Controlled experiments have reliably shown that tolerance to the behavioural, subjective 
and physiological effects of both marihuana and isolated THC develops following 
repeated exposure.105 Research suggests that tolerance to different effects of cannabinoids 
develops at different rates.106 
Research on cannabis withdrawal in the 1970s showed mixed results but more recent 
research has demonstrated a valid and reliable withdrawal syndrome for some people 
when regular cannabis use is abruptly stopped.107 Frequent high doses of THC can 
produce mild physical dependence.108 The intensity of withdrawal symptoms is compared 
to caffeine, with a psychological dependence similar to the hallucinogens.109  
In one study, healthy subjects who smoked several joints a day (or were given 
comparable amounts of THC orally) and abruptly discontinued use reported experiencing 
irritability, sleep disturbances, loss of appetite, weight loss, sweating, and gastrointestinal 
upsets.110 Most cannabis withdrawal symptoms occur within the first twenty-four hours 
of quitting, are most severe two to four days later, and last approximately one to two 
weeks.111 
A large national Australian study concluded that approximately 30% of current 
marihuana users reported experiencing withdrawal symptoms when they stop using.112  
Among daily users and those who sought treatment, a majority experienced 
withdrawal.113 Most reported that the experience of withdrawal directly resulted in at 
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least one failed attempt to quit.114 Existing data suggests that approximately one out of 
eleven people (9%) who try cannabis will meet the criteria for addiction at some point in 
their lives. This is lower than tobacco (32%), heroin (23%), cocaine (17%) and alcohol 
(15%), but it is not insignificant.115 
Although some studies have identified an “amotivational” syndrome, others have found 
the evidence is unconvincing.116 Research suggests that the “constellation of behaviours” 
including apathy, poor short-term memory, difficulty in concentration, and a lingering 
disinterest in maintaining personal appearance or pursuing goals may be the result of 
chronic cannabis intoxication.117 De-intoxication appears to resolve these symptoms.118  
There has been some concern expressed that marihuana use leads to the use of more 
harmful drugs. As one author noted, “There are strikingly regular patterns in the 
progression of drug use from adolescence to adulthood.”119 Unsurprisingly, most people 
who use “hard” drugs like cocaine and heroin have also used tobacco, alcohol and 
cannabis.120 The “stepping stone theory” has largely been abandoned in the scientific 
literature in favour of the theory that suggests cannabis is a “gateway” to the world of 
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illegal drugs.121 There is some limited support in the research that individuals using 
cannabis, particularly youths, have greater opportunity to access other drugs.122  
There is a social concern that increased medical use may translate to increased use in the 
general population. Given the current and likely restrictions on accessing medical 
marihuana and the abundance of supply in the illicit market, the likelihood of significant 
diversion is limited. Moreover, “there is no evidence that the medical marihuana debate 
alters the perceived risks associated with marihuana use among adolescents.”123 
Some groups are more susceptible to the risks of cannabis than others. We now turn to a 
consideration of the special risks that attend cannabis use by some individuals. The 
vulnerable groups considered in the next subsection include special consideration of the 
increased apprehension of risks for men and women wishing to have children, individuals 
with a predisposition to psychosis, and young people. 
VI: Vulnerable Groups 
Certain groups of individuals are particularly susceptible to the harms of cannabis and 
should avoid it if safer alternatives exist. The evidence of potential risks for these 
individuals puts the overall net value into question. Without compelling evidence of a 
significant medical benefit to the individual it is highly unlikely that cannabis use for the 
following groups would be constitutionally protected.  
Reproductive Function 
In both men and women, the primary target of cannabinoid action is the brain where 
administered cannabinoids bind with cannabinoid receptors and affect the hormonal 
system. Cannabis use impacts the hormonal system before pregnancy, alters the course of 
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pregnancy, and has effects on neonatal growth, infant behaviour and on executive 
functioning after infancy.124  
Before a baby is conceived, marihuana use lowers testosterone levels in men.125 Heavy 
use can decrease a man’s sperm count.126 The results of well-controlled studies indicate 
that the stage of a woman’s menstrual cycle dictates her hormonal response to marihuana 
smoking.127 Short-term use of THC may cause “transient decreases” in hormonal levels, 
which could lead to shortened menstrual cycle length and an increased incidence of 
anovulatory (irregular) menstrual cycles for “drug-naïve” females.128  
Pregnant women especially should avoid using cannabis since THC crosses the placenta 
and enters the circulation of the developing fetus, reaching concentrations of about 10 - 
30% of maternal concentration.129 Most, though not all, studies suggest prenatal cannabis 
use is associated with a decrease in fetal weight, length and head circumference.130 Some 
research has reported an increased incidence of preterm labor with marihuana use, while 
others fail to show this association.131 
Since 1978, the Ottawa Prenatal Prospective Study (OPPS) has been monitoring the 
effects of marihuana and cigarettes inhaled during pregnancy.132 In this prospective, 
longitudinal study, researchers interviewed 682 women in the Ottawa area once during 
each trimester of pregnancy. The results showed a statistically significant reduction of 
about one week in the gestational age of infants born to mothers who used marihuana six 	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or more times per week.133 Fried et al. followed the development of approximately 180 of 
these offspring by subjecting them to a battery of age-appropriate tests in the years 
beyond the neonatal period. There appeared to be some evidence for cognitive and 
behavioural abnormalities in the offspring of those mothers who “abused” marihuana.134  
Prenatal marihuana exposure was negatively associated with the executive function tasks 
that required impulse control and visual analysis/hypothesis testing.135 This appears to 
parallel some of the evidence on the risks of tobacco smoking. However, in contrast to 
children exposed to cigarette smoking, prenatal marihuana exposure was not associated 
with decreases in global intelligence.136  
Considering that cannabis is the most commonly used drug of women of childbearing 
age, more research needs to be done.137 Nevertheless, the precautionary principle should 
apply. Those who are planning a family should abstain from using marihuana, even for 
medical purposes, unless there are no safer alternatives. Non-smoked methods and non-
psychoactive cannabinoids should be substituted for smoked marihuana whenever 
possible. 
Psychiatric Illness 
There is some evidence that links cannabis and psychiatric disorders such as depression, 
anxiety or psychosis though, like many of the studies on cannabis, this evidence is far 
from conclusive. In the 20th Century, studies showed that controlled administration of 
cannabis could lead not only to paranoia but to delusions and hallucinations as well.138 
Parts of the brain, including the limbic and prefrontal cortices, as well as the striatum 	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have a high density of CB receptors, co-localized with dopamine receptors. These parts 
of the brain, and the chemical dopamine, are known to be dysfunctional in people with 
schizophrenia.139 Indeed, many antipsychotics exert some of their beneficial effect by 
blocking dopamine receptors in these areas of the brain.140 The medical journal, Lancet 
published a systematic review in 2007 reporting a causal link between cannabis use and 
the risk of psychotic outcomes.141 This study found a causal link between early cannabis 
use and later onset of psychosis by comparing control groups in the military.142  
Critics have claimed that it is unclear which way the association goes. Individuals with 
disrupted thought patterns may be more likely to try cannabis. The properties of THC 
may lead to the earlier onset of a disease that was inevitable.143 Many research studies 
have found that the psychosis-producing effects of cannabis are restricted to a subset of 
individuals who are vulnerable, in terms of psychosis proneness or genetic 
vulnerability.144 Biological data has been marshaled against the theory that cannabis use 
leads to psychosis. As Weiser and colleagues point out, there may be similar factors 
leading to cannabis use and schizophrenia. Independent of cannabis use, there are more 
receptors for cannabinoids in the brains of patients with schizophrenia than in normal 
individuals.145 Since genes for these receptors are associated with schizophrenia risk, the 
authors suggest it is possible that abnormalities in the cannabinoid system in the brain 
could lead independently to both cannabis use and schizophrenia.146 
Although cannabis and specifically THC has been implicated in the development of 
psychosis, there are promising leads in using the cannabinoid CBD as an anti-psychotic 
medication. Unlike THC, CBD is a noneuphoriant, anti-inflammatory analgesic that does 
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not bind well to the CB receptors.147 Zuardi et al have proposed that the ratio of THC to 
CBD is crucial in determining the effects of cannabis on psychosis.148 In a review of 23 
studies of schizophrenics using cannabis, fourteen studies reported that cannabis users 
had better cognitive performance than nonusers. Eight reported no difference, and one 
study reported better cognitive performance in the schizophrenics who did not use 
cannabis.149  
Individuals with a genetic history of psychotic episodes should be cautioned about using 
cannabis as a medicine, especially cannabis with higher THC levels and lower CBD 
levels. If cannabis does speed up a psychosis prognosis, delaying its onset may allow 
time to consolidate and improve social and vocational functioning before becoming ill, 
benefitting the patient over the long-term.150 Since marihuana use is a choice, unlike 
genetics, it may be wiser to avoid the risk or at least minimize the risk by choosing a 
product lower in THC and higher in CBD. 
Young People 
The demographics of cannabis use indicate that recreational use of cannabis typically 
begins around age 15, whereas individuals who use it medicinally are typically older. 
Nevertheless, there are young people with serious and severe illnesses that may respond 
well to cannabinoid-based therapies. Extra caution must be exercised in this group 
because the brains of young people are still developing.  
The prefrontal cortex is a region of the brain that weighs outcomes, forms judgments, and 
controls impulses and emotions. Teenagers experience a wealth of growth in synapses 
during adolescence when the brain starts pruning away the unnecessary synapses to make 
the remaining ones more efficient. The pruning process appears to start in the back of the 
brain and move forward, so that the prefrontal cortex is the last to be trimmed. As the 	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connections are trimmed, an insulating substance called myelin coats the synapses to 
protect them.151  
As a result, the prefrontal cortex is immature in teenagers as compared to adults and may 
not fully develop until the mid-20s. Cannabis use at this time modifies the functioning of 
this area of the brain, altering its natural development.152 Teenaged cannabis use has been 
specifically linked to an adult diagnosis of schizophreniform disorder, but not 
depression.153 Except in severe cases, cannabis use by those under 25 should be avoided 
while the brain is maturing. Smoking should be avoided and non-psychoactive 
cannabinoid preparations should be used. 
Further Research 
Marihuana has some effect on immune system but the relationship is unclear.154 The CB2 
receptors are found primarily in the tissues of the immune system. Two studies of HIV 
infection in homosexual men showed no clear association between marihuana use and 
increased progression to AIDS155 but more research needs to be undertaken to fully 
understand this relationship.156 
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VII: Conclusions On The Harms 
Numerous studies suggest that marihuana smoke is an important risk factor in the 
development of respiratory disease.157 It is clear that the potential harms from using 
cannabis are not trivial, but using non-smoked methods and avoiding divided attention 
tasks like driving can mitigate the most serious harms. 
The presence of harms indicates that where the benefits are unclear, other proven 
treatments may be preferred. Only some individuals will have a constitutional claim to 
marihuana for medical purposes. The constitutional claim is strongest where the evidence 
of a medical benefit is clear. In the next section, I review the evidence on the medical 
benefits. 
VIII: Medical Benefits 
Among those who used cannabis, 17.7% (representing about 420,000 
Canadians or 1.6% of the Canadian population aged 15 years and older) 
reported doing so for medical purposes. Prevalence of use for medical 
purposes was similar between male and female cannabis users (17.3% 
versus 18.4%, respectively), while more than one in five (21.8%) cannabis 
users aged 25 years and older reported using it for medical purposes, 
representing 1.5% of all adults in this age group. The percentage of youth 
who used cannabis for medical purposes is not reportable. 
 
Half (49.7%) of those who used cannabis for medical purposes did so 
mainly for chronic pain caused by conditions such as arthritis, back pain and 
migraines, while the remaining 50.3% used cannabis primarily for one of a 
variety of conditions that included insomnia, depression and anxiety. These 
numbers do not in any way measure or reflect enrolment in the federal 
Medical Marihuana Access Program.158 
 This section assesses the various therapeutic effects of cannabis. Clinical indications are 
noted within the sections. I have focused on some of the more common applications: 
anorexia (loss of appetite) and cachexia (wasting), nausea and vomiting, movement 
disorders, pain relief, and glaucoma (progressive loss of vision). The research shows that 
cannabis can reliably relieve some symptoms but it comes with risks. The relative risk-
benefit profile is relevant to the Charter analysis. Withholding medical treatment that has 	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strong evidence of a significant benefit is more difficult to justify. More severe 
infringements require a very clear connection between the purpose of the legislation and 
the means chosen to effect that purpose.159 After assessing some of the commonly 
reported therapeutic benefits of cannabis, I consider whether synthetic cannabinoids 
currently offer an acceptable alternative. 
Appetite 
The desire to consume food is one of the fundamental physiological processes necessary 
for survival.160 The appetite is regulated by a highly complex integration of hormonal and 
neuronal systems to maintain homeostasis.161 Disruptions of these homeostatic 
mechanisms are often a result of disease and can result in food deprivation or excess 
eating.162 
Reference to cannabis’ appetite-stimulating properties was recorded as early as AD 
300.163 The presence of many CB receptors in the hypothalamus is a strong indication 
that the endocannabinoid system is involved in the normal physiological regulation of 
appetite.164 Cannabis stimulates appetite and enhances enjoyment of food, which helps 
people with involuntary weight loss.  
Cannabis has been reliably shown to relieve symptoms of cachexia, which refers to the 
dramatic weight loss that is characteristic of several diseases, including malabsorption, 
congestive heart failure, major trauma, severe sepsis, AIDS, and cancer.165 Weight loss 
known as cachexia is characterized by the loss of lean body mass through increased 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Chaoulli, supra note 61 at 131. 
160 Billy Martin, “The Endocannabinoid System and the Therapeutic Potential of 
Cannabinoids” 125 at 128 [Martin] in ElSohly, supra note 54. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid at 147. 
164 Tim Kirkham, “Cannabinoids and Medicine: Eating Disorders, Nausea and Emesis” 
[Kirkham] in Vincenzo Di Marzo, ed, Cannabinoids (Texas: Klewer Academic, 2004) at 
148 [DiMarzo]. 
165 Martin Schnelle & Florian Strasser, “Anorexia and Cachexia” 153 at 153 [Schnelle & 
Strasser] in Grotenhermen & Russo, supra note 101. 
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protein degradation and reduced protein synthesis. This is unlike simple starvation where 
muscle mass is conserved and body fat is converted to energy. Cachexia also involves 
abnormalities in lipid and glucose metabolism, which, together with an increased resting 
metabolic rate, result in a negative energy imbalance.166 Unlike most starving people, 
cachexia sufferers do not have an increase in motivation to eat.167 Traditional treatments 
for cachexia involves steroids combined with enternal nutrition delivered through a 
feeding tube but these interventions are costly and can require very high doses.168 
Cachexia is associated with other health issues including anorexia, chronic nausea, early 
satiety, constipation, asthenia, decreased motor and mental skills, decline in attention 
span and concentration abilities, and change in body image.169 These symptoms 
negatively impact an individual’s quality of life and hasten the onset of death.170 
In a long-term study of 94 AIDS patients, the appetite-stimulating effect of THC 
continued for months.171 THC doubled appetite on a visual analogue scale in comparison 
to placebo. Patients tended to retain a stable body weight over the course of seven 
months.172 
Cannabis-based treatments can be a useful tool in attempting to maintain proper nutrition 
in patients with anorexia. Anorexia, manifesting as the simple loss of appetite, occurs 
frequently in cancer patients.  
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(1998) 394 Nature 277. 
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(2001) 132 Br J Pharmacol 617. See also L Facci et al, “Mast cells express a peripheral 
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Woolridge et al. evaluated the effects of cannabis on symptom control at a large HIV 
clinic, measuring the patterns and prevalence of cannabis use. Of their 523 patients, 27% 
(n. 143) used cannabis to treat symptoms associated with HIV. Of the 143 cannabis-using 
patients, 71% smoked marihuana (n. 101) and 27% ate or drank it (n. 39). Two percent (3 
patients) ingested the cannabis in another way.173 The most frequently reported symptom, 
loss of appetite, was improved in 97%. Half of the patients reported feeling pain and 94% 
of those individuals reported a benefit from cannabis.174 The collective results 
demonstrated statistically significant improvement in at least half of patients with nausea, 
anxiety, nerve pain, depression, tingling, numbness, weight loss, headaches, tremor, 
constipation, and tiredness.175 Symptoms that were not improved included weakness and 
slurred speech. Almost half of the respondents (47%) were found to have statistically 
significant memory deterioration.176  
More complicated cases of anorexia nervosa involve the deliberate withholding of food 
to control one’s weight. Both the British Medical Association and the Institute of 
Medicine advise that cannabis is unlikely to be effective in the patients with anorexia 
nervosa since the underlying psychopathology is very complex, involving issues with 
control over consumption rather than loss of appetite.177 Indeed, “in patients diagnosed 
with primary anorexia nervosa there was no measurable cannabinoid effect, presumably 
because the underlying pathological mechanism is not loss of appetite.”178 
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This evidence suggests that the benefit to individuals suffering from an involuntary loss 
of appetite and wasting are significant. The empirical evidence supports the anecdotal 
and observational evidence that marihuana stimulates the appetite.179  
Nausea & Vomiting 
Emesis is the medical term for throwing up, the forceful ejection of one’s stomach 
contents through the mouth and/or nose. Keeping food down is a significant and 
problematic side effect of chemotherapy and radiation in cancer patients. Nausea and 
vomiting can substantially contribute to the progressive deterioration of a patient’s 
physical condition and psychological well-being.180  
Nausea and vomiting may be the most common and troublesome side effect of cancer 
drugs, causing some patients to discontinue treatment: 
Retching (dry heaves) may last for hours or even days after each treatment, 
followed by days and even weeks of nausea. Patients may break bones or 
rupture the esophagus while vomiting. The sense of loss of control can be 
emotionally devastating. Furthermore, many patients eat almost nothing 
because they cannot stand the sight or smell of food. As they lose weight 
and strength, they find it more and more difficult to sustain the will to 
live.181 
In cancer chemotherapy patients, simple behavioural interventions including distraction 
and relaxation can help to reduce nausea but most conventional treatments are 
pharmacological.182 After repeated treatments, people develop conditioned reactions, 
causing them to feel ill before chemotherapy begins. Patients who vomit frequently have 
difficulty getting proper nutrition, often with severe consequences.183  
Some research has evaluated the anti-emetic efficacy of cannabinoids in cancer patients 
receiving chemotherapy using a systematic review of literature in electronic databases. A 	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meta-analysis found that the anti-emetic efficacy of cannabis was “superior as compared 
to conventional drugs and placebo.”184  
Several studies have demonstrated that oral dronabinol or nabilone (synthetic 
cannabinoids) were superior, or of equal effectiveness, to other drugs such as 
prochloperazine and metoclopramide.185 Cannabinoids have also been shown to be 
effective in patients whose nausea is refractory to other drugs.186 Non-psychoactive 
cannabinoid therapies could also prove useful for children who experience nausea or 
vomiting as a result of chemotherapy. Unlike Delta-9-THC, Delta-8-THC is not 
psychoactive and was shown to prevent vomiting during chemotherapy for children with 
a minimum of side effects.187 Patients often report a preference for a cannabinoid 
treatment to other regimens.188 Studies pooling the data of 768 patients reported that oral 
THC provided 76-88% relief of nausea and vomiting, while smoked cannabis figures 
supported 70-100% relief in the various surveys.189  
Newer anti-emetics may be more effective than cannabinoids in reducing the frequency 
of nausea and vomiting. However, after taking the appetite-stimulating, mood-elevating 
and analgesic properties into account, there may be a good rationale for considering 
cannabinoid use to help control emesis.190 These studies provide strong support for the 
anecdotal evidence that suggests cannabis provides significant relief from nausea and 
vomiting.  
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Movement Disorders, Spasticity & Seizures 
The basal ganglia is a subcortical brain network responsible for the selection and 
execution of motor routines and learning habitual memories. Riding a bike or learning an 
instrument involve this area of the brain, which is also implicated in unwanted 
movements and behavioural tics. The locations of endocannabinoid receptors are in the 
primary brain centers for involuntary and fine-tuning of motor functions like posture and 
muscle tone.191 
Involuntary movements, spasms and seizures are significant health issues for individuals 
with MS, epilepsy, Tourette’s Syndrome, and Parkinson’s Disease, to name just a few. 
CBD in doses between 100 and 600 milligrams per day produced improvements of 20-
50% in five patients with dystonia, a neurological disorder characterized by involuntary 
muscle contractions that cause slow repetitive movements or abnormal postures.192  
Research has shown that cannabis can reduce physical tics and spasticity.193 It may also 
be beneficial for treating obsessive-compulsive behaviour, but more evidence is needed 
to determine whether cannabis is a safe and effective medicine for these conditions.194 
The clinical use of marihuana for patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) to help control 
muscle spasms and spasticity is well established.195 
MS is a disorder in which patches of myelin (the protective covering of 
nerve fibers) in the brain and spinal cord are destroyed and the normal 
functioning of the nerve fibers themselves is interrupted. It seems to be an 
autoimmune response in which the body’s defense system treats the myelin 	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as a foreign invader. The symptoms usually appear in early adulthood, then 
come and go unpredictably for years. Attacks last weeks to months, and 
remission is often incomplete, with gradual deterioration and eventual 
severe disability. Injury, infection, or stress may cause a relapse. The 
average survival time is thirty years, but some patients deteriorate much 
faster, and others stabilize after a few attacks.196 
In one study of cannabis use for MS, a majority of patients reported diminished pain and 
spasticity.197 Cannabis also helps with bladder control, which is a serious quality of life 
concern for those living with MS.198 Some individuals may experience an improvement 
in their psychological symptoms. One study reported that 57% of individuals with MS 
were using marihuana because it provided relief of their psychological symptoms in 
addition to reducing pain and spasticity.199  
In addition to improving the symptoms of MS, some individuals with epilepsy experience 
a reduction in seizure frequency and severity after cannabis use. However, this is not 
fully confirmed and more research needs to be done.200 
Pain Relief 
 “Patients seek medical assistance for pain more often than any other symptom.”201 
Chronic pain involves persistent, long-term pain, which may include diffuse, throbbing 
pressures, or sharp, specific aches. An estimated 10% of patients with chronic pain use 
cannabis to treat their symptoms.202  
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Treatments for pain can be quite simple and cause few side effects. A placebo can 
minimize pain in 16% of surgery patients.203 Pain varies with tension and mood so 
behavioural interventions can decrease symptoms. Alternative treatments like 
acupuncture can alleviate symptoms for some people.204 For individuals with severe, 
chronic pain, the treatment is usually opioid narcotics and various synthetic analgesics. 
These drugs have many negative effects. Withdrawal from the more potent opioid 
painkillers includes extremely aversive flue-like symptoms and spastic muscle 
twitches.205  
Opioids are addictive and tolerance develops. The most commonly used 
synthetic analgesics - aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol), and nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) like ibuprofen - are not addictive, but 
they are often insufficiently powerful. Furthermore, they have serious toxic 
side effects, including gastric bleeding or ulcer, and in the long run, a risk of 
liver or kidney disease. Stomach bleeding and ulcers induced by aspirin and 
other NSAIDs are the most common serious adverse drug reactions reported 
in the United States... These drugs may be responsible for as many as 
76,000 hospitalizations and more than 7,600 deaths annually.206 
The spinal cord contains numerous CB receptors, which helps to improve the peripheral 
sensation of pain.207 THC may inhibit the production of the enzyme adenylate cyclase, 
which is involved in the transmission of pain messages.208 Although cannabis has been 
shown to have a level of analgesia comparable to that of codeine, the doses required 
induce unwanted behavioural effects.209  
Evidence suggests cannabinoids and opioids have synergistic analgesic effects, meaning 
they work together to produce greater pain relief.210 The combination of opioids and 
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cannabinoids may allow individuals to reduce the doses of both opioids and cannabinoids 
necessary to achieve desirable levels of analgesia. 
Considering Canada’s aging population, pain management may be one of the most 
important future uses for medical cannabis. For individuals suffering from chronic pain, 
the risks associated with traditional pharmacological treatments may be more undesirable 
than those associated with cannabis use. Although cannabis is not as powerful as the 
opioids, it has fewer serious side effects and the risk of dependence is slim. It may 
complement pharmaceutical treatments by allowing patients to reduce their doses of 
opioid pain medication. 
Glaucoma 
CB receptors are found in the eye and have proven invaluable for some individuals with 
glaucoma. The first patient in the United States to obtain a federal exemption for 
cannabis had glaucoma. Robert Randall’s prognosis was blindness within three to five 
years. With medically supervised cannabis use, Randall maintained his sight for nearly 
thirty years and reportedly retained some distance vision when he died in 2001.211  
Glaucoma is a disorder that results from an imbalance of pressure within the 
eye. The eyeball must be almost perfectly spherical to focus light accurately 
on the retina. Its shape is maintained by the pressure of an internal fluid, the 
aqueous humor. If the eye produces too much of this fluid or the channels 
through which it flows out are blocked, the increasing pressure may damage 
the optic nerve, which carries impulses from the eye to the brain. Glaucoma 
afflicts 1.5 percent of the population at age fifty and about 5 percent at age 
seventy. Almost one million Americans suffer from the disorder, and every 
year 80,000 are blinded by it…  
Today, glaucoma is treated chiefly with eye drops containing betablockers 
such as timolol (Timoptic), which inhibit the activity of epinephrine 
(adrenaline). They are highly effective but may have serious side effects; 
they may induce depression, aggravate asthma, slow the heart rate, and 
increase the risk of heart failure.212 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Ibid. 
212 Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 17 at 45-46. 
	   	  
	  
40	  
The discovery that marihuana reduces the pressure inside the eye occurred accidentally 
during an experiment at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The 
experiment was designed to determine whether cannabis dilated the pupils. Researchers 
photographed the eyes of student volunteers as they smoked marihuana. They observed 
the pupils slightly constrict rather than dilate.213 An ophthalmological examination 
showed that cannabis also reduced tearing and intraocular pressure. Further experiments 
with glaucoma patients showed a reduction in intraocular pressure for an average of four 
to five hours, with “no indications of any deleterious effects…on visual function or 
ocular structure.”214 
In a number of studies, cannabis decreased intraocular pressure by an average of 25 – 
30% and occasionally up to 50%, with effects lasting four to six hours. Some non-
psychotropic cannabinoids (CBD, CBG, CBN), and to a lesser extent, some non-
cannabinoid constituents of the cannabis plant have also been shown to decrease 
intraocular pressure.215 
Neither the American Glaucoma Society nor the Canadian Ophthalmological Society 
currently recommend cannabis use for glaucoma due to the availability of other 
therapeutic options and the inability to separate the desirable from undesirable effects.216 
Other Benefits 
The evidence is mixed on the therapeutic benefit of cannabis in treating other diseases 
although there is anecdotal evidence to support its application in many areas. There is 
somewhat of a confirmed therapeutic effect for treating allergies, inflammation, infection, 
depression, bipolar disorders, anxiety disorders, dependency and withdrawal from other 
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drugs.217  More research still needs to be done to confirm the effects on autoimmune 
diseases, cancer, neuroprotection, fever and blood pressure disorders.218 
Lester Grinspoon, professor emeritus at Harvard, provides a comprehensive account of 
many diseases that may be improved by cannabis. Although derived from anecdotal 
sources, Grinspoon spent his career devoted to the scientific study of cannabis.219 He 
provides accounts and evidence for some less common medical uses, including insomnia, 
adult attention deficit disorder, tinnitus, phantom limb pain and addiction.220 
As will be discussed, there is a threshold level of state interference with physical or 
psychological integrity that must be met before security of the person will be breached. 
Although a person may receive some medicinal benefit from cannabis use, in many cases, 
it may not be serious enough to warrant granting constitutional protection for that use.  
Synthetic Alternatives 
With the potential for synthetic cannabinoid derivatives that are less susceptible to abuse, 
is there a constitutional requirement for marihuana?  
Although THC is the primary active compound, other compounds play a role in 
marihuana’s effects. Evidence suggests that whole plant cannabis is more effective than 
THC alone or currently available synthetic derivatives. 
In their article, “Cannabis and Cannabis Extracts: Greater Than the Sum of Their Parts?” 
McPartland and Russo discuss therapeutic effects of chemical compounds other than 
THC and illustrate the synergy among them. 221 The authors present information about six 
other cannabinoids, over twelve terpenoids, three flavonoids, and one phytosterol.222 
They conclude that because of the various chemicals working together, whole plant 	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cannabis is therapeutically superior to synthetic THC. For instance, although there are 
carcinogenic elements of cannabis smoke, there is a lack of evidence showing lung 
cancer in cannabis-only smokers. CBD may counteract the potentially negative effects of 
smoking by offering a protective effect to the lungs.223  
[CBD] provides sedative properties, reduces anxiety, provides antipsychotic 
benefits, increases dopamine activity, inhibits serotonin uptake, enhances 
norepinephrine activity, protects neurons from glutamate toxicity, acts as an 
antioxidant, reduces hippocampal Ach release (which correlates with loss of 
short-term memory), and is an anti-convulsant on par with phenytoin (a 
standard antiepileptic drug).224  
The CBD in cannabis smoke could explain why inhaling it causes less airway irritation 
and inflammation than inhaling pure THC.225 Cannabis has been shown to be helpful for 
asthma because the CBD blocks lipoxygenase, the enzyme that produces asthma-
provoking leukotrienes.226 Cannabinoids are odourless, but other chemical compounds of 
the cannabis plant, known as terpenes are quite aromatic and also appear to have a 
therapeutic benefit.227 In addition to cannabinoids and terpenes, many other chemical 
messengers may contribute to marihuana’s experienced effects. 
In fact, for many patients, synthetic alternatives containing only THC or CBD are not 
adequate.228 
Russo provides five reasons why cannabis-based medicine extracts (CBME) offer a 
distinct advantage over THC alone: 
1. Potentiation – which involves an “entourage effect” - having other compounds 
along with THC makes for better THC binding and effectiveness; 
2. Antagonism – certain compounds of cannabis (e.g. CBD) may offset negative side 
effects of THC; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Ibid at 104. 
224 McPartland & Russo, supra note 55 at 106. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid at 107. See also Stolick, supra note 26 at 49. 
227 Robert C Clarke & David P Watson, “Cannabis and Natural Cannabis Medicines” 1 at 
7 in ElSohly, supra note 54. 
228 E.g. Reichbach, supra note 15. See also Parker, supra note 6 at 34. 
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3. Summation – a number of cannabis components may contribute to a certain 
therapeutic effect of THC; 
4. Pharmacokinetic – exemplified by one compound (e.g. CBD) which may alter the 
metabolism of THC; and 
5. Metabolism – due to the co-evolution over the millennia, humans are better able 
to metabolize herbal preparations (i.e. cannabis) as opposed to synthetic 
pharmaceuticals (i.e. synthetic cannabinoids).229 
This evidence explains why the currently available synthetic alternatives do not provide 
the same benefit as marihuana. The costs associated with producing and consuming 
pharmaceutical drugs is also very high, relative to cannabis.  
IX: Future Research & Development 
Scientists are able to manipulate the endocannabinoid system by introducing 
cannabinoids into the body or by blocking the CB receptors, preventing cannabinoids 
from binding with receptors. Research into manipulating cannabinoids may produce 
promising therapies that affect only the targeted receptor sites or do not have 
psychoactive effects.  
One possible improvement is to use cannabinoids that do not act on either of 
the two known cannabinoid receptors and therefore are devoid of the 
psychoactivity that is usually unwelcomed by patients who have not 
previously used cannabis for non-medical purposes.230  
According to the Maariv Daily, Israeli researchers have developed a plant that “looks, 
smells and even tastes the same [as marihuana], but does not induce any of the feelings 
normally associated with smoking marihuana that are brought on by the substance 
THC.”231 Tzahi Klein, head of development at Tikkun Olam, the firm that developed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 See McPartland & Russo, supra note 55. See also Ethan Russo “Cannabis: From 
Pariah to Prescription” (2003) 3 Journal of Cannabis Therapeutics 1 at 4 [Russo]. 
230 Harold Kalant & Amy Porath-Waller, “Clearing the Smoke on Cannabis: Medical Use 
of Cannabis and Cannabinoids” (2012) Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, online: 
<www.ccsa.ca> [Kalant & Porath-Waller].  
231 Agence France-Presse, “Israel researchers develop marihuana plant without the high,” 
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species said they wanted “to neutralise the effect of the THC and to increase the effect of 
another substance called CBD.”232 
The Institute of Medicine recommends, “clinical trials of cannabinoid drugs for symptom 
management should be conducted with the goal of developing rapid-onset, reliable, and 
safe delivery systems.”233 
Of the approximately 400,000 – 1 million Canadians who report using marihuana for 
medicinal purposes,234 just over 12,000 people are currently authorized to possess 
marihuana under the MMAR.235 There are methodological limitations in this accuracy of 
type of self-reported survey data. Furthermore, the data does not reflect how many of 
these individuals are in a situation where depriving them of cannabis would meet the 
threshold level for constitutional protection, there is a large discrepancy between the 
number of individuals reporting medical use of marihuana and those legally authorized to 
do so. The problems with the current framework are evident in the number of successful 
constitutional challenges. Future research and development depends largely on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Ibid. 
233 Joy, Watson & Benson, supra note 23 at 4. 
234 R v Beren and Swallow, 2009 BCSC 429 at 38 [Beren].  “The Canadian Addiction 
Survey, described by Dr. Kalant as the most detailed and comprehensive survey of its 
kind, reported in 2004 that 5% of Canadians over 15 years of age used cannabis for its 
self-reported medical use, putting the number of medical users at approximately one 
million persons. Senator Nolin testified that the Senate Special Committee on Illicit 
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as the working estimate of the total number of medical users. Ms. Belle-Isle, who was 
accepted to give expert opinion evidence in this trial, is a researcher in the area of 
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demand for alternatives. Hopefully, easing barriers to legal access will lead to a greater 
demand for safer alternatives to smoked marihuana. 
X: Conclusions On The Medical Evidence 
The greatest benefits of cannabis use appear to arise in the most serious diseases for 
which concern about the long-term consequences is the least significant. The acute harms 
resulting from cannabis impaired driving and chronic harms associated with smoking 
cannabis are not trivial. Even still, with the exception of the harms associated with 
smoking, the known risks are within the range of other currently available drugs.236 
The available evidence indicates an established therapeutic effect for treating nausea and 
vomiting, simple anorexia and weight loss. There is a relatively well-confirmed 
therapeutic effect for treating spasticity, movement disorders, asthma, glaucoma and 
providing pain relief.  
The role for cannabis in modern medicine is not to replace effective pharmaceutical drugs 
but to offer unique benefits that can reduce the harms of conventional treatments. Until 
scientists develop cannabinoid treatments that can selectively target certain regions and 
minimize undesired behavioural effects, whole plant herbal cannabis appears to be 
therapeutically superior to synthetic derivatives. Where the use of cannabis is expected to 
be long-term, the patient must fully understand the potential for chronic harms. Doctors 
must be able to educate their patients about the known risks and benefits.   
Assessing whether an individual patient is constitutionally entitled to possess and use 
cannabis requires doctors to compare the medical evidence with the individual account. 
These types of questions are part medical, part legal. In some cases, the medical use of 
marihuana will not be controversial. In other cases, it may be necessary to critically 
examine both the empirical evidence and the individual’s account of the impact of 
marihuana use.  
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In the next chapter we look at judicial treatment of the constitutional claim to access 
marihuana for medical reasons.   
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PART TWO: CANNABIS AND THE CHARTER 
I: Introduction 
Enacted in 1982, the Charter is part of Canada’s entrenched constitution. It is the 
supreme law of Canada and laws that are inconsistent with its provisions are of no force 
and effect.237  
In this section, I provide an overview of section 7 of the Charter, providing descriptions 
of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person, as well as the principles of 
fundamental justice. I provide a chronological summary of the cases applying section 7 
and examine how these have been applied to the medical use of marihuana. I detail the 
circumstances that led to the enactment of the MMAR and the cases that influenced 
subsequent regulatory amendments. I analyze the evidence to determine a threshold for 
when there will be a violation of security of the person and what the principles of 
fundamental justice require. In the next part, I apply the Charter analysis to the current 
MMAR. 
II: Section Seven of the Charter 
Section 7 guarantees everyone in Canada “the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” 
Section 7 provides three independent legal rights: life, liberty and security of the person, 
subject to the principles of fundamental justice. The legal rights described in section 7 of 
the Charter apply to everyone in Canada. These rights are independent but 
overlapping.238 Presently, no comprehensive definition exists for these three interests.239 
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The Charter applies only to government action but Charter rights can be violated by the 
conduct of a non-government body if the violation is a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of government action.240 The courts determine whether the government has 
infringed these rights on a case-by-case basis using a “purposive” analysis, which seeks 
to understand the values underlying the individual rights and the state interests.241 Rights 
violations that conform to the principles of fundamental justice will not violate the 
Charter.  
For a successful claim under section 7, the legal burden is on the person claiming a 
Charter violation. They must show on a balance of probabilities that government action 
has violated their right to life, liberty or security of the person and identify a principle of 
fundamental justice that was breached.  
The leading cases under section 7 of the Charter have dealt with contentious social 
issues. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has said, “The issue for this Court to 
determine is not whether Parliament has weighed those pressures and interests wisely, but 
rather whether the limit they have imposed on a Charter right or freedom is reasonable 
and justified.”242  
The criminal prohibition of marihuana can violate the rights to life and liberty for some 
medical users. However, the debate in the medical context has largely focused on security 
of the person. The Supreme Court has established that a government-imposed prohibition 
on something that provides significant medical benefit will violate security of the 
person.243 Courts have also found that unnecessary government-imposed barriers to 
access needed medical treatment violate an individual’s security of the person. The facts 
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Irwin Law, 2009) at 224 [Sharpe & Roach].  For a recent statement on this see Carter v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 886 at 1306 [Carter]. 
240 United States of America v Burns, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [Burns].  
241 R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 [Morgentaler] at 12. 
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necessary and whether the barrier or prohibition is justified. This involves considering the 
individuals involved, the intensity of their symptoms, and the degree of relief offered by 
the treatment. In what follows, I will briefly discuss the rights to life and liberty before 
moving to a comprehensive discussion of security of the person. 
Life 
Section 7 entrenches the right to life, recognizing the inherent value of human life. 
Though not applicable in Canada, the death penalty is the clearest example of 
government action that would violate the right to life. 
The right to life was carefully considered in Rodriguez, where a majority of the SCC 
stated that Canadian society is “based upon the intrinsic value of human life and on the 
inherent dignity of every human being.”244 However, in that case, a narrow majority of 
the Court found that the right to life did not include the right to have someone aid or 
assist in ending one’s life.  
In their analysis of the right to life, Sharpe and Roach suggest that, “given the interest at 
stake, a risk to life may itself violate the right to life in section 7 of the Charter.”245 The 
risk to life has been considered in the context of a potential extradition to face the death 
penalty.246 The possibility of a risk to life was also considered in Chaoulli and Insite. In 
Chaoulli, Deschamps J. said the right to life was affected by long delays in surgical 
procedures caused by the province’s prohibition on private insurance.247 In Insite, the 
right to life was affected by the potential denial of medical care for injection drug 
users.248 
The courts have not yet found that the prohibition on cannabis violates the right to life, 
although the evidence indicates that for some individuals, depriving them of cannabis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 See Rodriguez, supra note 242 at 585.  
245 Sharpe & Roach, supra note 239 at 224 [emphasis added]. 
246 Burns, supra note 240. 
247 Chaoulli, supra note 61 at 40. 
248 See Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44 at 
headnote [Insite]. 
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may hasten death. In Parker, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that Mr. Parker’s 
seizures were life-threatening because without cannabis, the frequency and severity of his 
seizures increased. However, the Court found that only the rights to liberty and security 
of the person were engaged, not the right to life.249 There may be a case where the 
deprivation of cannabis violates the right to life, but that case has not been fully argued 
yet. Violations of liberty and security of the person are far more common. 
Liberty 
Philosophers have written extensively on the independence of the human spirit. Liberty 
encompasses the idea that people are autonomous, self-determining agents and should be 
able to pursue their idea of the good life, within reason.250  
In the context of the Canadian Charter, liberty encompasses two facets, the narrower 
right to be free from physical restraint including detention, arrest or imprisonment, as 
well as the broader right to make decisions of fundamental personal importance. 
Violations of either must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.  
Wilson J. describes the broader understanding of liberty in Morgentaler: 
The right to "liberty" contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a 
degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting 
his or her private life. Liberty in a free and democratic society does not 
require the state to approve such decisions but it does require the state to 
respect them.251 
As applied to the facts of medicinal cannabis use, the liberty interest is engaged on both 
definitions. Decisions about medical treatment are of fundamental personal importance. 
The criminal sanction attached to marihuana possession for those who are not legally 
exempted can lead to detention, arrest and imprisonment.252 
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The liberty right is clearly engaged and there are potential cases involving the right to 
life. However, in what follows, I thoroughly consider the right to security of the person, 
which is most commonly argued in the medical context. 
Security of the Person 
Security of the person encompasses both physical and psychological integrity. In 
Morgentaler, the SCC recognized that although the Charter elevated security of the 
person to the status of a constitutional norm, “it is not a value alien to our legal 
landscape.”253 That the human body should be legally protected from physical 
interference is well-established in Canada’s legal history. The common law recognizes 
that any medical procedure carried out on a person without their consent constitutes an 
assault.254 
In addition to encompassing a person’s physical integrity, the SCC held that security of 
the person also encompasses protection of psychological integrity, which can be 
negatively affected by “overlong subjection to the vexations and vicissitudes of a pending 
criminal accusation.”255 Psychological integrity may be compromised by the stress and 
anxiety arising from disruptions to relationships within the family, social and work 
contexts, negative stigma, loss of privacy, legal costs, and uncertainty as to the outcome 
and sanction.256 Psychological effects may be serious enough to reach a level that will 
engage the section 7 right to security of the person. These psychological effects "need not 
rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary 
stress or anxiety."257 
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  Ibid.	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The right to security of the person has not generally been interpreted to create a positive 
obligation on the state,258 nor has it been extended to include economic rights or any 
rights wholly unconnected with the administration of justice.259  
There are circumstances where infringing the right to security of the person is justified. 
However, “if the state does interfere with security of the person, the Charter requires 
such interference to conform with the principles of fundamental justice.”260  
Principles of Fundamental Justice 
Violations of security of the person are justified if they are in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. The principles of fundamental justice represent the 
collective interests that justify violations of the individual rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person. Violations that are consistent with these principles are justified in 
law. Early on in the Charter jurisprudence, the SCC set a high standard for the 
government by requiring that legislation meet both procedural and substantive principles 
of fundamental justice.  
The Court has said the principles of fundamental justice are “the basic tenets of the legal 
system,”261 a balance of individual rights and state interests,262 and “principles that have 
general acceptance among reasonable people.”263 Laws that are arbitrary, vague, or 
overbroad will violate the principles of fundamental justice.264 More specifically, these 
principles require that serious criminal offences have a minimum mens rea 
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259 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 47-15 [Hogg 
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requirement,265 a right to make full answer and defence266 and a right to silence.267 It 
would violate the principles of fundamental justice if youths were treated the same way 
as adults in sentencing268 or if a punishment would shock the conscience of the public.269 
The term “principles of fundamental justice” had no legal definition prior to the 
enactment of the Charter but the concept has rapidly evolved as new fact scenarios test 
the limits of section 7. 270 Two years after the Charter was enacted, the SCC attempted to 
infuse the term with precise legal meaning, per Lamer J.: 
…[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets 
and principles, not only of our judicial process, but also of the other 
components of our legal system. 
 
 ...[T]he proper approach to the determination of the principles of fundamental 
justice is quite simply one in which …”future growth will be based on 
historical roots”...271 
In the 2003 case of Malmo-Levine, the majority summarized the minimum conditions for 
a principle to qualify as a principle of fundamental justice:  
 [I]t must be a legal principle about which there is significant societal 
consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought 
fairly to operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or 
security of the person. 272 
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Many principles of fundamental justice have been advanced and rejected. The harm 
principle,273 the best interests of the child standard274 and respect for human dignity275 
were not found to be principles of fundamental justice.  
Various Canadian courts have acknowledged the medical benefit of cannabis and have 
struck down sections of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) and the 
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) on the basis of the guarantees 
contained in the Charter. These decisions prompted the federal government to establish a 
legal supply,276 permit exemptions for caregivers who provide assistance to medical 
marihuana users,277 simplify the categories of applicants, and reduce the number of 
requisite medical declarations.278 Most recently, the courts have mandated a minimum 
level of physician education279 and struck down restrictions on the form that cannabis 
must be in.280  
In what follows, I provide a chronology of the jurisprudence and regulatory amendments 
that have shaped the current legal landscape. I apply the medical evidence to determine 
the minimum threshold for security of the person violations and reach a conclusion on 
what the principles of fundamental justice require. 
III: Post-Charter Chronology 
The post-Charter chronology is divided into three subsections based on the major legal 
and regulatory developments. The first subsection examines legal developments before 
the MMAR were enacted in 2001. The second subsection deals with Charter challenges to 
the initial MMAR and resulting regulatory amendments in 2003. The third subsection 
considers changes to the law made from 2003 to the present day. 	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Early Legal Developments, 1988 – 2001 
In 1988, the United Nations adopted the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A party to the Convention is, inter alia, required to 
adopt measures "subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system" to prohibit the possession of cannabis and the cultivation of cannabis for 
personal use.281 
R v Morgentaler is one of the seminal cases where the SCC discussed section 7 of the 
Charter.282 At the time, it was an indictable criminal offence to procure or perform an 
abortion.283 Women could obtain legal “therapeutic” abortions if they followed the 
procedure required in the Criminal Code.284 The procedure required women to appear 
before a panel of “qualified medical practitioners” who would determine whether “the 
continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would or would be likely to 
endanger her life or health.”285  
It was optional for hospitals to establish an abortion panel.286 The required composition 
of the panel precluded its establishment in many hospitals.287 The statutory standard of 
endangering the woman’s life or health was vague and inconsistently applied.288 Many 
women had to travel a great distance to appear before the abortion panel.289 These legal 
requirements caused delays in getting approval for an abortion, which led to many 
undesired consequences including greater health risks for those women.290  
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A minority of the SCC found that this to be a matter for Parliamentary discretion. They 
said that it is not up to the courts to solve or even attempt to solve the abortion issue.291  
The majority found that these laws violated a woman’s right to security of the person. 
There were three concurring opinions. Dickson C.J. and Lamer J. concluded that “state 
interference with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress, at least 
in the criminal law context, constitute a breach of security of the person.”292  Beetz and 
Estey JJ. put it another way: "security of the person, within the meaning of s. 7 of the 
Charter must include a right of access to medical treatment for a condition representing a 
danger to life or health without fear of criminal sanction.”293 Wilson J. found a clear 
violation of security of the person because the law denied women control over their 
reproductive health. Women were rendered passive recipients of a decision made by 
others as to whether their bodies would be used to nurture a new life.294 In accordance 
with the language of section 7, any violation of security of the person must conform to 
the principles of fundamental justice.  
Considering the principles of fundamental justice, the majority found that the legally 
mandated administrative procedure was responsible for increasing the delay, and 
consequently, for the ensuing health risks to women who sought abortions. Furthermore, 
the impugned provisions set out a defence to a criminal prohibition that was practically 
unavailable to many women.  
One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that when 
Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Ibid at 189, McIntyre & LaForest JJ. 
292 Ibid at 22, 24, Lamer CJ.  “Not only does the removal of decision-making power 
threaten women in a physical sense; the indecision of knowing whether an abortion will 
be granted inflicts emotional stress. Section 251 clearly interferes with a woman's bodily 
integrity in both a physical and emotional sense. Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal 
sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own 
priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and thus a 
violation of security of the person. Section 251, therefore, is required by the Charter to 
comport with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
293 Ibid at 70, 155, Beetz J. 
294 Ibid at 245, Wilson J. 
	   	  
	  
57	  
illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically illusory. The criminal law 
is a very special form of governmental regulation, for it seeks to express our 
society's collective disapprobation of certain acts and omissions. When a 
defence is provided, especially a specifically-tailored defence to a particular 
charge, it is because the legislator has determined that the disapprobation of 
society is not warranted when the conditions of the defence are met.295 
In this case, the evidence showed that the defence was unavailable to many women. For 
the women who were able to adhere to the required procedure, the ensuing delay put their 
health at risk. The majority concluded this was a violation of security of the person that 
was inconsistent with the procedural principles of fundamental justice and the law was 
struck down. 
A short time later, security of the person was again at issue in the case of Sue Rodriguez, 
a 42–year-old mother and wife who had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS or Lou 
Gehrig’s disease), a neurological disorder where motor neurons progressively deteriorate. 
Her condition was rapidly worsening and her life expectancy was between 2 and 14 
months. In the coming months she would lose her ability to swallow, speak, walk, or 
move her body. Shortly after, she would lose the capacity to breathe or eat without 
mechanical assistance and would be confined to a bed.296 Sue wanted to enjoy life for as 
long as possible and avoid the loss of personal control that would inevitably come as a 
result of her disease. She knew the time would come when she no longer desired to live 
but by then, her ability to take her own life would have passed.297 She wanted to be able 
to administer a deadly cocktail of drugs under medical supervision at the time of her 
choosing. There is no criminal prohibition against suicide. However, section 241 of the 
Criminal Code makes it an indictable offence to counsel, aid or abet a person to commit 
suicide.298 The Supreme Court of Canada split 5 – 4.  
The majority held that although there was a violation of Rodriguez’s security of the 
person, it was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Respect for 
human dignity, although a fundamental value of Canadian society, was not found to be a 	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legal principle and therefore, not a principle of fundamental justice.299 Therefore, section 
7 of the Charter was not violated. 
All the judges who considered section 7 agreed there was a violation of security of the 
person. They were divided on whether this was in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. The SCC will likely revisit this issue as a consequence of the 
decision in Carter v Canada where the Supreme Court of British Columbia reconsidered 
the issues based on the current understanding of the principles of fundamental justice and 
found that section 241 of the Criminal Code does violate section 7.300 The SCC’s 
findings and conclusions in Morgentaler and Rodriguez set the stage for medical 
marihuana users to challenge the broad criminal prohibition of marihuana under section 7 
of the Charter.  
On July 18, 1996, police officers executed a warrant and seized 71 marihuana plants from 
the home of Terrance Parker. He was charged with trafficking and cultivation under the 
Narcotic Control Act (NCA).301 On September 18, 1997, the police again attended at 
Parker’s home and seized three growing marihuana plants. By this time, the NCA had 
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been repealed and Parker was charged with possession of marihuana contrary to the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA).302  
Unlike the NCA, the CDSA allows the Minister of Health to exempt individuals from the 
operation of the general provisions pursuant to section 56, which provides:  
The Minster may, on such terms and conditions as the Minister deems necessary, 
exempt any person or class of persons or any controlled substance or precursor or 
any class thereof from the application of all or any of the provisions of this Act or 
the regulations if, in the opinion of the Minister, the exemption is necessary for a 
medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the public interest. 
The data, albeit limited, suggests that relatively few individuals were successful in 
obtaining exemptions.303 Parker was not exempted from the operation of the CDSA under 
section 56, though he would be a likely candidate for approval. 
Parker was diagnosed with epilepsy as a child. Conventional medications and even two 
brain surgeries were not helpful at controlling his violent and life-threatening seizures. 
He started using marihuana and documented his symptoms and use patterns in a journal. 
He noted that his seizures were less frequent and less severe. He reduced his medication. 
He could even prevent oncoming seizures. Parker’s doctor wrote in September 1987: 
 Mr. Parker has had many side effects over the years due to his anti-
convulsant medications, which have prevented their perhaps more 
efficacious use in higher doses. These side effects are well-recognized in 
the medical literature. Hence, from a medical and quality-of-life point of 
view, I am of the opinion that it is medically necessary, in order to obtain 
optimal seizure control, that Mr. Parker regularly use marihuana in 
conjunction with his other anti-convulsant medications.304 
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Parker grew his own supply of marihuana to avoid the black market. After he was 
arrested and charged, he challenged the legislative provisions under section 7 of the 
Charter. Since the NCA had already been repealed, the cultivation and trafficking charges 
were moot. The remaining charge was for possession of cannabis under the CDSA. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that, “Where illness can neither be prevented nor 
cured, efforts are directed towards preventing deterioration or relieving pain and 
suffering.”305 The Court found that the state-imposed criminal prohibition on cannabis 
possession violated Parker’s security of the person because he was forced to choose 
between his liberty and his health.306 As in Morgentaler, Parker was being denied a 
“generally safe medical treatment” that “might be of clear benefit” to him.307  
The Court in Parker summarized five principles of fundamental justice applicable where 
the criminal law intersects with medical treatment: 
1. The principles of fundamental justice are breached where the deprivation 
of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance the state's 
interest; 
2. A blanket prohibition will be considered arbitrary or unfair and thus in 
breach of the principles of fundamental justice if it is unrelated to the 
state's interest in enacting the prohibition, and if it lacks a foundation in 
the legal tradition and societal beliefs that are said to be represented by 
the prohibition; 
3. The absence of a clear legal standard may contribute to a violation of 
fundamental justice; 
4. If a statutory defence contains so many potential barriers to its own 
operation that the defence it creates will in many circumstances be 
practically unavailable to persons who would prima facie qualify for the 
defence, it will be found to violate the principles of fundamental justice; 
and 
5. An administrative structure made up of unnecessary rules, which result in 
an additional risk to the health of the person, is manifestly unfair and does 
not conform to the principles of fundamental justice.308  
The Court summarized, “the common-law treatment of informed consent, the sanctity of 
life and commonly held societal beliefs about medical treatment suggest that a broad 	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criminal prohibition that prevents access to necessary medicine is not consistent with 
fundamental justice.”309 Although one of the primary objectives of the CDSA was to 
protect health, preventing Parker from accessing cannabis actually caused serious harm to 
his health. Since the effect of the legislation was diametrically opposed to its objectives, 
it was found to be arbitrary.310 The Court held that a blanket prohibition on cannabis 
violated Parker’s Charter rights guaranteed in section 7. Without a medical exemption 
system that addresses the medical use of marihuana for the individuals who require it, the 
CDSA deprived individuals of a beneficial medical treatment and subjected them to 
criminal sanctions. The Court said this result was “antithetical to our notions of 
justice.”311 
The Court considered the discretionary exemption contained in section 56 and concluded 
that the unfettered discretion of the Minister of Health was not consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice.312 
The result in this case was that the possession offence in section 4(1) of the CDSA was 
unconstitutional. On July 31, 2000, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down the 
provision, but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to 
fill the void.313  
On July 30, 2001, one day before the suspension imposed in Parker was to expire, the 
first Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) came into force. The MMAR were 
enacted pursuant to section 55 of the CDSA, which empowers the Governor-in-Council to 
make regulations exempting persons, or classes of persons, from the application of the 
Act or Regulations.314  
The general objectives of the MMAR are “to establish a framework to allow access to 
marihuana by individuals suffering from grave or debilitating illnesses, where 	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conventional treatments are inappropriate or are not providing adequate relief.”315 The 
MMAR create a framework by which seriously ill people can apply for an Authorization 
To Possess (ATP) marihuana and obtain a Personal Use Production Licence (PUPL) or 
Designated Person Production Licence (DPPL). 
Initially, there were three categories of applicants. Applicants applying under Category 1 
had symptoms associated with a terminal illness where death was expected in twelve 
months. A medical declaration from one physician was required. Category 2 was defined 
to include individuals with specific symptoms or diseases listed in the Schedule. This 
category required the declaration of a specialist. Category 3 was for all other applicants 
and required the declaration of two specialists. Physicians had to declare that all 
conventional treatments had been tried or considered, that marihuana would mitigate the 
symptom, and that the expected benefits outweighed the risks. Physicians would specify a 
daily dose limit for an individual and marihuana could be delivered to the physician’s 
office to provide to the patient.316 
Part Two created a framework to allow individuals to apply for a PUPL or a DPPL to fill 
the supply needs of authorized medical users. Individuals applying for an ATP were 
required to indicate the proposed source of marihuana, even though there were no 
licensed dealers or legal source of marihuana or marihuana seeds. Applicants for a DPPL 
could not be compensated, could grow marihuana for only one authorized person (1:1 
ratio) and could not grow marihuana in common with more than two other DPPL holders 
(“three max”).317  
Even after the MMAR were enacted, the medical profession was reluctant to authorize the 
use of marihuana for their patients given the burdensome paperwork that required doctors 
to declare things that were beyond their knowledge. Given the absence of long-term 
empirical evidence, in many cases it was practically impossible for doctors to state 	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definitively that the benefits of using marihuana outweighed the risks. Medical 
associations across Canada discouraged their members from signing the required forms.  
The Canadian Medical Protective Agency (CMPA) provides legal defence and liability 
protection to Canadian physicians and provides compensation to patients and their 
families who have been harmed by negligent clinical care. One letter to physicians from 
the CMPA was particularly “chilling.”318 This letter said physicians were being asked to 
declare things that were beyond the scope of their expertise. The letter highlighted that 
unless a physician could be certain that that the benefits outweighed the risks and that all 
conventional treatments had been tried and were inappropriate, they would be at 
increased risk of being reported to their College to face professional sanctions for making 
a false declaration.319  
Although the initial MMAR did provide a framework for those with grave or debilitating 
illnesses to access marihuana when conventional therapies were ineffective or not 
providing adequate relief, the procedural requirements made the defence difficult to 
obtain. Furthermore, there was no legal supply so an individual having obtained an 
exemption, would still have to access the black market to purchase dried marihuana or 
seeds. 
Legal & Regulatory Developments, 2001 – 2003 
In 2001, the major federal agency responsible for funding health research in Canada, the 
Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR) established the Medical Marijuana 
Research Program (MMRP), which included a 5-year, $7.5 million clinical research 
grant.320 Only three clinical research proposals were approved for CIHR funding: a 
smoked-cannabis and chronic pain study initiated by McGill's Pain Center, an HIV/AIDS 
and appetite study by the Community Resource Initiative of Toronto (CRIT) at St. 
Michael's Hospital, and the Cannabis for the Management of Pain: Assessment of Safety 	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Study (COMPASS), which was the first project of the CIHR Marijuana Open Label 
Safety Initiative.321 
In 2002, a Special Senate Committee was struck to examine, among other things, 
Canada’s approach to cannabis. Chaired by Pierre Nolin, this Committee considered the 
use of cannabis for therapeutic purposes after the initial MMAR were enacted. The 
Committee reviewed evidence from a number of sources. Although they recognized that 
smoked marihuana could have harmful side effects, they concluded that the potential 
therapeutic uses of marihuana had been sufficiently documented to permit its use for 
therapeutic purposes and recommended further research.322 
The Committee considered marihuana in a medical context and observed that: 
• The MMAR are not providing a compassionate framework for access to 
marihuana  for therapeutic purposes and are unduly restricting the 
availability of marihuana to  patients who may receive health benefits from 
its use;  
• The refusal of the medical community to act as gatekeepers and the lack of 
access to  legal sources of cannabis appear to make the current regulatory 
scheme an “illusory”  legislative exemption and raises serious Charter 
implications;  
• In almost one year, only 255 people have been authorized to possess 
marihuana for  therapeutic purposes under the MMAR and only 498 
applications have been received  – this low participation rate is of concern; 
• Changes are urgently needed with regard to who is eligible to use cannabis 
for  therapeutic purposes and how such people gain access to cannabis; 
• Research on the safety and efficacy of cannabis has not commenced in 
Canada  because researchers are unable to obtain the product needed to 
conduct their trials; 
• No attempt has been made in Health Canada’s current research plan to 
acknowledge  the considerable expertise currently residing in the 
compassion clubs; and 
• The development of a Canadian source of research-grade marihuana has 
been a  failure.323  	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September 2002 was the first month that Health Canada provided online statistics about 
the operation of the MMAR. At that time, almost half of the people who were authorized 
to possess marihuana for medical purposes (488 of 864) were exempted under section 56 
rather than under the MMAR framework.324 The number of section 56 exemptions 
declined as time went on.325  
In 2002, Jim Wakeford raised further concerns about the newly-enacted MMAR. 
Wakeford was diagnosed with AIDS in 1989. He had tried other medications including 
Marinol (oral THC), but found smoked cannabis provided the best relief. He used 
cannabis under medical supervision.326  
Wakeford obtained a personal exemption under section 56 of the CDSA but the 
exemption did not apply to his caregivers, who had been charged with trafficking in 
marihuana as a result of their attempts to assist him. He and his caregivers had to access 
the black market to obtain an adequate supply. He brought a motion before the Ontario 
Superior Court that his exemption under section 56 was insufficient. However, since the 
exemption was based on a decision of the Minister of Health, only the Federal Court had 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. On the constitutionality of the impugned legislation, the 
Court said that even if he suffered anxiety about the plight of his caregivers, his anxiety 
would not likely be sufficient to elevate his claim to a constitutionally protected level. 
Finally, the Court stated that even if Wakeford’s anxiety reached that level, the 
infringement of his security of the person would accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice.327  
Wakeford also argued that the CDSA and MMAR violated his security of the person 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice because the government did not establish 
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a legal supply. The Court held that since Wakeford had access to a supply, he was not 
reliant on the government to provide it to him.328 
The absence of a legal supply continued to be an issue and the provisions of the MMAR 
dealing with supply were addressed again. This time, the challenge was successful. The 
Alberta Court of Appeal in Krieger held that it was absurd to remove the possibility of 
legal access to a substance that an individual is legally allowed to possess.329 The Court 
said that it was unconstitutional for the government to require an individual who is 
lawfully entitled to possess cannabis to participate in an illegal act in order to purchase 
it.330 The Court struck down the prohibition on production of cannabis and said 
individuals should be able to grow their own cannabis if it was impossible to access a 
legal supply.331 
The successful Charter challenges in the medical context likely encouraged individuals 
seeking to challenge the criminal prohibition for non-medical use. In R v Malmo-Levine 
and the companion cases of R v Caine and R v Clay, the SCC considered the 
constitutionality of the criminal prohibition on cannabis possession in a non-medical 
context. David Malmo-Levine argued that Parliament went beyond its legitimate powers 
by criminalizing a plant that caused little to no harm. The Court considered security of 
the person, but found that since marihuana was non-addicting, deprivation of it did not 
cause serious stress to the individual. The judges preferred to rest their analysis on a 
violation of liberty, which was clearly established by the potential for imprisonment.332  
Malmo-Levine advanced the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice. He 
argued that the criminal law is only justified in prohibiting conduct that causes harm to 
others. The Court said that there are many things that do not cause harm (e.g. consensual 
incest) that Parliament is justified in prohibiting.333 The Court concluded that the harm 	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principle was not a principle of fundamental justice.334 The majority considered gross 
disproportionality under the heading of section 12 of the Charter, which protects against 
cruel and unusual punishment. They found that since there was no minimum penalty for 
cannabis possession, the punishment was not grossly disproportionate.335 
The three dissenting judges differed in their analysis but all concluded that the law was 
unconstitutional.336 In support of his conclusion, Deschamps J. found:  
When the state prohibits socially neutral conduct, that is, conduct that 
causes no harm, that is not immoral and upon which there is no societal 
consensus as to its blameworthiness, it cannot do so without raising a 
problem of legitimacy and, consequently, losing credibility. Citizens 
become inclined not to take the criminal justice system seriously and lose 
confidence in the administration of justice. Judges become reluctant to 
impose the sanctions attached to such laws.337 
Charter challenges, like the one in Malmo-Levine continued to have an impact on 
defining the scope of security of the person and the principles of fundamental justice 
contained in section 7.  
In March 2003, the Office of Cannabis Medical Access abruptly cancelled the funding for 
the Toronto-based CRIT research project, despite having already distributed over 
$800,000 of a $2 million research grant for the study.338 Likewise, the $260,000 McGill 
chronic pain and smoked cannabis clinical study that was approved in 2001 suffered 
delays due to bureaucratic problems in accessing a suitable supply of research cannabis 
from Health Canada.339 
The next constitutional challenge to the MMAR resulted in major changes. Warren Hitzig 
and a number of other seriously ill applicants challenged the constitutionality of the 	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MMAR in a civil case. They alleged that the MMAR imposed overly restrictive barriers 
that made eligibility difficult. Some of the applicants were unable to get a specialist’s 
approval to possess or cultivate cannabis and were forced to obtain their medicine from 
the black market.340 Even after individuals were authorized, the absence of a legal supply 
remained a significant issue. The Court looked at two main problems: difficulties meeting 
the eligibility requirements of the MMAR and the absence of a legal supply. Most of the 
argument in Hitzig focused on the absence of a legal supply.  
Pending the hearing of the Hitzig appeal, on July 8, 2003, Health Canada implemented an 
interim supply policy (ISP) to provide approved persons with the dried cannabis and 
cannabis seeds from the government supplier, Prairie Plant Systems (PPS).341 The 
objective of the ISP was to provide a legal supply and render the medical exemption 
constitutional until such a time as the appeal was heard and Parliament could make 
informed legislative changes.342  
Before the ISP was established, PPS cannabis was for research purposes only. The 
options to obtain a legal supply were limited. Individuals could seek out a person who 
could apply for a DPPL, but they could not be compensated, could not grow for more 
than one person (1:1 ratio), or combine their production with more than two others 
(“three max”). The last legal option was to apply for a PUPL. However, for seriously ill 
individuals this option was fraught with difficulties. The time, labour and skills required 
to produce an adequate crop of marihuana often exceeded their abilities. These legislative 
restrictions led to a serious shortfall in the legal supply. The black market was filling the 
void. As the Hitzig Court noted: 
The problems associated with the purchase of medicinal marihuana on the 
black market are numerous and, in most cases, obvious. As with any black 
market product, prices are artificially high. High prices cause real difficulty 
for seriously ill individuals, many of whom live on fixed incomes. Black 
market supply is also notoriously unpredictable. The supplier of marihuana 
today may have moved on by tomorrow or may have been closed down by 	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the police. In addition to unpredictability, there is no quality control on the 
black market. Purchasers do not know what they are getting and have no 
protection against adulterated product. This is particularly problematic for 
some whose illnesses involve allergies, or stomach ailments that can be 
aggravated by the consumption of tainted products. Resort to the black 
market may also require individuals to consort with criminals who are 
unknown to them. In doing so, they risk being cheated and even subjected to 
physical violence. Finally, the evidence of the applicants makes it 
abundantly clear that requiring law-abiding citizens who are seriously ill to 
go to the black market to fill an acknowledged medical need is a 
dehumanizing and humiliating experience.343 
In argument, the Government contended that an adequate, safe supply was met by 
“unlicensed suppliers” but the Court was unwilling to let the existence of well-run 
compassion clubs relieve the Government of its duty to promote and maintain the rule of 
law.344 The evidence adduced showed that many long-term medical cannabis users go to 
the black market, including compassion clubs, because they have no choice.345  
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the MMAR violated the rights to liberty and 
security of the person contained in the Charter by failing to effectively remove state 
barriers to a licit source of marihuana for medical users. In finding the threshold for 
section 7 was met, the Court said that: 
Even apart from these criminal sanctions for non-compliance, the MMAR 
constitute significant state interference with human dignity of those who 
need marihuana for medical purposes. To take the medication they require 
they must apply for an ATP, comply with the detailed requirements of that 
process, and then attempt to acquire their medication in the very limited 
ways contemplated by the MMAR. These constraints are imposed by the 
state as part of the justice system’s control of access to marihuana. As such, 
they are state actions sufficient to constitute a deprivation of the security of 
the person of those who must take marihuana for medical purposes. They 
are state actions within the administration of justice that stand between 
those in medical need and the marihuana they require.346 
In this case, the Court found the principle of fundamental justice that was breached was 
the rule of law. As the trial judge phrased the problem, “the government is asking 	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individuals who have been granted legal authorization to consort with criminals to access 
their constitutional rights.”347 The state’s obligation to obey the law is central to the very 
existence of the rule of law.348 The inevitable consequence of the absence of a legal 
source for those who were determined to be in medical need of it was a violation of the 
fundamental principle that the state must obey and promote compliance with the law.349 
The Government argued that requiring medical specialists for Categories 2 and 3 helped 
to prevent abuse because individuals were subject to further scrutiny and medical 
vetting.350 The Court of Appeal said that the requirement for one specialist was not 
arbitrary because it served the state interest in protecting the health and safety of its 
citizens in relation to an untested drug. Specialists have more knowledge about the range 
of possible treatments for specific diseases and can provide details about other options. 
The evidence presented in Hitzig did not reveal a significant barrier to obtaining one 
specialist’s signature. However, the Court noted that if physician cooperation dwindled it 
might represent a significant practical impediment to access.351 The requirement for 
medical declarations from two specialists for Category 3 applicants was found to be an 
unnecessary, arbitrary barrier that violated the principles of fundamental justice.352 There 
was no rational connection between the offending aspects of the MMAR and the 
government's objectives of better public health and safety, and effective narcotic 
control.353  
The Court found the most direct remedy to cure the constitutional defects and respect the 
rights of medical cannabis users was to immediately declare invalid the offending 
provisions, leaving the constitutionally valid remainder. The Court struck down the 
provisions prohibiting compensation for designated growers, they struck down the ratio 
of one authorized person to one licensed producer and the “three max” provision. The 	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Court noted, “It is conceivable that, as events unfold, further serious barriers could 
emerge either to the eligibility or to reasonable access to a licit source of supply. Should 
that happen, the issue of the appropriate remedy might have to be revisited in a future 
case.”354 
After the Hitzig appeal, on December 17, 2003, the Government published amendments 
to the MMAR in the Canada Gazette. These amendments offered permanent access to a 
lawful government supply of cannabis to authorized holders who did not have a PUPL or 
a designated producer. These measures attempted to resolve the problem with supply.355  
The Government also initiated stakeholder consultations, including patients, physicians, 
pharmacists and law enforcement agencies, to discuss the need for potential changes to 
the MMAR.356  
In these amendments, the Government confirmed its commitment to supplying dried 
marihuana to persons authorized to possess it for medical purposes, and marihuana seeds 
to persons authorized to produce it, until such time as an alternate supply satisfied the 
requirements of the Food and Drugs Act (FDA),357 the CDSA and their respective 
Regulations.358  
These amendments also addressed physician concerns about cannabis deliveries to 
doctors’ offices by permitting home-delivery of cannabis.359 The sections of the MMAR 
that required licensed producers to maintain particular records and books, and the 
requirement to transfer the marihuana directly to the authorized person were repealed.360 
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Parliament reenacted the ratio of one authorized person to one designated producer that 
was struck down in Hitzig. The Government clarified that the objective in maintaining the 
1:1 ratio was to limit the size and scale of growing operations. Although there would be a 
greater number of people authorized to produce cannabis, the justification was that a 
surplus would be more difficult to hide. The Government further explained that limits on 
the production of cannabis are necessary to:  
• Maintain control over distribution of an unapproved drug product, which 
has not yet been demonstrated to comply with the requirements of the 
FDA/FDR; 
• Minimize the risk of diversion of marihuana for non-medical use; 
• Be consistent with the obligations imposed on Canada as a signatory to 
the United Nations’ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as 
amended in 1972 (the 1961 Convention), in respect of cultivation and 
distribution of cannabis; and 
• Maintain an approach that is consistent with movement toward a supply 
model whereby marihuana for medical purposes would be: subject to 
product standards; produced under regulated conditions; and distributed 
through pharmacies; on the advice of physicians, to patients with serious 
illnesses, when conventional therapies are unsuccessful. Such a model 
would include a program of education and market surveillance.361 
The amendments after Hitzig addressed some of the major problems with supply and 
eligibility but many problems with the MMAR remained.  
Legal & Regulatory Developments, 2003 - Present 
More recent legal developments in the Charter jurisprudence suggest a heavy reliance on 
empirical evidence to decide the legal questions involved in the legal analysis under 
section 7. The emphasis on the principles of fundamental justice as a balancing exercise 
in section 7 has virtually precluded any state justification under section 1 of the Charter.  
Section 1 provides that “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”362 
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The balancing that occurs when considering the principles of fundamental justice is 
similar to the proportionality test conducted under section 1 for other Charter violations. 
Unlike section 1 where the courts ask whether the pressing and substantial objectives are 
rationally connected to minimally impairing and proportional measures, the vernacular of 
section 7 asks whether the rights-infringing measures pursue a valid objective, are 
arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate.  
Although the concepts involved are almost identical, the legal burden is different. In 
section 7, the burden is on the claimant to show their rights have been violated in a 
manner inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. If they cannot show a 
violation that is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice on a balance of 
probabilities, there is no Charter violation and no government justification is required. If 
there is a violation of both security of the person and the principles of fundamental 
justice, the burden in a section 1 analysis shifts to the Government to show on a balance 
of probabilities that the measures are justified. Any state justification will be insufficient, 
unless exceptional circumstances such as war or natural disaster justify overriding the 
fundamental principles of justice.363 
While the courts dealt with Charter issues, researchers were making efforts to improve 
the state of research on medical cannabis. However, in June 2004, the CIHR posted a 
notice indicating that funding for the medical marihuana research program (MMRP) 
initiated in 2001 was "suspended until further notice.”364 This is unfortunate. In the 
research literature, a common refrain is that more research needs to be done.  
 Research and empirical evidence played a significant role in the 2005 case, Chaoulli v 
Québec (AG), where individuals living in the province of Québec experienced long 
delays in non-urgent wait times in the public healthcare system. In Chaoulli, the 
impugned laws were section 15 of Québec’s Health Insurance Act ("HEIA") and section 
11 of the Hospital Insurance Act ("HOIA"), which prohibited the purchase of private 
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health insurance for insured services. The objective of these laws was to preserve the 
integrity of the public health care system.  
The appellants were, Jaques Chaoulli, a physician who wanted to operate a private 
medical practice, and George Zeliotis, who had experienced difficulties with long wait 
times for heart surgery and hip replacements. Together they asked for a declaratory 
judgment that the impugned provisions violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter and 
section 1 of the Québec Charter. These applicants contended that the prohibition 
unnecessarily deprived individuals of access to health care services. The appellants were 
not arguing for a constitutional right to private insurance, just for a declaration that the 
current system was unconstitutional.365 
They claimed, inter alia, that the waiting times violated section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 1 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights 
and Freedoms for individuals who had to wait a long time for non-critical surgery. 
Section 1 of the Québec Charter states that, “every human being has a right to life, and to 
personal security, inviolability and freedom.366  
The evidence showed that people waiting for non-critical surgery like knee or hip 
replacement could be on wait lists for up to two years during which time they would 
suffer on a daily basis. The issue was whether the ban on private insurance could be 
justified to preserve the public health system, given that the waiting times affected 
individuals’ physical and psychological integrity. The Court agreed that there was a 
violation of security of the person, but there was no clear consensus about whether the 
principles of fundamental justice had been breached. 
The seven judges who heard this case were divided. One judge found a violation of the 
Québec Charter and did not go on to consider the Canadian Charter.367 Three judges 
found that the impugned laws violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter and section 1 of 
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the Québec Charter.368 Three judges found no violation, reasoning that the laws were 
within the range of constitutional options and the health care debate was properly an issue 
for the legislature.369 Because the Court was evenly split on whether there was a violation 
of section 7 of the Canadian Charter, there was only a majority with respect to the 
Québec Charter. Although the decision is binding only in Québec, the reasoning is 
persuasive and this decision has had a significant impact on subsequent cases in regard to 
the threshold for violations of security of the person. 
The three judges who found a violation of section 7 first considered whether security of 
the person was engaged. They noted that, in addition to the obvious negative physical 
effects on individual health, waiting for medical care may have significant adverse 
psychological effects. The evidence in Chaoulli suggested that 95% of patients waiting 
for knee replacements wait well over one year and, in many cases, over two years.370 
These judges discussed the evidence relating to whether this violation met the threshold 
for constitutional protection. They said: 
While a knee replacement may seem trivial compared to the risk of death 
for wait-listed coronary surgery patients, which increases by 0.5 percent per 
month, the harm suffered by patients awaiting replacement knees and hips is 
significant. Even though death may not be an issue for them, these patients 
"are in pain", "would not go a day without discomfort" and are "limited in 
their ability to get around", some being confined to wheelchairs or house 
bound.371 
This case makes it clear that state-imposed limits that significantly reduce an individual’s 
quality of life will violate security of the person because of the impact on the individual’s 
physical and psychological integrity. Serious psychological effects do not have to rise to 
the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary stress 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Ibid at 102, McLachlin CJ, Major & Bastarache JJ. 
369 Ibid at 161, Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ. They would found that the health plan 
established by Québec did not violate the principles of fundamental justice because the 
means were rationally connected and not arbitrary. Although the inevitable delays in 
accessing health care meant that some people suffered, the dissent said the evidence was 
unclear that another system of health care provision would have been better (at 237-240). 
370 Ibid at 114. 
371 Chaoulli, supra note 61 at 123. 
	   	  
	  
76	  
or anxiety to violate security of the person.372 Similarly, serious physical effects do not 
have to be life-threatening, but must be greater than ordinary pain or discomfort. In this 
case, an average wait time between one and two years met the threshold level for 
constitutional protection because of the intensity of the pain and discomfort.373  
After finding a violation of security of the person, these judges next considered whether 
the violation was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. They relied 
heavily on evidence from other western democracies to illustrate alternative measures 
that the legislature could have adopted.374 They said that there was not a real connection 
on the facts between the measures that interfered with security of the person and the 
purpose that the interference was intended to serve.375 Therefore, because the measures 
were not “necessary,” they concluded Québec’s legislation was arbitrary.376 
Notably, this is a different standard for arbitrariness than in Rodriguez, where the court 
asked whether the measure was inconsistent with or bore no relation to its purpose.377 It is 
much harder to show that a law bears “no relation” to its purpose than it is to show the 
measure is not “necessary.”  
Reflecting on arbitrariness, the majority said:  
In order not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security 
requires not only a theoretical connection between the limit and the 
legislative goal, but a real connection on the facts. The onus of 
showing lack of connection in this sense rests with the claimant. The 
question in every case is whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense 
of bearing no real relation to the goal and hence being manifestly 
unfair. The more serious the impingement on the person's liberty and 
security, the more clear must be the connection. Where the 
individual's very life may be at stake, the reasonable person would 	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expect a clear connection, in theory and in fact, between the measure 
that puts life at risk and the legislative goals.378 
They found that the impugned legislation unnecessarily created delays in accessing 
medical care, which contributed to the deterioration of those individuals’ health. 
Therefore they held that the law infringed the claimants’ security of the person in a 
manner that did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice.379 
In contrast, the three judges who found no violation of section 7 said there was no 
evidence that other systems were better. They acknowledged that the evidence clearly 
established that the public health care system has serious and persistent problems but 
rejected the idea that the courts were suited to address the problems. They said, “The 
resolution of such a complex fact-laden policy debate does not fit easily within the 
institutional competence or procedures of courts of law.”380 They did not agree that the 
legislation was arbitrary, saying: “the prohibition against private health insurance is a 
rational consequence of Quebec's commitment to the goals and objectives of the Canada 
Health Act.”381 
The tension between the legitimate roles for Parliament and the judiciary are often at 
odds in section 7 cases. The issue of medical access to marihuana is no different. There 
seems to be little political will to address the constitutional requirements of a medical 
marihuana exemption system. Parliament has responded to these decisions with 
regulatory amendments but the courts have been the driving force for striking down the 
unconstitutional provisions to improve the functioning of the MMAR. 
In 2005, Parliament enacted further amendments to the MMAR, published in the Canada 
Gazette, Part II, on June 29. These amendments responded to a number of concerns. 
Individuals who had to use marihuana for medical purposes complained about the 
onerous requirements that were an impediment to access. Physicians lamented being 
gatekeepers to an untested and unapproved drug. Police wanted to ensure they would be 	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able to have reliable information about whether an individual was legally authorized to 
possess cannabis. Parliament addressed these concerns and attempted “to streamline the 
regulatory requirements and processes associated with applying for an authorization to 
possess marihuana for medical purposes under the MMAR.”382 
The 2005 amendments provided explicit authority for Health Canada to communicate 
limited information to police under prescribed circumstances. The amendments further 
provided limited authority for pharmacists to supply marihuana to authorized persons. 
These amendments also re-defined the categories of applicants. Categories 1 and 2 were 
merged to include those with terminal illnesses and the symptoms and diseases listed in 
the Schedule. The new Category 1 required the declaration of one physician. Category 3, 
which related to debilitating symptoms that were not specifically enumerated, became the 
new Category 2. These amendments eliminated the requirement that Category 2 would 
have to obtain a declaration from a specialist. However, a specialist consultation was 
required. Under the new Category 2, a specialist would have to concur that conventional 
treatments are ineffective or medically inappropriate and indicate that they are aware 
marihuana is being considered as an alternative treatment.383 
The 2005 amendments repealed the requirement that marihuana be delivered directly 
from the designated producer to the ATP holder, and permitted designated producers to 
ship cannabis through the postal system in the manner specified in the MMAR. The 
requirement that designated producers keep records of their production activities was also 
removed in these amendments.384 
After the 2005 amendments, Grant Krieger was charged with production and trafficking 
of marihuana. He owned and operated the Krieger Wellness Society, a compassion club 
that provided marihuana to those with a purported medical need, regardless of whether 	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they were authorized under the MMAR. Krieger claimed he was justified in doing so 
because doctors would not sign the application form for him or his approximately 420 
clients.385 Neither Krieger nor his five employees had medical training.386  
The Court recognized the state had a valid interest in restricting unlicensed production 
due to the risks from untested plant material. “Microbial content is a concern… Bacteria, 
moulds, fungi and viruses present on plant material may present a significant health risk 
to users, particularly those with compromised immune systems and those already in a 
weakened physical state.”387 Evidence about Krieger’s system of production and 
distribution was absent and there was no evidence it met minimum levels for safety or 
quality control.388 These were valid concerns that justified limits on unlicensed 
production. Relying on the numerical data supplied by Health Canada and the findings in 
Hitzig, the Court found that a sufficient number of physicians were participating in the 
program and this requirement was not a significant barrier to access.389 In this case there 
was no Charter breach and Krieger was convicted of the criminal charges. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judgment.390 
In September 2006, the ruling Conservative party announced that it was cutting $4 
million earmarked for the MMRP, effectively terminating this program and ending all 
federal financial support for medical cannabis research in Canada. As a result, Health 
Canada's initial commitment to a five-year, $7.5 million dollar research plan was reduced 
to a three year, two-study initiative.391 
The Government’s policy to supply individuals with marihuana was insufficient to render 
the MMAR constitutional. In 2006, Clifford Long was a passenger in a car that was 
stopped by the police for a seatbelt infraction. He was charged under section 4(1) of the 
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CDSA for possession of approximately 3.5 grams of marihuana.392 The earlier case of R v 
Parker had established that without a valid medical exemption, the criminal prohibition 
was invalid. Long argued that there was not a valid medical exemption in place at the 
time and therefore section 4(1) was invalid.393  
His liberty was at stake and he argued that although the government had established a 
policy to supply cannabis, the policy was not a law. The Regulations merely permitted the 
Government to supply cannabis. They did not require it nor did they entitle authorized 
persons to anything other than the right to ask the Government for access.394 There was 
no obligation on the government to supply marihuana. Long argued that it did not matter 
whether a particular Minister was well intentioned or happened to exercise his or her 
discretion reasonably. What mattered was the exemption amounted to unfettered 
discretion, contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.395 The Court agreed. They 
found that the MMAR created a “constitutionally unacceptable medical marihuana 
exemption.”396 The Court reasoned that since the constitutionality of the Regulations 
depended on Parliament providing a legal supply of cannabis, a policy to supply it is 
insufficient. The Government must take on the legal obligation.397  
Because Long was able to show there was not a constitutionally valid medical exemption 
in place, it followed from Parker that the criminal prohibition in the CDSA was of no 
force and effect and he was acquitted. The Government subsequently took on the legal 
obligation to provide marihuana to individuals with a medical need and thus addressed 
that particular defect. 
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Further amendments in 2007 addressed other concerns about the MMAR. It focused on 
correcting inconsistencies between the English and French versions with minor changes 
to certain substantive provisions, largely dealing with the production site.398  
These amendments did not change the 1:1 ratio of authorized person to licensed grower 
contained in section 41(b.1), which Parliament re-enacted after Hitzig. Although the 
Government made PPS marihuana and seeds available to persons holding an ATP, many 
individuals felt that the product was of inferior quality.399 The evidence indicated that less 
than 20% of authorized persons used this supply.400  
The number of authorized persons far exceeded the number of individuals who wanted to 
produce marihuana for medical purposes. The result of the 1:1 ratio was that there were 
not enough individuals to produce marihuana for authorized persons. In the absence of a 
quality legal supply, many individuals with an ATP went to the black market because 
they could not find a grower or grow their own.  
In Sfetkopoulos, the applicants applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the 
Minister of Health’s decision to deny a production licence to Carasel Harvest Supply 
Corporation, a husband and wife business that wanted to produce cannabis for more than 
one individual each.401 The issue was whether the 1:1 ratio provided an adequate licit 
supply to satisfy section 7. The Federal Court, for largely the same reasons in Hitzig, 
found that for those who need to use marihuana for medicinal purposes, the right to 
security of the person entailed access to medication without undue state interference.402 
The Court considered the Government’s justifications for the 1:1 ratio provided in the 
December 2003 amendments but found they were not substantial or compelling when 
measured against the violation of security of the person. Among other things, the Court 
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found the 1:1 ratio did not have the effect of maintaining control over distribution of an 
unapproved drug product:  
Indeed it seems logical that if designated producers were authorized to 
produce for many customers there would be economies of scale and a level 
of income that might make possible even better quality control by the 
producer. At the same time, a host of one-customer designated producers 
would be made unnecessary and therefore any control and inspection system 
Health Canada might wish to impose on designated producers would be 
simpler and cheaper to operate with fewer producers.403 
The judge found the 1:1 ratio was not rationally connected to the objective of minimizing 
diversion. He said, “designated producers, no matter how many customers they have, 
must confine their sales to persons with an ATP. A designated producer, since he is 
authorized to grow marihuana now, has a present potential for producing more than his 
one customer needs and diverting the surplus for illicit sale. This would be true whether 
he grows for one customer or 25.”404 The judge acknowledged that with a larger 
operation it is easier to hide a larger surplus, but found that was not compelling since 
fewer authorized producers make it easier to inspect.405 
Other justifications for the 1:1 ratio were considered and rejected.406 The Court 
concluded it was not tenable for the government to force individuals to buy from PPS, 
grow their own, or be limited to the unnecessarily restrictive system of designated 
producers. Since the only alternative was to purchase cannabis illegally, this violated the 
rule of law and was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice.407 
The Federal Court declared the 1:1 ratio contained in section 41(b.1) invalid. The 
declaration was not suspended. The appeal by the Attorney General was dismissed408 and 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied.409  	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In response to Sfetkopoulos, the Government amended the MMAR in 2009. On May 14, 
2009, the Government enacted a new ratio of two authorized persons for each licensed 
producer.  
This response was meant to be an incremental step while the government considered a 
new licensing regime for larger-scale marihuana production, which would include 
comprehensive labelling, security, and record-keeping requirements similar to those in 
place for other controlled substances.410 At this time, the Government suggested that 
wider stakeholder consultation and a broader review of the marihuana medical access 
program would consider the constitutional issues raised by the existing MMAR.411 
In 2009, Matthew Beren was charged with possession, trafficking and production of 
cannabis in connection with a large growing operation that supplied the Vancouver Island 
Compassion Club (VICC). Beren made a number of arguments to suggest the MMAR 
remained unconstitutional.412 Beren's position was that the practical effect is that the 
exemption created by the MMAR is illusory for most Canadians.413 
Beren argued the MMAR were constitutionally defective in two main areas. The first was 
that the exemption was too difficult to access due to the MMAR requirements for a 
physician declaration. The second was that the legal supply was inadequate.414 He argued 
that the MMAR, even after the amendments, did not create a constitutionally adequate 
means for qualified persons to obtain an exemption from the absolute prohibition 
because: 
a) the MMAR requirement that a physician be the gatekeeper to the legal 
protections of the programs acts to render the exemptions from the 
criminal law practically unavailable to the vast majority of persons who 
could benefit from the use of medical cannabis; 
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b) the MMAR requirement that a specialist in the particular illness or disease 
be consulted in relation to category 2 applications is an arbitrary 
restriction on access; 
c) the MMAR requirement that a physician and patient declare that all 
conventional treatments have been tried or considered and rejected is an 
arbitrary restriction on access; 
d) the MMAR restriction on the categories of health care professionals that 
can act as gatekeepers to the legal protections of the program, limiting the 
gatekeeper role solely to medical doctors, is arbitrary; 
e) the MMAR requirement that authorized persons in category 1 renew their 
licences on an annual basis is arbitrary; and 
f) significant delays in processing applications under the MMAR, as well as 
renewals and amendments, undercut the existence of the right and, for 
terminal patients, make the protection practically unavailable.415 
Beren also argued that the CDSA, as modified by the MMAR and Health Canada's supply 
policy did not create a constitutionally adequate method for qualified persons to obtain a 
legal, adequate and effective supply of cannabis because: 
a) the MMAR restriction in s. 41(b.1) that prohibits a producer from 
growing cannabis for more than one authorized person, otherwise known 
as the one-to-one ratio restriction, is arbitrary; 
b) the MMAR restriction in s. 54.1 that prohibits more than three production 
licence holders from growing at any one physical location, otherwise 
known as the "three max" restriction, is arbitrary; 
c) the federal government's sale, pursuant to a discretionary policy, of a 
single strain of non-organic, pre-ground, gamma-radiated dried cannabis 
to licensed end-users does not rectify the supply problems created by the 
one-to-one ratio and three max restriction; 
d) the federal government's policy decision to cease providing dried 
cannabis to persons that are unable to afford it acts to prevent access to a 
legal supply of cannabis and forces some authorized persons to either 
obtain cannabis from the black market or to go without; 
e) the Health Canada policy of contacting physicians regarding daily 
dosages, levels in excess of five or ten grams per day does not facilitate 
the purposes of the program and is not conducive to the health and healing 	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of the end-users and acts to prevent or limit access to an adequate lawful 
supply of medical cannabis; and 
f) the government policy decision to permit only the possession of dried 
cannabis, which has the effect of not permitting the legal use of cannabis 
resin or the derivatives made with cannabis resin, such as baked goods, 
salves and sprays is arbitrary.416 
The arguments about the 1:1 ratio were moot because Parliament had already amended 
this ratio to 2:1. Evidence was provided on the total number of Canadians who use 
marihuana for medical purposes. The estimates are based on survey data and cannot be 
regarded as entirely reliable. Apparently, the range is somewhere between 400,000 and 
one million.417 It is uncertain what number of these would meet the level of constitutional 
protection. 
The Court found Beren's s. 7 rights to liberty and security of the person were engaged by 
the restrictions imposed on producing marihuana.418 However, the Court held there was 
ample justification for the requirement of a physician or specialist’s declaration.419 
On the supply issue, the Court said that even without judging the medical evidence on the 
efficacy of different strains, it was rational for individuals to prefer suppliers who could 
offer them different strains, especially when it was accompanied by research to support 
the claimed effects.420 The Court also struck the “three max” provision in section 54.1, 
which limited common production.421 The Court said it was axiomatic that the arbitrary 
restrictions were not rationally connected to the objectives. Thus, the section 7 breach 
was not saved by section 1.422  
The remedy was to declare the impugned sections unconstitutional and they were severed 
from the MMAR. The declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year to allow the 	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Government to research alternative methods of distribution that would adequately address 
the supply issue.423 Beren was found guilty of producing and trafficking in marihuana 
outside of the legal framework provided by the constitutionally valid parts of the 
MMAR.424 
In 2010, the Government amended the MMAR primarily to address the vacuum that was 
created when section 54.1 was struck down.425 Now, up to four production licences can 
be issued for a single production site (“four max”). These amendments also allowed 
individuals with a PUPL to grow for another authorized person, which was overlooked 
when the ratio was amended for DPPL holders.426 
In 2011, Matthew Mernagh claimed that the defence purportedly offered by the MMAR 
remained illusory for many individuals who require marihuana for medical purposes. He 
tendered evidence to show that the vast majority of doctors refuse to sign the medical 
declaration required by the MMAR.  
Mernagh was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, scoliosis, seizures and depression. 
Prescription medications had accompanied unwanted effects and failed to provide 
adequate relief of his symptoms. For Mernagh, pain was a constant companion.427 He 
cultivated his own supply of cannabis. The evidence showed that used medicinally, it 
eased his symptoms and allowed him to function.428 Despite his efforts, Mernagh was 
unable to find a doctor to support his ATP, meaning that his cultivation and possession of 
cannabis was illegal.429 He challenged the possession, production and trafficking of 
cannabis provisions of the CDSA. Mernagh contended that the combined effect of an 
inaccessible medical exemption system and a criminal prohibition for accessing 
necessary medial treatment violated his liberty and security of the person and was 	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contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. The Government argued that the 
problem with access was not a problem with the MMAR and the fault lay with doctors 
whose medical opinion was not subject to government control or the requirements of the 
Charter.430 
The viva voce and affidavit evidence entered at trial illustrated that the state-imposed 
barriers to legal access are a clear violation of security of the person for individuals who 
require marihuana for medical purposes. The Court found:  
A common theme in the evidence of all of the patient witnesses was that 
they suffer from medical conditions that are serious, debilitating and 
painful. All of the patient witnesses had been prescribed opioids (narcotics) 
by their physicians and all of the witnesses had, after a period of time, found 
that these prescribed medications were either ineffective in managing their 
symptoms, and/or caused side effects, some of which have led to other 
serious health issues, including addiction. All of the patient witnesses had 
asked their physicians to assist them in obtaining a licence to use marihuana 
under the federal program, but most of the physicians involved had refused 
to do so. Accordingly, the medical use of marihuana by these individuals 
constitutes a criminal activity, even though they are not criminally minded 
people. This in turn has created an additional a source of concern and 
anxiety for all of the patient witnesses. The stress of which further 
undermines their health.431 
The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) said it “recognizes and is sympathetic, to, the 
needs of those individuals who may gain or hope to gain benefit from the use of 
marihuana in relieving their symptoms.” However, the Association was disappointed with 
the way the medical exemption system had been implemented because the MMAR puts 
doctors in an “unenviable” position of authorizing a potentially harmful drug that had not 
been approved.432  
The evidence presented in Mernagh showed the extent of the medical profession’s 
ongoing concern, particularly in regard to the lack of meaningful consultation with the 
profession before the MMAR was enacted.433 The Court found many factors contributed 	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to physician reluctance to authorize the medical use marihuana, including the stigma 
associated with marihuana434 and the influence of the pharmaceutical industry.435 Since 
doctors are not specifically informed about the therapeutic benefits and risks of 
marihuana, they lacked information about its clinical effectiveness.436 The judge found 
that patients were often educating their doctors on the medicinal benefits of cannabis, 
rather than the other way around.437 The Court also examined the negative impact of 
opioid painkillers.438 The trial judge found as a fact that “the medical profession does not 
intend to accept the responsibility that Parliament has thrust upon them.”439  
A violation of life, liberty and security of the person was not debated in this case. All 
parties accepted that there was a violation that met the threshold test for seriousness. The 
legal analysis turned on whether this violation was consistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice.440  
The question the judge posed was “whether physician participation in the MMAR, or 
perhaps more accurately, the lack of it, has rendered the exemption (and thereby the 
defence), illusory?”441 As per Morgentaler, an illusory defence to a criminal charge will 
violate the principles of fundamental justice.442  
This case revisited the issue of physician cooperation briefly considered in other cases. In 
Hitzig, the requirement for a physician did not render the defence illusory because a 
sufficient number of individual physicians and specialists were authorizing the 
therapeutic use of cannabis. On that evidence, the exemption could not be said to be 
practically unavailable. However, the Hitzig Court noted that if the evidence showed 
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physician participation was a barrier to access, the conclusions could be revisited.443 In 
Mernagh, the Court summarized the law: 
The decisions in both Parker and Hitzig confirm the existence of a 
constitutional right to choose cannabis as medicine and the concomitant 
duty on government to provide a constitutionally viable means to exercise 
this right. Without an effective medical exemption, the Court held, the 
government loses the constitutional authority to retain the criminal 
prohibition against the use of cannabis.444 
The trial judge described the evidentiary record in the Mernagh case as “drastically,”445 
“dramatically”446 and “vastly”447 different than the record in Hitzig. In 2011, the evidence 
did not support the Crown’s contention that the Regulations were working.448  
“The widespread shortage of doctors in Canada and their broad based refusal to prescribe 
marihuana is a perfect complement to Health Canada’s policy of maintaining a tight, 
almost miserly, control over the distribution of medicinal marihuana.”449 The Court found 
that Health Canada’s “preference for tight controls as opposed to a prompt, fair and 
efficient approval process does not conform to the principles of fundamental justice.”450 
The trial judge stated: 
  In my respectful view, the intent to limit the availability of medicinal 
marihuana to a "small number of persons" is not in conformity with the 
legal principles set out in Parker and in Hitzig. "Small numbers" have 
nothing to do with respecting the constitutional rights of Canadians. Each 
citizen is entitled to be treated equally. If the citizen qualifies for 
admission to the program, it should not and does not matter that the 
government's expectations regarding the number of patients approved or 
expected to be approved for medicinal marihuana is exceeded.451 
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446 Ibid at 198. 
447 Ibid at 200. 
448 Ibid at 203. 
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In addition to the tight controls imposed by the MMAR, the numbers presented in 
Mernagh suggest that less than one half of one percent of physicians signed declarations 
for their patients between 1998 and 2010.452 There is likely a much greater need than is 
currently being served.  
Of the estimated 400,000 individuals who report using marihuana for medicinal 
purposes,453 it is uncertain how many have a legitimate need, have tried alternative 
treatments or who are content accessing the black market. Nevertheless, there still 
appears to be a sufficient number with a legitimate need who want to access the program 
but are unable to do so. In Mernagh, this was found to be a direct result of the MMAR, 
which designated physicians as gatekeepers without taking the necessary steps to secure 
their cooperation. Based on the evidence presented, the defence purportedly offered by 
the MMAR was found to be illusory and contrary to the principles of fundamental 
justice.454 The evidence showed that the refusal of physicians was a direct result of the 
measures adopted in the MMAR.  
The judge reasoned that by delegating doctors under the legislative scheme, it was 
incumbent on Parliament to ensure their preparation for, and acceptance of, the 
responsibilities that had been imposed on them to ensure the regulatory scheme would 
serve its intended purpose. “The deficiency with the legislation is not that doctors were 
appointed as gatekeepers, but the fact that there were no steps taken to obtain the support, 
co-operation and participation of the medical profession as gatekeepers before or after 
they were so designated.”455 
The legislation was not justified under section 1.456 The requirement for a physician was 
integral to the legislation and could not be severed while leaving the rest intact.457 The 	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453 Kalant & Porath-Waller, supra note 230 at 5. 
454 Mernagh, supra note 8 at 230, 234. 
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456 Ibid (there was no rational connection (at 272), minimal impairment (at 275) and was 
not proportionate to the objectives of the MMAR (at 298)). 
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remedy in this case was to strike down the entire legislation. The declaration of invalidity 
was suspended for three months, reflecting the amount of time these issues have been 
ongoing and the government’s failure to take positive steps to address the barriers to 
legitimate access.458 
The suspension of invalidity was extended until the Court of Appeal renders its decision. 
Thus, the Criminal Code provisions remain in full force and effect.459 The appeal was 
heard May 7 - 8, 2012.460 
The most recent SCC decision discussing the scope of section 7 concerned a federal 
exemption for Insite, an established supervised injection site in Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside (DTES). The site was established in 2003 in response to crisis-level health 
problems associated with injection drug use concentrated in a small geographical region 
of downtown Vancouver.461 Many of the health problems were not a result of the drugs 
themselves, but of the unsafe practices that were apparently consequences of the criminal 
prohibition.462 The evidence presented in that case described addicts sharing needles and 
using dirty puddle water to dissolve drugs before injection.463 Cooperation between 
municipal, provincial and federal jurisdictions resulted in a pilot project aimed at 
reducing these problems.464  
Since 2003, Insite had been operating under an exemption contained in section 56 of the 
CDSA. In 2008, the federal government failed to extend Insite’s exemption from the 
operation of criminal laws.465 This resulted in legal action by the claimants for 	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459 Public Prosecution Service of Canada, News Release, “Court Grants Stay Pending 
Appeal” (22 June 2011) online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/nws-
nvs/comm/2011/22_06_11.html> 
460 Megan O’Toole, “Crown urges Ontario court to overturn medical marijuana ruling”, 
National Post (7 May 2012), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/05/07/crown-
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462 Ibid at 93. 
463 Ibid at 10. 
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declarations that the CDSA was unconstitutional as it applied to Insite or, in the 
alternative, that the Minister of Health, in refusing to grant an extension of the 
exemption, had violated the claimants’ rights.466 
Although the unanimous Court upheld the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,467 they 
found that the Minister of Health’s exercise of discretion to deny a continued exemption 
for medical purposes violated drug addicts’ right to security of the person and did not 
accord with the principles of fundamental justice. Specifically, they found the Minister’s 
decision was arbitrary and disproportionate. 
On the issue of the constitutionality of the CDSA provisions, the Court found for the 
offence of possession, the availability of imprisonment as a penalty engaged the liberty 
interests of the staff because they could be found guilty of this offence by virtue of 
having knowledge of the presence of drugs, and consenting to their presence in the 
facility over which they have control.468 Without an exemption, staff would be unable to 
legally provide services to their clients, which would deprive them of potentially 
lifesaving medical care, thus engaging their rights to life and security of the person.469 
The Court said: “To prohibit possession by drug users anywhere engages their liberty 
interests; to prohibit possession at Insite engages their rights to life and to security of the 
person.”470 However, because neither the activities of the clients nor staff at Insite could 
be construed as trafficking, they did not have the requisite standing to challenge the 
trafficking provision.471 
In considering whether the violations of the liberty and security of the person accorded 
with the principles of fundamental justice, the Court considered two objectives of the 
CDSA: the protection of public health and the maintenance of public safety.472  	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469 Ibid at 91. 
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The public safety purpose of the Act is achieved by the prohibition on 
possession and trafficking in listed substances.  The public health purpose of 
the statute is achieved not only by the prohibitions in ss. 4(1) and 5(1), 
which seek to avert the use of dangerous substances, but also by the 
provision of regulations guiding exemptions for and the use of listed 
substances for medical and scientific purposes in ss. 55 and 56 of the Act.473 
In Parker, the Minister’s broad discretionary power contained in section 56 amounted to 
unfettered discretion.474 In contrast, the SCC found that this exemption was a “safety 
valve that prevents the CDSA from applying where it would be arbitrary, overbroad or 
grossly disproportionate in its effects.”475 Therefore, the Minister’s discretion is limited 
by the Charter and not unfettered. In this case, they found that the CDSA itself was not 
the problem. Based on the evidence, the Minister’s failure to exempt Insite was arbitrary. 
Following the same reasoning that was applied to the CDSA, the Court found the 
Minister’s decision engaged the claimants’ section 7 rights to life and security of the 
person. The Minister’s refusal to grant a further exemption was arbitrary and grossly 
disproportionate in its effects and therefore did not comport with the principles of 
fundamental justice.476 
The SCC provided a framework to guide the arbitrariness analysis. The Court said the 
first step is to identify the law’s objectives.477 The second step is to identify the 
relationship between the state interest and the impugned law, or, in this case, the 
impugned decision of the Minister.478 The SCC reviewed the jurisprudence on 
arbitrariness: 
The jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled. In Chaoulli, three 
justices (per McLachlin C.J. and Major J.) preferred an approach that 	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474 See Parker, supra note 6 at 117.  The SCC distinguishes the unfettered discretion of 
the Minister in Insite from that in Parker because, “No decision of the Minister was at 
stake in Parker, and the Court’s conclusion rested on findings of the trial judge that, at 
that time, ‘the availability of the exemption was illusory.’” 
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asked whether a limit was “necessary” to further the state objective (paras. 
131-32). Conversely, three other justices (per Binnie and LeBel JJ.), 
preferred to avoid the language of necessity and instead approved of the 
prior articulation of arbitrariness as where “[a] deprivation of a right . . . 
bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies 
behind the legislation” (para. 232).  It is unnecessary to determine which 
approach should prevail, because the government action at issue in this 
case qualifies as arbitrary under both definitions.479 
There appear to be three different tests for arbitrariness: whether the impugned law is 
necessary to achieve the objectives, whether the deprivation bears any relationship to the 
objective, or whether it is inconsistent with the state interest that lies behind it.  
In this case, the evidence showed that the operations at Insite actually furthered the 
objectives of public health and safety by reducing the risk of death and disease without 
leading to increased crime rates, public injection or relapse rates.480 The staff intervened 
in 336 overdoses since 2006 with not a single death.481 The Court said that the Minister’s 
decision was arbitrary regardless of whether the Court adopted the tests for arbitrariness 
from Rodriguez or Chaoulli. It bore “no relation” to the objectives, it was “inconsistent 
with” its underlying objectives and it was “not necessary” to achieve the legislative 
aims.482  
On the issue of gross disproportionality, the Court simply said: 
The application of the possession prohibition to Insite is also grossly 
disproportionate in its effects.  Gross disproportionality describes state 
actions or legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be 
disproportionate to any legitimate government interest: Malmo-Levine, at 
para. 143. Insite saves lives. Its benefits have been proven. There has been 
no discernable negative impact on the public safety and health objectives of 
Canada during its eight years of operation. The effect of denying the 
services of Insite to the population it serves is grossly disproportionate to 
any benefit that Canada might derive from presenting a uniform stance on 
the possession of narcotics.483  	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Although the parties did not make a section 1 argument, the SCC said no justification 
would succeed.484  
The Minister’s decision was found to be unreasonable based on the empirical evidence 
about the Insite facility.485 This case highlights the necessity of empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that the measures are related to the objective. Policy simpliciter is not 
sufficient to justify infringing Charter rights.486 
The reasoning in Insite was recently applied in the case of Canada v Bedford, which 
considered section 7 in the context of prostitution.487  In Canada, prostitution is legal. 
However, some incidental activities such as operating bawdy houses, living off its avails 
and communicating for the purposes of prostitution are illegal. Terri Jean Bedford, 
Valerie Scott and Amy Lebovitch were and are sex workers: prostitutes.488 They 
challenged the constitutionality of Canada’s Criminal Code sections 210, 212(1)(j) and 
213(1)(c) under sections 2 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I will 
focus on the Court’s analysis of the section 7 right to security of the person and the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
The evidence showed that the legislation prohibiting bawdy houses had the effect of 
isolating prostitutes, thus making their working conditions more dangerous. They could 
not hire bodyguards or drivers who could increase their safety due to the prohibition on 
living off the avails of prostitution. Lastly, for the most vulnerable sex workers on the 
street, the prohibition against communicating for the purposes of prostitution made it 
extremely difficult to assess and vet potential customers. As a result, these provisions 
created an extremely unsafe situation for individuals engaged in a lawful activity.489  
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The Ontario Court of Appeal found there was a violation of prostitutes’ security of the 
person. They said: “Properly understood, the respondents’ security of the person claim is 
about self-preservation. The preservation of one’s physical safety and well-being is a 
fundamental component of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy lies at the heart of the 
right to security of the person.”490  
Although it was their clients who inflicted violence on the prostitutes, the law was found 
to play a sufficient contributory role by preventing prostitutes from taking steps that 
could reduce the risk of such violence.491  To determine whether there is a sufficient 
causal connection between the impugned legislation and the rights violation, the court 
must first determine what it is that the legislation prohibits or requires. The next step is to 
determine how the statutory prohibition or requirement impacts those who claim to have 
suffered a limitation on their right to security of the person because of the legislation. 
Finally, it is necessary to examine the actual impact of the legislation and determine 
whether it limits or otherwise interferes with the physical and psychological integrity 
protected by security of the person.  
Individually and in tandem, the impugned provisions in this case criminalized conduct 
that would mitigate the risk posed to prostitutes.492 Therefore, the legislation increased 
the risk of physical harm. This was found to compromise prostitutes’ personal integrity 
and autonomy, which lies at the core of the right to security of the person.493 
In considering the principles of fundamental justice, the Court noted that the analysis 
turns on the relationship between the law and its objective. Each principle of fundamental 
justice uses a different “filter” to assess the relationship. The Court provided a clear 
framework to be applied in the arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality 
analysis though it is unclear whether it can be applied consistently.  
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The Court identified the objectives of the impugned provisions. The objectives of the 
bawdyhouse provision were to combat neighbourhood disruption or disorder, and to 
safeguard public health and safety.494 The objective of the provision prohibiting living off 
the avails of prostitution was to prevent pimps from profiting from the exploitation of 
prostitutes.495 The objectives of the communication provision were to curtail street 
solicitation and the social nuisance that it creates.496 The Court’s characterization of the 
objectives may not reflect Parliament’s initial concern with the immorality of 
prostitution. In my submission, criminalizing activities incidental to prostitution is related 
to the objective of discouraging prostitution, not just to curtail a social nuisance.   
 The Court found the bawdyhouse provision was overbroad because it caught conduct 
that did not contribute to the social harm that Parliament sought to curtail.497 The Court 
found the provision grossly disproportionate because the extreme impact on prostitutes’ 
health and safety.498 The Court found the avails provision was overbroad. They “read in” 
words so the provision prohibited living off the avails of prostitution only “in exploitive 
circumstances.” This remedy attempted to ensure the provision did not use means that 
were broader than necessary to accomplish the valid state objective.499 Despite finding 
that communication with potential clients is an indispensible screening tool used to 
enhance safety for the most vulnerable street prostitutes, two of three judges held that the 
communication provision did not violate the principles of fundamental justice in that it 
was not arbitrary,500 overbroad501 or grossly disproportionate.502  
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Leave to appeal to the SCC was filed May 25, 2012503 and, if granted, will be another 
case where the empirical evidence presented in court will inform a controversial decision 
on socio-legal issues with broad implications across Canada. The analysis in the recent 
section 7 cases shows that the way the objectives are framed will have a significant 
impact on the legal analysis. 
Building on this foundation of Charter challenges, in April 2012, Owen Smith challenged 
the constitutionality of the MMAR requirement for cannabis to be in a dried form. This 
challenge took place during a voir dire on the criminal charges that he was facing. Smith 
was processing cannabis plants to separate the active ingredients from the plant and 
infuse them into cookies, oil-filled capsules, and other edible and non-edible products.504 
These were sold at the Cannabis Buyers Club of Canada where Smith was employed.505 
The Crown argued that:  
The current licensing scheme, which restricts authorized medical users to 
dried marihuana, or that limits the number of plants a licensed producer may 
grow, allows police or regulators to easily ascertain whether a medical 
possessor or producer is exceeding the limits of their respective 
authorizations, thus limiting the chances that some of the product ostensibly 
might be diverted into the illegal distribution network.506 
Both the narrow and broad definitions of the right to liberty were engaged. There was a 
potential for imprisonment as well as a deprivation of the fundamental personal choice. 
Security of the person was also engaged. The judge’s findings of fact included that: 
 
Oral ingestion also has the benefit of prolonging the effects of the drug in 
the system, with the corresponding detriment of taking longer to build a 
therapeutic level of the drug than would occur with smoking, for example. 
 
Because orally ingested THC or CBD stays in the system longer, it would 
be better for someone with a chronic condition of pain or glaucoma, where 
some level of therapeutic dosage would remain while the patient 	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slept.507 
The judge paraphrased Parker, saying that the restriction of cannabis to its dried form 
constituted “an interposition of the threat of criminal prosecution between them and the 
form of medication found effective to treat the symptoms of their very serious 
illnesses.”508 
Turning to consider the principles of fundamental justice, the judge considered that there 
was some reduced risk in administration of cannabinoid therapies that were non-
smoked.509 Importantly, Johnston J. found, “It is not possible to tell by looking what the 
contents of a cookie might be, or what concentration of THC a capsule of oil might 
contain.”510 The same laboratory analysis would have to be undertaken regardless of 
whether cannabis was in dried form or some other form. Thus, he found the restriction of 
marihuana to its dried form was arbitrary because it was not rationally connected to the 
state interests, including preventing diversion and controlling false or misleading claims 
of medical benefit.511 
This case considered section 1 in more detail than most of the recent section 7 
jurisprudence, but found there was “little rational connection” between restricting 
cannabis to its dried form and the legitimate objective of preventing diversion of lawful 
medical marihuana into the illegal market.512 The restriction of cannabis to its dried form 
unreasonably impaired the right to choose how to ingest the medicinal ingredients in the 
safest and most effective manner.513 These restrictions were not proportionate and 
therefore violated section 7 of the Charter in a manner that was not consistent with 
section 1.514  
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IV: Conclusions on Section Seven of the Charter 
A substantial overhaul of the MMAR is needed to render the marihuana medical access 
program constitutionally sound. Currently, the biggest problems with the MMAR relate to 
the issues of obtaining legal authorization and accessing a legal supply. These are 
complex policy questions that require a careful balancing of interests. Charter values 
must be used to develop a constitutional medical marihuana access program but they do 
not provide a roadmap to implementation. 
After almost three decades of litigation, the outer limits of “life, liberty and security of 
the person” as well the “principles of fundamental justice” are still rapidly developing in 
response to new fact scenarios.515 The constitutional analysis differs depending on the 
objectives of the legislative scheme and the specific facts that are said to violate life, 
liberty and security of the person. Much of the constitutional analysis in recent judgments 
suggests a heavy reliance on empirical evidence to reach a conclusion on whether the 
legislation infringes section 7. There is a sufficient body of research to support the 
medical use of marihuana for some individuals.  
Below, I consider the implications of the research evidence applied to the Charter. I 
reach a conclusion on the threshold level for a violation of security of the person. I assess 
whether the legislative measures of the MMAR and their effects are consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice using the tests articulated in the jurisprudence. From 
this, it is possible to develop medical marihuana access regulations that balance the 
interests of individuals and society. I turn first to what circumstances will violate security 
of the person.  
Security of the Person 
A lack of access to medical treatment that interferes with the individual’s physical and 
psychological integrity in a substantial way meets the threshold for violating security of 
the person. Where these conditions are met, state barriers to accessing the treatment that 
bear no relation to the objectives will violate the principles of fundamental justice. The 	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case law illustrates that a breach of security of the person will only be violated when 
there is evidence of significant harm to the individual’s physical or psychological 
integrity that is substantially relieved by the prohibited treatment. However, the level of 
harm or suffering "need not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but 
must be greater than ordinary stress or anxiety."516 
Individuals are not entitled to unlimited choice in their medical treatment and the 
Supreme Court has said the state is justified in restricting general access to marihuana 
based upon a reasonable apprehension of harm.517 There are some clear cases where the 
empirical and individual evidence demonstrably shows substantial unique benefits of 
cannabis. Specifically, it has reliable effects in increasing appetite, decreasing pain, intra-
ocular pressure, nausea, vomiting, spasticity, seizures and may relieve the psychological 
discomfort that accompanies these maladies.518 Clearly, these symptoms seriously affect 
a person’s quality of life. If using cannabis substantially relieves serious symptoms, 
depriving individuals of this drug will violate their security of the person. 
Other individuals may gain significant relief by using marihuana but the evidence of a 
benefit over existing therapies is inconclusive. In these cases, it is scientifically uncertain 
whether the benefits outweigh the risks. Here, it is unclear whether marihuana is a 
necessary medicine that would meet the threshold for Charter protection. Whether these 
individuals will qualify for constitutional protection to possess and use marihuana 
depends on the individual circumstances. Security of the person will not be violated 
unless the physical or psychological stress rises above the ordinary level. However, it 
"need not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness."519 The only way to 
determine whether the level of physical and psychological harm rises to a level of 
constitutional protection is for a medical professional to critically examine the empirical 
evidence and the individual patient. 
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518 See VIII: Medical Benefits. 
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In the context of the federal criminal prohibitions contained in the CDSA, the threat of 
criminalization and restrictions on choice engage the liberty interest. Criminalizing and 
depriving individuals who require cannabis for medicinal use affects their physical and 
psychological integrity, fundamental to their security of the person.520 Although there has 
not been a need to argue a violation of life, this dimension of section 7 may also be 
engaged where deprivation of marihuana increases the risk of death. These serious threats 
to the rights protected in section 7 require the objectives to be clearly connected to valid 
objectives.  
An inaccessible exemption system coupled with a criminal prohibition manifestly 
violates some individuals’ physical and psychological integrity. It is no answer to say 
these individuals can suffer through ineffective, unpleasant conventional treatments with 
significant risks when the evidence shows that for some individuals, cannabis provides 
relief beyond what is currently available in the pharmacopeia. For these individuals, 
cannabis is a necessary medical treatment. Parliament has carved out an exemption to the 
operation of the criminal law. Individuals who obtain an authorization to possess under 
the MMAR are exempt from the operation of the criminal law. State barriers to access for 
those who require medical marihuana must conform to the principles of fundamental 
justice.  
Principles of Fundamental Justice 
I have reviewed the evidence on cannabis and its application in a therapeutic context. 
After finding the criminal prohibition on marihuana infringes the rights to liberty and 
security of the person for medical users, the next step in the constitutional analysis is to 
consider whether these infringements are consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice.  
For individuals who gain a medical benefit from using marihuana, the criminal 
prohibition against its possession is arbitrary because it works in opposition to the goal of 
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protecting public health.521 Without a constitutionally valid exemption system, 
individuals who have a medical need for marihuana are subject to criminal liability. The 
MMAR provide an exemption to the operation of the criminal law. Parliament has 
indicated the people who qualify under these Regulations are not deserving of social 
censure because they require marihuana for medical purposes. As the Court said in 
Morgentaler: 
One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that when 
Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should not be 
illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically illusory. The criminal law 
is a very special form of governmental regulation, for it seeks to express our 
society's collective disapprobation of certain acts and omissions. When a 
defence is provided, especially a specifically-tailored defence to a particular 
charge, it is because the legislator has determined that the disapprobation of 
society is not warranted when the conditions of the defence are met.522 
Legislation that has the effect of forcing people to the black market will violate the rule 
of law, one of the fundamental principles of justice. Vague, arbitrary, overbroad or 
grossly disproportionate laws will violate the principles of fundamental justice. The 
Charter defines the borders of state action, drawn in relation to valid objectives.  
The principles of fundamental justice are the fulcrum of Charter violations. In Part Three 
of this paper, I look at the existing system, considered in light of the minimum Charter 
requirements and contemplate what an ideal system might include.  
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PART THREE: TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL 
In what follows, I will review the main provisions of the current MMAR and consider the 
Charter threshold. I suggest an optimal system to ensure the law is prudent and effective, 
which goes beyond the minimum requirements of the Charter. As the Court of Appeal 
commented in Parker, “Parliament is not bound to legislate to the constitutional 
minimum. It can adopt the optimal and most progressive legislative scheme that it 
considers just.”523  
I: The Current MMAR 
In addition to its objectives, the current MMAR has four parts. Part 1 establishes a 
framework for individuals to apply for an authorization to possess. Part 2 deals with 
licences to produce marihuana, either for personal use or as a designated producer. Part 3 
includes general obligations. Part 4 establishes a supply of marihuana seed and dried 
marihuana. I will address each of these in turn. 
Objectives 
MMAR 
The objectives of the MMAR are “to establish a framework to allow access to marihuana 
by individuals suffering from grave or debilitating illnesses, where conventional 
treatments are inappropriate or are not providing adequate relief.”524 The objectives of the 
MMAR are intrinsically entwined with those of its enabling legislation, the CDSA. The 
SCC recently identified the objectives of the CDSA as the protection of public health and 
the maintenance of public safety.525  
The public safety purpose of the [CDSA] is achieved by the prohibition on 
possession and trafficking in listed substances.  The public health purpose of 
the statute is achieved not only by the prohibitions in ss. 4(1) and 5(1), 
which seek to avert the use of dangerous substances, but also by the 
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provision of regulations guiding exemptions for and the use of listed 
substances for medical and scientific purposes in ss. 55 and 56 of the Act.526 
The objectives of these related pieces of legislation attempt to limit marihuana use to 
those who truly need it so that the inherent risks are minimized. There are two standards 
set out for eligibility in the MMAR. First, the suffering must be “grave or debilitating” 
and second, conventional treatments have failed. These standards appear to be overbroad. 
I address each of these below. 
The first requirement attempts to limit the use of marihuana to those individuals who are 
suffering from “grave or debilitating” illnesses. However, this high threshold is not 
consistent with the jurisprudence that says stress "need not rise to the level of nervous 
shock or psychiatric illness."527 In order to reach a minimum level of Charter protection, 
the pain or discomfort must be “greater than ordinary stress or anxiety” and the relief 
offered by marihuana must be substantial. However, the standard of “grave or 
debilitating” sets the bar too high. Individuals who are not suffering grave or debilitating 
illnesses may also qualify for Charter protection. 
An ideal system would limit the medical use of cannabis to those with serious and 
significant symptoms that are substantially relieved by marihuana or cannabinoid-based 
treatments. This more accurately reflects the Charter standards for security of the person 
while still maintaining limits set for medical use. Use of the word cannabis rather than 
marihuana connotes the whole-plant rather than simply the dried buds.  
The second requirement that conventional treatments are inappropriate or failing to 
provide adequate relief is also aimed at protecting public health and safety. This 
requirement does not seem to be arbitrary. It is rationally connected to the objective of 
protecting public heath by limiting access to an unapproved drug that carries some health 
risks.  
Approved drugs have gone through rigorous testing procedures and the risks and benefits 
are generally known. The Court in Parker explained, “One only has to remember the 	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tragedy of Thalidomide to understand the need for the regulatory structure.”528 However, 
unlike newly developed pharmaceutical drugs like Thalidomide, marihuana is a plant-
based drug that has co-existed with humans for millennia.529 While a degree of scientific 
precision about its risks and benefits is lacking, there is a great deal of experiential 
knowledge about its effects on humans for some conditions. Additionally, the known 
risks associated with approved pharmaceutical drugs, such as opioid painkillers, are often 
greater than the known risks of marihuana.530 The harms associated with smoking can be 
mitigated by a variety of non-smoked methods. 
Fundamental personal choice and control over one’s body are both protected by section 7 
yet this does not entail an unlimited choice of medication. Some individuals whose pain 
rises to the level of constitutional protection clearly benefit from using marihuana. The 
requirement that conventional treatments are ineffective or medically inappropriate for 
these individuals is an infringement of their rights to liberty and security of the person. 
Where the benefits are significant and the risks can be mitigated, it would be overbroad to 
require all conventional medications are tried first. 
In other instances, where the benefits are not as clear, it is prudent to first consider 
medications that have been approved. In these cases, the requirement for conventional 
medications to fail does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the public heath and 
safety objectives. In cases where the evidence is unclear that cannabis provides a unique 
benefit, there is a valid state interest to require individuals to consider other options 
before cannabis.  
The Charter Minimum 
The Charter minimum would entail providing access to those who are suffering from 
diseases where the level of stress or pain, due to its intensity or duration, seriously affects 
the individual’s quality of life. It need not rise to the level of “grave or debilitating.” In 	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most cases, the range of conventional treatments will be considered before cannabis. 
However, for those individuals who suffer from symptoms or diseases where the 
empirical evidence demonstrates a unique benefit, other medications should not have to 
fail before cannabis can be considered. These individuals should be able to choose the 
risks they want to accept in the course of medical treatment. 
The Ideal 
An ideal objective might be “to provide access to cannabis (marihuana) to individuals 
suffering from serious physical or psychological distress where the benefits outweigh the 
known risks.”  
Use of the term cannabis, rather than marihuana is a more scientifically accurate term that 
contemplates a broader range of therapeutic products than simply the flowering buds of 
the plant. Increased use of other cannabinoid-based medications can lower the risks 
associated with smoking. The standards contained in this objective specifically address 
the Charter criteria for a breach of security of the person and balance the state interest by 
incorporating a standard by which to measure eligibility. It acknowledges that some risks 
and benefits are known. This is more specific than the previous requirement that the 
benefits outweigh the risks because in this statement, the risks are limited to the known 
risks. It provides a concrete standard against which doctors can weigh the evidence and 
establish a medical judgment. This objective is consistent with Canada’s international 
obligations under the 1988 Convention because the provisions of the UN Convention are 
subject to the “constitutional principles and basic concepts of its legal system.”531 
Authorization to Possess  
In this subsection, I look at the requirements of the current MMAR as it relates to 
eligibility for an authorization to possess, for both the individual declaration and the 
medical declaration. I assess the legislative requirements contained in the MMAR 
according to the minimum requirements of the Charter. After ascertaining the Charter 
minimum, I deal with the optimal way of obtaining the requisite medical authorization 
and an authorization to possess. 	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Individual Declaration  
MMAR 
The current MMAR require individuals to apply under one of two categories according to 
their symptoms and associated medical conditions. Individuals may be eligible under 
Category 1 or Category 2.  
Category 1 is defined as individuals who are treated within the context of compassionate 
end-of-life care or have any of the listed symptoms in the Schedule reproduced below.532 
 Symptom Associated Medical Conditions 
1. Severe nausea Cancer, AIDS/HIV infection 
2. Cachexia, anorexia, weight 
loss 
Cancer, AIDS/HIV infection 
3. Persistent muscle spasms Multiple sclerosis, spinal cord injury or disease 
4. Seizures Epilepsy 
5. Severe pain Cancer, AIDS/HIV infection, multiple sclerosis, spinal 
cord injury or disease, severe form of arthritis 
Category 2 is defined as “a debilitating symptom that is associated with a medical 
condition or with the medical treatment of that condition and that is not a Category 1 
symptom.”533 Glaucoma is one example of a Category 2 medical condition. 
Applicants must apply to the Minister and provide their own declaration, a medical 
declaration and two copies of a current photograph.534 In addition to providing personal 
information, the applicant must declare that they are aware that no notice of compliance 
has been issued under the Food and Drug Regulations (FDR) concerning the safety and 
effectiveness of marihuana as a drug.535 They must also declare that they have discussed 
the potential benefits and risks of using marihuana with the medical practitioner 
providing the medical declaration. Further, the applicant must declare they are aware that 	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the benefits and risks associated with the use of marihuana are not fully understood and 
that the use of marihuana may involve risks that have not yet been identified and that they 
accept those risks. If the daily dose is more than five grams, they must declare they are 
aware of and accept the potential risk of drug dependency as well as the elevated risks to 
the cardiovascular and pulmonary systems and psychomotor performance associated with 
long-term use. The applicant must sign, date and declare the information to be correct and 
complete. 
Charter Minimum 
The state objectives in requiring an individual declaration are to collect relevant personal 
information necessary to verify identity and ensure accurate record-keeping, proper 
medical use and acknowledgment that there are known and unknown risks. 
 Where the requirements of the legislation are met, the Minister has no discretion to deny 
the application. The requirements for an individual declaration in the MMAR address the 
goals of protecting public health and safety by collecting data for long-term monitoring, 
confirming the identity of the person who will receive the marihuana, ensuring they have 
a medical need and are cognizant of the risks. These measures are rationally connected to 
the objectives and are not arbitrary.  
The required information is not unusual. Most everything government-related requires 
some level of personal information and detail about the particular application. However, 
there is a delay between the time of physician approval and the time of legal 
authorization. The currently reported wait time for processing an application is eight to 
ten weeks.536 As the Court said in Parker, “an administrative structure made up of 
unnecessary rules, which result in an additional risk to the health of the person, is 
manifestly unfair and does not conform to the principles of fundamental justice.”537 
This is an unnecessary delay since the Minister is not judging the validity of the medical 
assessment. Government involvement in the final approval of what is ultimately a 	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medical decision is unnecessary and therefore overbroad. The requirement for the 
Minister to approve the application goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives. 
The delay caused by the application process coupled with the difficulty obtaining the 
requisite medical declaration adds to the delay and denial of medical care for many 
individuals with a medical need. The required procedure has effects that are grossly 
disproportionate to the benefit obtained by the state. The objectives of verifying ID, 
record-keeping and ensuring individuals are aware of the risks could be accomplished by 
other means that are not as great an infringement of individual rights. The benefit 
obtained by the state must be weighed against the violations to liberty and security of the 
person, which continue during the delay between physician approval and legal approval. 
During this time, individuals are either deprived of a needed medicine or must access the 
black market. In Hitzig, the rule of law was violated where individuals were forced to 
purchase their medicine from the black market.538  
By creating a two to three month delay in accessing needed medical treatment that has 
been approved by a physician, the current MMAR have established a legal regime that is 
overbroad because it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the valid objectives and 
violates the rule of law because it forces people to access the illegal market.  
The Ideal 
The required information could be collected through a mandatory filing requirement 
before or within a reasonable time of obtaining authorization. The same information that 
is currently required by the ATP form could be included in a filing requirement. A 
government-issued photo ID card could be mailed to the individual after the filing 
requirement has been fulfilled.  
A federally issued ID card addresses the concerns of law enforcement and individuals 
who need to show valid authorization. Enhanced security features should be used to 
prevent forgery. Restrictions and conditions about the extent of the authorization should 	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be clear on the card. A warning on the back of the card should alert individuals that there 
are unknown risks to using cannabis and should also indicate that breach of the 
conditions may result in civil and criminal penalties.  
A voluntary ID card program appears to be imprudent and ineffective. In California 
where the state-issued ID card is voluntary, only a small percentage of medical users 
have applied for the card because dispensaries issue their own.539 This makes it more 
difficult to ascertain the number of individuals who are legally authorized to use cannabis 
and to distinguish between legal and illegal users since authorization cards may be easy 
to forge.540 A voluntary system also makes it more difficult to track long-term health 
outcomes. 
A filing requirement and ID card system provides a rationally connected, minimally 
impairing solution. Mandatory filing is an infringement of liberty but it is in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. It is a small intrusion, which is not arbitrary, 
overbroad or grossly disproportionate. It is in the interests of all stakeholders to have a 
clear, consistent, uniform system of regulation. 
In the next section, I consider the medical declaration requirement in the MMAR, whether 
it accords with the Charter and what the ideal requirements should be.   
Medical Declaration 
MMAR 
Under the current MMAR, a physician must provide a medical declaration. This 
declaration must include relevant information about the physician and their authority to 
practice medicine. It must also include the name of the applicant, their medical condition, 
the symptom that is associated with the condition and whether the symptom is a Category 
1 or 2 symptom. The physician must declare that conventional treatments for the 	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symptom have been tried or considered and have been found to be ineffective or 
medically inappropriate for the treatment of the applicant. The physician must also 
declare that they are aware that no notice of compliance has been issued under the 
FDR.541  If the applicant is applying under Category 2, the medical declaration must also 
confirm that a specialist in a field relevant to the applicant’s symptoms has been 
consulted and agrees that conventional treatments for the symptom are ineffective or 
medically inappropriate. The specialist must be aware that marihuana is being considered 
as an alternative treatment.542 
The photograph on the federal ID card does not have to be a passport photo but must 
follow a similar format. The medical practitioner who is making the declaration must 
certify on the reverse side that the photograph is an accurate representation of the 
applicant.543  
If these requirements are met, the Minister shall issue an ATP and provide notice of 
authorization to the medical practitioner. The authorization includes the name, date of 
birth and gender as well as the person’s full address. It also includes an authorization 
number, the name of the medical practitioner, the maximum quantity of marihuana the 
person can possess, the date of issue and the date of expiry. The maximum quantity (in 
grams) is determined by a formula, which multiplies the daily dose (in grams) by 30.544 
The grounds for refusal are limited. The Minister shall refuse to issue an ATP if the 
person is not ordinarily resident in Canada or if any information, statement or other item 
included in the application is false or misleading. If the Minister refuses to issue an ATP, 
the applicant must be provided with written reasons and be given an opportunity to be 
heard.545 An ATP expires 12 months after the date of issue, or sooner if the medical use is 
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for less than a year.546 Applicants can renew or amend their ATP by following the 
requirements set out in the MMAR.547  
Caregivers are permitted to possess marihuana while they are in the presence of the ATP 
holder to provide assistance in the administration of marihuana.548 
Charter Minimum 
The objectives of requiring a medical declaration are to protect public health and safety. 
These objectives are met by limiting access to a drug to the subset of individuals who 
require it to maintain their health. Questions of health and drug prescription fall to 
medical professionals who are trained to assess symptoms, detect malingerers and 
prescribe treatments. Parliament’s choice of medical professionals as gatekeepers is not 
arbitrary. The requirement for some individuals to consult a specialist serves the valid 
purpose of ensuring the patient has knowledge of the entire range of available treatments 
relevant to their disease. The requirement for a specialist is not arbitrary.  
Requiring a physician to approve the medical use of marihuana is tailored to the objective 
of ensuring only those with a legitimate medical need are authorized to possess and this 
barrier to access does not go beyond what is necessary.  
A specialist may add some knowledge over and above that of a general practitioner. 
However, the added benefit of a specialist must be weighed against the additional delay 
and cost to the individual. Some individuals who would seem to prima facie qualify for 
the exemption have difficulties finding one physician to sign a medical declaration. In 
Hitzig, the Court noted that if physician cooperation dropped to the point where the 
defence to the criminal offence was illusory, the principles of fundamental justice could 
be violated.549 In Mernagh the evidence of the patient witnesses illustrate the extent to 
which this is a problem across Canada.550  
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548 Ibid, s 23. 
549 Hitzig ONCA, supra note 16 at 142-143. 
550 See Mernagh, supra note 8. 
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The requirement for a specialist is not strictly necessary but does serve some purpose in 
that individuals are subject to further medical scrutiny and are given a full range of 
conventional treatment options so they can make an informed decision about their 
medical treatment. In Bedford, the prohibition on bawdyhouses was overbroad because it 
caught conduct that did not contribute to the harm Parliament sought to curtail.551 
Likewise, while the requirement for a specialist does prevent some potential malingerers 
from obtaining legal authorization, it also prevents some individuals with a legitimate 
medical need. For individuals who would otherwise qualify for admission to the 
marihuana medical access program, this requirement is a barrier to access that adds delay 
and cost.  
There is some corresponding benefit to the state by reducing the harms associated with 
increased use. However, the lack of evidence of serious harms suggests these are 
minimal. Furthermore, there are ways to reduce the known harms. Although some 
individuals may improperly gain authorization, Health Canada reports that an average 
dose is between one to three grams per day. These amounts are not consistent with an 
intention to traffic. If individuals gain access to the legal medical supply for personal use, 
the risks to them will be lower if they have access to a safer product. Unlike other drugs 
of abuse, specifically opioids like oxycodone, the likelihood of cannabis abuse and the 
risks associated with it are significantly lower. Even if the statutory requirement to see a 
specialist were eliminated, physicians could refer their patients to one for a second 
opinion if the circumstances warranted.  
In my submission, the requirement for a specialist goes beyond what is necessary. One 
physician is sufficient to meet the objectives of ensuring the individual has serious and 
significant symptoms. One physician is sufficient to determine whether the expected 
benefits of marihuana outweigh the known risks. The Government publishes a large body 
of empirical evidence on the risks and benefits of cannabis online.552 The Government, 
doctors and individuals share the responsibility for ensuring they have the required 
information necessary to make informed choices. In light of research on the potential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Bedford ONCA, supra note 487 at 135. 
552 Information for Health Care Professionals, supra note 177. 
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benefits for some individuals, the maxim, “first, do no harm” entails prescribing cannabis 
if a failure to do so would cause harm.  
The Ideal 
The ideal process for authorization to possess marihuana for medical purposes involves 
medical vetting and minimal delay. There must also be a process to collect necessary 
information to provide proof of legal authority, monitor statistics and long-term 
outcomes.  
One option that would meet these objectives would be a physician prescription coupled 
with a requirement that the patient file necessary information forthwith or within a 
reasonable time. If a physician determines that the individual has serious and significant 
symptoms where the expected benefits outweigh the known risks, they could provide a 
prescription to their patient who could immediately take it to a licensed dealer. The 
patient would file the relevant information with the Government prior to receiving an ID 
card or prior to receiving their first dose. There would have to be some checks in place to 
ensure individuals actually filed. Physicians may have to file some information when 
they prescribe cannabis or the information may have to be filed before the prescription 
can be filled. This system would meet the objectives of medical vetting, minimal delay, 
data collection and proof of legal authority in a way that is not overbroad, arbitrary or 
grossly disproportionate.  
In the next section, I move on to consider the Part 2 of the MMAR, dealing with licences 
to produce marihuana. I detail the current system, what the Charter requires and what the 
ideal system would provide.  
Production Licences  
MMAR 
Currently, under the MMAR, individuals applying for an ATP, or current ATP holders 
may apply for a Personal-Use Production Licence (PUPL) if they are over 18 years of age 
and have not had a PUPL revoked within 10 years.553  The applicant must provide 	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relevant personal information and information about the production site. Outdoor 
production must not be adjacent to a school, public playground, day care facility or other 
public place frequented mainly by those under 18 years of age. Dried marihuana must be 
kept indoors.554 The application must include a description of the security measures in 
place.555 The maximum number of plants is determined by a formula. The amount of 
plants will vary depending on the daily dose limit and whether the production is indoors 
or outdoors.556 
The grounds for refusal are similar to the ATP. A person will be refused a PUPL if they 
would be the holder of more than two licences to produce or the production site would be 
host to more than four licences.557 
A person who holds a Designated-Person Production Licence (DPPL) is authorized to 
produce marihuana for the ATP holder specified in their licence. The person may produce 
and store the marihuana at different sites provided the requirements of section 34 are met. 
If the marihuana will be sent in the mail, section 34(1.1) sets out the requirements. 
A person is ineligible for a DPPL if they are under 18, or have been found guilty of 
trafficking or importing/exporting in Canada or another country.558 The application must 
include details about the production site, and personal information about the applicant. 
Section 41(b) provides that a licence will be denied if the person would become the 
holder of more than two licences. The holder of a licence may not simultaneously 
produce marihuana partly indoors and partly outdoors.559 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Ibid, s 28. 
555 Ibid. 
556 Ibid, s 30.  For example, a person with a daily dose of one gram would be permitted to 
grow 5 indoor plants and keep 225 grams in storage. For exclusively outdoor growing, a 
person whose daily dose was 1 gram would be permitted a maximum of 2 plants and 750 
grams in storage. For this dose amount and a combination of indoor and outdoor plants 
would permit a maximum of 4 indoor and 1 outdoor plant with a maximum of 375 grams 
in storage. See “For Patients” online:  MedicalMarihuana.ca 
<http://medicalmarihuana.ca/for-patients/marihuana-calculator>. 
557 Ibid, s 32. 
558 Ibid, s 35. 
559 Ibid, s. 52.1. 
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An inspector may, without the consent of the occupant, at any reasonable time, enter any 
place where the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that marihuana is being 
produced or kept by the holder of the licence to produce, and may, for that purpose 
(a) open and examine any receptacle or package found there that could 
contain marihuana; 
(b) examine anything found there that is used or may be capable of being 
used to produce or keep marihuana; 
(c) examine any records, electronic data or other documents found there 
dealing with marihuana, other than records dealing with the medical 
condition of a person, and make copies or take extracts; 
(d) use, or cause to be used, any computer system found there to examine 
electronic data referred to in paragraph (c); 
(e) reproduce, or cause to be reproduced, any document from electronic data 
referred to in paragraph (c) in the form of a printout or other output; 
(f) take any document or output referred to in paragraph (c) or (e) for 
examination or copying; 
(g) examine any substance found there and, for the purpose of analysis, take 
samples, as reasonably required; and 
(h) seize and detain, in accordance with Part IV of the Act, any substance 
found there, if the inspector believes, on reasonable grounds, that it is 
necessary.560 
Charter Minimum 
The objectives of the provisions dealing with production licences are to provide a legal 
source of supply, to restrict production to as few plants as possible, to prevent diversion, 
and to keep the production out of sight of the public, especially areas where youth are 
present. The Government has said that the objective of maintaining small-scale medical 
marihuana production is a temporary measure. Its goal is to move Canada toward a 
supply model whereby medical-grade marihuana is produced under regulated conditions 
subject to product standards and distributed through pharmacies.561 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Ibid, s 51. 
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The provisions of the MMAR dealing with production that have generated the most 
controversy are the sections that limit licensed producers to grow marihuana for a small 
number of authorized individuals562 and limit the maximum number of producers per 
production site.563  
While these provisions may not be effective at limiting diversion, they do bear some 
relation to the Government’s objective of limiting the size and scale of production. In 
Malmo-Levine, the majority of the SCC held that although the criminal prohibition 
against marihuana was “largely ineffective,” it was not arbitrary.564 The Court said, “The 
so-called "ineffectiveness" of the prohibition on marihuana possession is simply another 
way of characterizing a refusal to comply with the law. That refusal cannot be elevated to 
a constitutional argument against validity based on the invocation of fundamental 
principles of justice.”565 To the extent the provisions limiting the ratio and maximum 
number of producers reduce the ability to hide a large surplus of marihuana they are not 
arbitrary.  
These provisions are intrinsically linked to the issue of a legal supply and the 
fundamental principle of the rule of law. Without an adequate legal supply, individuals 
who are authorized to possess marihuana are forced to the black market. This violates the 
principles of fundamental justice. These provisions were amended from the original 1:1 
ratio and “three max” after successful constitutional challenges.566 It is uncertain whether 
these incremental amendments made a real difference in the availability of a quality legal 
supply. Presumably, the situation has improved marginally but in all likelihood, these 
incremental amendments fall short of creating an adequate legal supply. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 MMAR, supra note 5, s 32(e) for PUPL; 41(b) for DPPL. 
563 Ibid, s 32(d) for PUPL; 63.1 for DPPL. 
564 Malmo-Levine, supra note 272 at 151. 
565 Ibid at headnote. 
566 See Sfetkopoulos, supra note 399 and Beren, supra note 234. 
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If there is still no quality legal supply, these provisions are overbroad and grossly 
disproportionate. However, these provisions may be moot in light of the proposed 
changes to the MMAR that are anticipated to phase out home-based production.567 
The principles of fundamental justice contained in section 7 of the Charter do not require 
the Government to permit home-based cannabis production. Home-based production 
increases the likelihood of criminal mischief, diversion, fire hazards, and the production 
of inferior quality marihuana that is unsuitable for medical use. These are all serious 
public health and safety risks. However, at present they are necessary to establish an 
adequate legal supply. Without an adequate legal supply, individuals with a need for 
cannabis must access the black market, violating the principles of fundamental justice. 
The Charter does require that individuals who require cannabinoid-based medicines have 
access to a lawful source that meets their medicinal needs.568 Whether the current MMAR 
provide that is uncertain. There is no recent evidence on how the amendments have 
affected the supply.  
The Ideal  
There are challenges and risks involved with home-based or community-based 
production. Individuals may find it difficult to produce a product that meets their needs. 
The time and effort are significant. Crops can fail to thrive, or become contaminated with 
mould, increasing the risks to medical users’ health. There are risks associated with 
electrical fires from the lights and wiring. Criminals may break in to steal the marihuana, 
jeopardizing public safety. The risk of diversion may be increased if there is less 
oversight. The state has a valid interest in minimizing these risks. Nevertheless, the 
potential risks do not apply to everyone. Some individuals enjoy the cultivation process 
and find it therapeutic to grow their own medicine. Proper safety measures and inspection 
can reduce the dangers associated with home-based cannabis production. Permitting 
some individuals to grow their own cannabis respects their autonomy and control over 
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568 See “Supply	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their body and the medicine they put in it, which strikes at the core of liberty and security 
of the person.569 
The ideal system would eliminate the need for most individuals to cultivate their own 
supply of marihuana but permit it under regulated conditions for those who so desire. The 
market for illegal medical cannabis and the current home-based production would shrink 
as the availability of a quality-controlled product eliminates the need to access the black 
market. It stands to reason that the related risks of these activities would likewise be 
reduced. For individuals who require marihuana for medical purposes, the availability of 
a quality legal supply obviates the need for home or community-based production and 
eliminates the associated risks. I will address the issue of supply more comprehensively 
when I analyze Part 4 of the MMAR dealing with this issue. 
General Obligations 
MMAR 
Part 3 of the current MMAR details general obligations. Under the current MMAR, the 
holder of an ATP or a licence to produce must show proof of their authority to a police 
officer on demand.570 A revoked licence must be returned to the Minister within 30 
days.571 In the case of loss or theft, written notice must be provided to police within 24 
hours and to the Minister within 72 hours. The notice to the Minister must confirm that 
the police have been given written notice.572  
The Minister must revoke any licence if the conditions for eligibility are not met, if the 
medical practitioner advises that the continued use of marihuana is contraindicated, and, 
among other things, if false or misleading information was provided.573 The Minister 
must also revoke a licence if the producer does not comply with the restrictions imposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 See e.g. Bedford, supra note 487 at 107, 111. 
570 MMAR, supra note 5, s 58. 
571 Ibid, s 60. 
572 Ibid, s 61. 
573 Ibid, s 62. 
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upon it. For example if more than four licences to produce are authorized at a particular 
production site, the Minister must revoke the excess licences.574  
Section 65 of the MMAR addresses circumstances where marihuana must be destroyed 
but does not specify how it must be destroyed.  
An inspector who is notified of a complaint must notify the Minister, who is authorized to 
communicate this information to the police for the purposes of ensuring the proper 
administration or enforcement of the CDSA or MMAR.575 The Minister may also notify 
the police about the details of authorized production to assist them in their 
investigation.576 
Charter Minimum 
These objectives of these provisions are an attempt to ensure the system is not abused. 
The measures adopted permit law enforcement to ascertain the legal authority of an 
individual in possession of marihuana, maintain control over documents that support 
legal authority and set conditions under which authorization can be revoked. These also 
facilitate communication with the police if there are complaints about a production site or 
the medical practitioner who signed the declaration. 
The measures adopted are, for the most part, rationally connected to the objective of 
maintaining control over the exemption system. As long as cannabis remains illegal, the 
possibility of diversion to the non-medical market remains a real issue. While some of the 
underlying requirements are subject to challenge, revoking licences for non-compliance 
with the law comports with the fundamental principle of the rule of law. These particular 
requirements do not, in procedure or substance, infringe the section 7 rights of 
individuals. The information provided to law enforcement is rationally connected to 
ascertaining the scope of an authorized person’s legal authority. The requirement to 
notify the authorities if a licence is lost or stolen ensures that unauthorized persons do not 
have access to the medical supply of marihuana. 	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These measures fall within the constitutional range.  
The Ideal 
The ideal medical marihuana exemption system is one in which those who are legally 
authorized can produce and possess marihuana without unnecessary state interference. 
However, there will be some level of interference necessary to ensure the state interests 
in the safety and health of its citizens. Communicating information to police, revoking 
licences that do not comply with the law and requiring individuals to return documents 
that are no longer necessary are prudent measures. 
Supply of Marihuana Seed and Dried Marihuana 
MMAR 
Part 4 of the current MMAR address the supply of marihuana. The provisions in this part 
are partly governed by the Narcotic Control Regulations,577 which regulate the 
production and distribution of pharmaceuticals and other narcotics.  
Part 4 authorizes the Minister to import and possess viable cannabis seed for the purpose 
of selling, providing, transporting, sending or delivering the seed to the holder of an ATP 
or to a licensed dealer.578 A licensed dealer may provide or send viable cannabis seed to 
the holder of a licence to produce, or dried marihuana to the holder of an ATP. 
Furthermore, a licensed dealer, a pharmacist, or a medical practitioner may also provide 
or send dried marihuana to the holder of an ATP.579 
Charter Minimum 
The objectives of providing a legal supply chain are to ensure quality control for the 
health of medical users and minimize diversion for the health and safety of the 
community.  
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The requirement for the marihuana to be dried was recently struck down in Smith.580  In 
that case, the Crown argued that the objectives underlying the requirement for the 
marihuana to be dried was primarily to reduce diversion. The Crown argued it would be 
easier for individuals to divert products if it was unclear whether it contained marihuana. 
Furthermore, it would be more difficult to determine whether someone exceeded their 
lawful limit if the marihuana was in a different form. The rationale for the restriction was 
also to protect people from potentially unfounded claims about the benefits of cannabis in 
forms other than dried marihuana where the risks and benefits have not been as well 
researched. The Crown cited the risks of using solvent-based methods to extract 
cannabinoids as another reason to justify the limit.581  
The effects of this provision are that to stay within the limits of the law, individuals must 
smoke, vaporize582 or bake the dried plant material rather than separating out the 
cannabinoids, which are fat-soluble and can be absorbed into butter or oil for oral 
consumption. If individuals with an ATP convert the dried marihuana to another form, 
they are operating outside of the law. The medical evidence shows there are different 
therapeutic effects depending on the mode of administration, particularly related to the 
onset and duration of the subjective effects.583 
There is some evidence that the relative levels of THC and CBD in particular strains of 
marihuana have different therapeutic effects. There are also notable differences between 
sativa and indica types of the plant. The indica varieties appear to produce more of a 
relaxant effect on the body and the sativa varieties appear to produce more of a cerebral 
effect on the mind.584 This is relevant to the different types of symptoms people 
experience and the desired effects they hope to obtain from cannabis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 See Smith, supra note 280. 
581 Ibid at 68-71. 
582 Vaporizing is a method that heats herbal cannabis to below the combustion point so 
that no plant material is burned and minimal particulate matter, smoke, tar or carbon 
monoxide are ingested.  
583 Kirkpatrick & Hart, supra note 57 at 12-13. 
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The choice of how to take a medicine that one is authorized to possess is a decision of 
fundamental personal importance falling under the liberty interest in the Charter. A 
criminal restriction on the form of a medicine engages the right to liberty and security of 
the person.  
After violations of liberty and security of the person have been found, it is necessary to 
ask whether limiting marihuana to its dried form is justified according to the principles of 
fundamental justice.  
It appears that the government does have some valid reasons for restricting marihuana to 
its dried form and in that sense it cannot be said to be arbitrary.  
In the gross disproportionality analysis, the effects of the legislation are compared to the 
measures. In this case, the effects are grossly disproportionate. Restricting cannabis to the 
form of dried marihuana removes many treatment options that are tailored to different 
types of symptoms. Furthermore, it increases the likelihood that individuals will smoke 
the marihuana, raising health concerns. The corresponding benefit to the state is minimal. 
Although it may be easier to calculate the quantity if it is dried, a certificate of analysis to 
prove the contents is still necessary. Presently, individuals are limited to a maximum 
quantity of dried marihuana. The quantity remains the same regardless of whether it 
remains in its dried form or is converted.   
The current MMAR limits the medicinal product to its dried form, precluding other 
effective forms of administration that may be more effective at treating an individual’s 
particular symptoms. This affects their liberty and security of the person in a grossly 
disproportionate manner that is not justified under the Charter. 
In order to respect the rule of law and respect the principles of fundamental justice, those 
with a constitutional entitlement to medical cannabis must have a legal source. There 
must be reasonable access to a quality supply in order to ensure state barriers do not 
unduly restrict the availability of a medical treatment that provides substantial relief of 
serious and significant symptoms.  
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The Ideal 
The ideal system of supply would offer a variety of quality-controlled cannabis-based 
medicines distributed through regulated, licensed distributors (“dispensaries”) operated 
by healthcare professionals. Below, I address the ideal systems of supply and distribution.  
Supply 
The current legal supply options are for authorized individuals to produce their own, have 
a designate produce it or purchase it from the Government supplier, PPS. The numerous 
small-scale production sites are difficult to control. In contrast, fewer large-scale 
productions would be easier to monitor. Eliminating the vast majority of home and 
community-based production would address many of the state concerns about public 
heath and safety. 
PPS currently holds a contract to produce cannabis for the Canadian government. In April 
2007, a report evaluating this contract reported that 351 out of the 1,742 ATP license 
holders were accessing the Government’s supply of cannabis.585 At that time, the cost of 
the contract with PPS totaled $10,278,276.586 Health Canada pays PPS $328.75/kg and 
charges patients $5000/kg.587 This works out to $5 per gram, about half the price of one 
gram on the black market.588  
Expanding the number of licensed commercial producers could offer more variety. 
Companies involved in agriculture or pharmaceutical production would be ideally suited 
to producing large crops of medical-grade cannabis. Commercial production facilities 
could convert the plant to other forms so that dried marihuana is not the only option. 
Utilizing economies of scale allows large-scale operations to produce a quality product at 
a lower price. Labelling and packaging standards should obviously be imposed.  	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Canada and Prairie Plant Systems” (October 2007) at 2, online: 
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586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid at 7. 
588 UNODC, World Drug Report 2011 (United Nations. Publication, Sales No. 
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The main advantages of such a system would be that economies of scale could be 
employed to produce a variety of products at a cheaper cost. More comprehensive 
security measures could be implemented. Inspection and monitoring would be easier in a 
smaller number of locations. To address Parliament’s concern about large-scale medical 
grow operations being indistinguishable from criminal ones, the prudent course of action 
is to limit the number of legal producers that can exist in each province. In Connecticut, 
similar legislation provides that at least three but not more than ten licensed cannabis 
producers can operate in the state.589 Canada could implement a similar restriction for 
each province. This would allow for the production of an adequate supply, create 
competition in the market and allow for better government control of production. With 
fewer sites of production, it would be easier to implement necessary security and 
inspection measures. Law enforcement would become much easier because the legal 
production sites would be known.  
Distribution 
While pharmacies do offer some potential, they are not ideally suited to being a primary 
distribution channel for cannabis and cannabis-based medications. Pharmacies should 
offer some cannabis-based medicines, but the range of products, accessories and 
specialized knowledge available at a pharmacy may be limited.  
An ideal system of distribution would include cannabis dispensaries where a broader 
range of products, accessories and resources are available. Pharmacists, or individuals 
with similar training, who have been specifically educated in the medical properties of 
cannabis and other drugs should operate these dispensaries. A cannabis-specific focus 
allows for a more comprehensive consideration of how this unique plant-based drug 
might affect the individual patient. Aside from specialized knowledge, the environment 
may offer a level of service to individuals using cannabis medicinally.  
Individuals would have access to a broader range of products that suit their particular 
medical needs. Pricing, a concern for those with low or fixed incomes, could not be so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 US, HB 5389, An Act Concerning The Palliative Use Of Marihuana, 2012, Reg Sess, 
Conn, 2012, Sec. 10(b)(A) (enacted). 
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high as to render the defence to the criminal charge illusory, but otherwise, standard 
business practices could apply.  
II: The Government’s Proposed Changes to the MMAR 
In the proposed changes to the MMAR, the Government indicates that Health Canada 
would no longer be responsible for approving a patient’s authorization. In order to 
streamline the process and avoid lengthy waiting periods, the government proposed that: 
The core of the redesigned Program would be a new, simplified process in 
which Health Canada no longer receives applications from program 
participants. A new supply and distribution system for dried marihuana that 
relies on licensed commercial producers would be established. These 
licensed commercial producers, who would be inspected and audited by 
Health Canada so as to ensure that they comply with all applicable 
regulatory requirements, would be able to cultivate any strain(s) of 
marihuana they choose. Finally, the production of marihuana for medical 
purposes by individuals in homes and communities would be phased out. 
 
Individuals wishing to use marihuana for medical purposes would still be 
required to consult a physician who is licensed to practice medicine in 
Canada.590 
The proposed MMAR will be published in the Canada Gazette, Part I, in late 2012 for 
further public input before the new MMAR are enacted.591 
III: Beyond the Charter Minimum 
To develop a medical cannabis access system takes careful planning and thought directed 
at all the individuals who will be affected by the legislation. Each provision and the 
legislation as a whole must be constitutional both in procedure and substance. It must 
respect both the constitutional rights of individuals who require medical cannabis and the 
collective good of the country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Consultation Results, supra note 9. 
591 Health Canada, “Government of Canada Considers Improvements to the Marihuana 
Medical Access Program to Reduce the Risk of Abuse and Keep our Children and 
Communities Safe” (17 June 2011), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-
cp/_2011/2011_80-eng.php>. 
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An important issue that arises is the title of the legislation. In my submission, the 
program and legislation should be renamed the Cannabis Access Program (CAP) and 
Cannabis Access Regulations (CAR). These titles and acronyms are more scientifically 
accurate and also consonant with the valid objectives of the program, unlike the current 
Medical Marihuana Access Division (MMAD) and Marihuana Medical Access 
Regulations (MMAR). 
A clear legal standard should be in place to avoid violating the principles of fundamental 
justice.592 The ideal objectives of this program should be “to provide access to cannabis 
(marihuana) to individuals suffering from serious physical or psychological distress 
where the expected benefits outweigh the known risks.” 
Based on this standard, a medical professional can evaluated the individual, the empirical 
evidence and may conclude that cannabis is appropriate. If a patient is approved to use 
cannabis for medicinal purposes, they must file the required information and may then 
take their prescription to a pharmacy or dispensary to be filled. Upon receipt of this 
information, the Government would issue a photo ID card to demonstrate lawful 
authority. Some individuals who produce cannabis in accordance with prescribed safety 
and health standards may still be exempted from the prohibition on production in the 
CDSA, but this is not a requirement of the Charter.  
These suggested changes appear to be somewhat similar to the Government’s proposed 
changes, which will be published in detail later this year. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Since the late 1980s, scientific research has provided an explanation for cannabis’ 
apparently unique therapeutic benefits by providing an understanding of how and why 
this plant exerts its effects. The medicinal benefits of cannabis appear to relate to the 
location of the cannabinoid receptors in different areas of the brain associated with 
cognition, appetite, motor control and other functions. While there is a great deal of 
information on the general effects of cannabis, much more research is needed to reach a 
scientific consensus on potential therapeutic applications and contraindications. Future 
research efforts will likely be focused on methods of administration other than smoking 
that target the individual’s particular condition without undesirable behavioural effects. 
The Charter requires that individuals not be deprived of life, liberty or security of the 
person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. These principles 
require a viable exemption from the general criminal prohibition of cannabis for those 
with a bona fide medical need who obtain, or can expect to obtain, significant relief from 
serious symptoms. For individuals who need to use marihuana for medical reasons, state 
barriers to access coupled with a criminal sanction is a violation of their liberty and 
security of the person that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice.  
In this paper, I have suggested a Charter-compliant cannabis access program dealing 
with aspects of production, distribution and possession. The suggested approach is 
tailored to the objectives of providing safe access to those who require cannabis as a 
medicine while minimizing the risks associated with its use. Canada has the opportunity 
to implement a world-class cannabis access program for those with a legitimate need. We 
are at a constitutional crossroad. Let us take the path toward compassionate access that 
rationally balances all interests. 
 
	   	  
	  
130	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
LEGISLATION 
 
(2009) C Gaz II, 797. 
 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being  
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19 at ss 4-7 and Schedule II. 
 
Criminal Code of Canada, RSC, 1985, c C-46. 
 
Food and Drugs Act, RSC, 1985, c F-27.  
 
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001-227. 
 
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations – Regulations Amending Controlled Drugs  
and Substances Act, (17 December 2003) C Gaz II, Vol 137 No 26, online:  
<http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2003/index-eng.html>. 
 
Marihuana Medical Access Regulations – Regulations Amending the Controlled  
Drugs and Substances Act, (29 June 2005) C Gaz II, online: Government of  
Canada <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2005/index-eng.html>. 
 
Narcotic Control Act, RSC 1985, c N-1. 
 
Narcotic Control Regulations, CRC 2010, c 1041. 
 
NRS tit 453a § 453A.810, online: <http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS- 
453A.html#NRS453ASec810>. 
 
The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, 1923, SC 1923, c 22. 
 
Safe Streets and Communities Act, SC 2012, c 1. 
 
SOR/2010-63, (2010) C Gaz II, online: <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp- 
pr/p2/2010/2010-03-31/html/sor-dors63-eng.html>. 
 
SOR/2007-207, (2007) C Gaz, online:  
<http://www.gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2007/2007-10-03/html/sor- 
dors207-eng.html>. 
 
	   	  
	  
131	  
US, HB 5389, An Act Concerning The Palliative Use of Marihuana, 2012, Reg Sess,  
Conn, 2012, Sec 10(b)(A) (enacted). 
 
 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] AC 789. 
 
Bedford v Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264. 
 
Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44. 
 
Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186. 
 
Canada (AG) v Bedford, [2012] SCCA No 159. 
 
Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44. 
 
Canada v Schmidt, [1987] 1 SCR 500. 
 
Canada (AG) v Sfetkopoulos, [2008] SCCA 531. 
 
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), 2004 SCC 4. 
 
Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 886. 
 
Chaoulli v Québec (AG), 2005 SCC 35. 
 
Cunningham v Canada, [1993] 2 SCR 143. 
 
Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513. 
 
Ford v Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 712. 
 
Gosselin v Québec, [2002] 4 SCR 429. 
 
Hitzig v Canada, [2003] OJ No 3873. 
 
Hitzig v Canada (2003), 171 CCC (3d) 18. 
 
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46. 
 
Mills v The Queen, [1986] 1 SCR 863. 
 
Perka v The Queen (1994), 14 CCC (3d) 385. 
	   	  
	  
132	  
 
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (BC), [1985] 2 SCR 486. 
 
Rodriguez v British Columbia, [1993] 3 SCR 519. 
 
R v Beren and Swallow, 2009 BCSC 429. 
 
R v DB, 2008 SCC 25. 
 
R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151. 
 
R v Heywood, [1994] 3 SCR 761. 
 
R v Krieger, 2006 SCC 47. 
 
R v Krieger, 2006 ABPC 259. 
 
R v Malmo-Levine, [2003] SCR 571. 
 
R v Mernagh, 2011 ONSC 2121. 
 
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30. 
 
R v Long, 88 OR (3d) 146. 
 
R v Oakes, [1986] 3 SCR 103. 
 
R v Parker, [2000] OJ No 2787. 
 
R v Smith, 2012 BCSC 544. 
 
R v Stinchcombe (1991), 3 SCR 326. 
 
Sfetkopoulos v Canada, 2008 FC 33. 
 
Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177. 
 
United States of America v Burns, [2001] 1 SCR 283. 
 
Wakeford v Canada, [2002] OJ No 85. 
 
 
SECONDARY MATERIAL: MONOGRAPHS 
 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental  
 Disorders, 4th ed (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association,  
	   	  
	  
133	  
 2000). 
 
Doweiko, Harold. Concepts of Chemical Dependency, 3rd ed (Pacific Grove, CA:  
Brooks/Cole, 1996). 
 
Earleywine, Mitchell.  Understanding Marihuana: A New Look at the Scientific  
Evidence (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
Gahlinger, Paul. Illegal Drugs: A Complete Guide to Their History, Chemistry, Use, and  
Abuse (New York: Plume, 2004). 
 
Grinspoon, Lester & James Bakalar. Marihuana: The Forbidden Medicine (United  
States: Yale University, 1997). 
 
Guyton, Arthur C & John E Hall. Textbook of Medical Physiology, 11th ed  
(Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier Inc, 2006). 
 
Hanson, Glen, Peter J Venturelli & Annette Fleckenstein. Drugs and Society, 7th ed  
(Boston: Jones and Bartlett Pub, 2002). 
 
Hogg, Peter. Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2010). 
 
Hogg, Peter. Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th Ed, vol 2 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters,  
2007)  
 
The Indian Hemp Drugs Report (1893-1894), reprint (Maryland: Jefferson Press,  
1969), online:  
<http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/inhemp/ihmenu.htm>. 
 
Joy, Janet, Stanley Watson Jr and John Benson Jr, eds. Marihuana and Medicine:  
Assessing the Science Base (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999). 
 
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869). 
 
Pollen, Michael.  The Botany of Desire: A Plant’s-Eye View of the World (New York:  
Random House, 2001). 
 
Ray, Oakley & Charles Ksir. Drugs, Society, & Human Behavior, 7th ed (Toronto:  
Mosby, 1995). 
 
Sharpe, Robert & Kent Roach. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed (Toronto:  
Irwin Law, 2009). 
	   	  
	  
134	  
 
Steen, Robin.  Marihuana as Scapegoat, Cannabis as Medicine: A Cognitive-Rhetorical  
Analysis of a Canadian Drug-Policy Problem (MA Thesis, University of British  
Columbia, 2010) [unpublished]. 
 
Stolick, Matt.  Otherwise Law-Abiding Citizens: A Moral and Scientific Assessment of  
Cannabis Use (Toronto: Lexington Books, 2009). 
 
Wang, Tongtong.  Methodological issues in the assessment of the safety of medical  
cannabis (DPhil Thesis, McGill University Faculty of Medicine, 2009)  
[unpublished]. 
 
 
SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES 
 
Abel, EL. “Retrieval of Information after Use of Marihuana” (1971) 231 Nature 58. 
 
Agence France-Presse. “Israel researchers develop marihuana plant without  
the high”, National Post (30 May 2012) online: National Post  
<http://life.nationalpost.com/2012/05/30/israel-researchers-develop- 
marihuana-plant-without-the-high/>. 
 
Anderson, D Mark & Daniel I Rees. “Medical Marihuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and  
Alcohol Consumption” Montana State University, University of Colorado  
Denver and IZA. Discussion Paper No 6112 November 2011. 
 
Bennett, Chris. “Early/Ancient History” in Julie Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A Complete  
Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park Street Press, 2010) 17. 
 
Buys, YM and PE Rafuse. “Canadian Ophthalmological Society policy statement on  
the medical use of marihuana for glaucoma” (2010) 45 Can J Ophthalmol 324. 
 
Calignano, A et al. “Control of pain initiation by endogenous cannabinoids,” (1998)  
394 Nature 277.  
 
Capler, Rielle. “A Review of the Cannabis Cultivation Contract between Health  
Canada and Prairie Plant Systems” (October 2007), online:  
<safeaccess.ca/research/pdf/hc_pps_contract_report.pdf>. 
 
Cassanova, M Llanos et al. “Inhibition of Skin Tumor Growth and Angiogenesis in  
vivo by Activation of Cannabinoid Receptors” (2003) 111 J Clinical  
Investigation 43. 
 
	   	  
	  
135	  
Castle, DJ and N Solowij. “Acute and subacute psychomimetic effects of cannabis in  
humans” in D Castle & R Murray, eds, Marihuana and madness (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 127. 
 
Centonze, Diego et al. The Endocannabinoid System in Targeting Inflammatory  
Neurodegenerative Diseases, (2007) 28 Trends Pharmacological Sci 180. 
 
Coates, RA et al. “Cofactors of progression to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome  
in a cohort of male sexual contacts of men with human immunodeficiency  
virus disease” (1990) 132 Am J Epidemiol 717.   
 
Comeau, Pauline. “Cut to marihuana research sends strong message”, online: (2006)  
175 CMAJ 12 <http://www.cmaj.ca/content/175/12/1507.full>. 
 
Corcoran, Cheryl. “Mental Health Risks Associated with Cannabis Use” in Julie  
Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park  
Street Press, 2010) 179. 
 
Craker, Lyle E & Zoe Gardner. “The Botany of Cannabis” in Julie  
Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park  
Street Press, 2010) 35. 
 
Croxford, J Ludovic and Takashi Yamamura. “Cannabinoids and the Immune System:  
Potential for the Treatment of Inflammatory Disease?” (September 2005)  
166 J Neuroimmunology 3. 
 
Curtis, A, CE Clarke & HE Rickards. “Cannabinoids for Tourette's Syndrome  
(Review)” (2009) 4 The Cochrane Library, online:  
<www.thecochranelibrary.com>. 
 
ElSohly, Mahmoud A. “Chemical Constituents of Cannabis” in Franjo Grotenhermen  
and Ethan Russo, eds, Cannabis and Cannabinoids: Pharmacology, Toxicology, 
 and Therapeutic Potential (New York: The Haworth Integrative Healing  
Press, 2002). 
 
Facci, L et al. “Mast cells express a peripheral cannabinoid receptor with differential  
sensitivity to anadamide and palmitoylethanolamide” (1995) 92 Proc Natl  
Acad Sci USA 3376. 
 
 “For Patients” online: MedicalMarihuana.ca <http://medicalmarihuana.ca/for- 
patients/marihuana-calculator>. 
 
Gauldie, SD et al. “Anadamide activates peripheral nociceptors in normal and  
	   	  
	  
136	  
arthritic rat knee joints” (2001) 132 Br J Pharmacol 617. 
 
Gordon, Elisabeth & Orrin Devinsky, “Marihuana: Effects on Neuronal Excitability and 
Seizure Threshold” in Nahas et al, ed, Marihuana and Medicine (New Jersey: 
Humana Press, 1999) 619. 
 
Grotenhermen, Franjo. “The Toxicology of Cannabis and Cannabis Prohibition”  
(2007) 4 Chem Biodiv 1744 at 1746. 
 
Hall, W, N Solowij & J Lemon, “The health and psychological consequences of cannabis 
use,” National Drug Strategy Monograph Series No 25 (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1994). 
 
Hashibe, M, H Morgenstern, Y Cui et al, “Marijuana Use and the Risk of Lung and 
Upper Aerodigestive Tract Cancers: Results of a Population Based Case-Control 
Study” (2006) 15 Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 1829. 
 
Health Canada. “Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey: Summary of  
results for 2010” (2011), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/drugs- 
drogues/stat/_2010/summary-sommaire-eng.php>. 
 
Health Canada. “Drugs and Health Products: Fact Sheet – Medical Access to  
Marihuana” (08 February 2008), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp- 
mps/marihuana/law-loi/fact_sheet-infofiche-eng.php>. 
 
Health Canada. “Drugs and Health Products: Fact Sheet – Medical Use of Marihuana”  
(31 May 2012), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp- 
mps/marihuana/index-eng.php>. 
 
Health Canada. “Drugs and Health Products: Health Canada’s Marihuana Supply” (15  
September 2010), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp- 
mps/marihuana/supply-approvis/index-eng.php>. 
 
Health Canada. “Drugs and Health Products: Information for Health Care  
Professionals” (September 2010), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc- 
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/marihuana/how-comment/medpract/infoprof/index- 
eng.php#tphp>. 
 
Health Canada. “Drugs and Health Products, Medical Marihuana Regulatory Reform  
2011: Consultations Results” (30 May 2012), online: Health Canada  
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp- 
mps/consultation/marihuana/_2011/program/consult_reform-eng.php>. 
	   	  
	  
137	  
 
Health Canada. “Government of Canada Considers Improvements to the Marihuana  
Medical Access Program to Reduce the Risk of Abuse and Keep our Children  
and Communities Safe” (17 June 2011), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc- 
asc/media/nr-cp/_2011/2011_80-eng.php>. 
 
Herkenham, M et al. “The cannabinoid receptor: biochemical, anatomical and  
behavioural characterization” (1990) 13 Trends Neurosci 420.  
 
Holland, Julie. “Cannabinoids and Psychiatry” in Julie Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A  
Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park Street Press, 2010) 287. 
 
Hollister, LE. “Marihuana and Immunity” (1992) 24 J Psychoactive Drugs 159. 
 
Holubek, William. “Medical Risks and Toxicology” in Julie Holland, ed, The Pot Book:  
A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park Street Press, 2010) 146.  
 
Howlett, Allyn C et al. Cannabinoid Physiology and Pharmacology: 30 Years of  
Progress, 47 Neuropharmacology 345. 
 
Jampel, H. “American glaucoma society position statement: marihuana and the  
treatment of glaucoma” (2010) 19 J Glaucoma 75.  
 
Johns, A. “Psychiatric effects of cannabis” (2001) Br J Psychiatry 178. 
 
Kalant, Harold & Amy Porath-Waller. “Clearing the Smoke on Cannabis: Medical Use  
of Cannabis and Cannabinoids” (2012), online: Canadian Centre on Substance  
Abuse, online: <www.ccsa.ca>. 
 
Kandel, DB & K Yamaguchi. “From beer to crack: developmental patterns of drug  
involvement” (1993) 83 American Journal of Public Health 851. 
 
Kandel, DB, K Yamaguchi  & K Chen. “Stages of progression in drug involvement  
from adolescence to adulthood: Further evidence for the gateway theory”  
(1992) 53 Journal of Studies in Alcohol 447. 
 
Kaslow, RA et al. “No evidence for a role of alcohol or other psychoactive drugs in  
accelerating immunodeficiency in HIV-1 positive individuals. A report from  
the Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study” (1989) 261(23) JAMA 3424. 
 
Kirkey, Sharon. “Doctors refuse to authorize pot use, leaving patients in pain”,  
Postmedia News (30 October 2011) online:  
<http://www.canada.com/health/Doctors+refuse+authorize+leaving+patien 
	   	  
	  
138	  
ts+pain/5630488/story.html>. 
 
Kirkham, Tim. “Cannabinoids and Medicine: Eating Disorders, Nausea and Emesis”  
in Vincenzo Di Marzo, ed, Cannabinoids (Texas: Klewer Academic, 2004). 
 
Kirkpatrick, Matthew G & Carl L Hart. “The Subjective Effects of Cannabis” in Julie  
Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park  
Street Press, 2010) 9. 
 
Kotulak, Ronald. "Teens Driven to Distraction" Chicago Tribune (24 March 2006),  
online: How Stuff Works <http://health.howstuffworks.com/human- 
body/systems/nervous-system/teenage-brain1.htm>. 
 
Labouvie, E, ME Bates & RJ Pandina. “Age of first use: Its reliability and predictive  
utility” (1997) 58 Journal of Studies on Alcohol 638. 
 
Lauer, Matt.  Finest Quotes: Marihuana Quotes - Matt Lauer, online:  
<http://www.finestquotes.com/select_quote-category-Marihuana-page- 
0.htm#ixzz1y9j1g5FL>. 
 
Lucas, Phillipe G “Regulating compassion: an overview of Canada's federal medical 
cannabis policy and practice” (2008) 5 Harm Reduction Journal 5, online: 
<http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/5>. 
 
Mann, Robert E et al. “Impacts of cannabis on driving: An analysis of current  
evidence with an emphasis on Canadian data” (May 2003) Road Safety and  
Motor Vehicle Regulation Directorate Transport Canada. 
 
Marvin, Caroline B & Carl L Hart, “Cannabis and Cognition” in Julie Holland, ed, The  
Pot Book: A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park Street Press, 2010). 
 
McPartland, John & Ethan Russo. “Cannabis & Cannabis Extracts: Greater than the  
Sum of their Parts” (2002) 1 Journal of Cannabis Therapeutics 103. 
 
Munson, AE & KO Fehr. “Immunological effects of cannabis” in AE Munson & KO  
Fehr, eds, Cannabis and Health Hazards (Toronto: Addiction Research  
Foundation, 1983). 
 
Murphy, Laura “Hormonal System and Reproduction” in Franjo 
Grotenhermen and Ethan Russo, eds, Cannabis and Cannabinoids: 
 Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential (New York: The  
Haworth Integrative Healing Press, 2002) 289. 
 
	   	  
	  
139	  
Nahas, Gabriel “Toxicology and pharmacology” in GG Nahas, ed, Marihuana in Science  
and Medicine (New York: Raven Press, 1984) 109. 
 
Nicoll, Roger & Bradley Alger. “The Brain’s Own Marihuana”, Scientific Am (22  
November 2004). 
 
“NORML Estimates One Million Medical Marihuana Patients in California”, Cannabis  
Culture Magazine (31 May 2011), online:  
<http://www.cannabisculture.com/content/2011/05/31/NORML-Estimates-One-
Million-Medical-Marihuana-Patients-California>. 
 
O’Toole, Megan. “Crown urges Ontario court to overturn medical marijuana ruling”, 
National Post (7 May 2012), online: 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/05/07/crown-urges-ontario-court-to-overturn-
medical-marijuana-ruling/>. 
 
Pertwee, RG. “Ligands that target cannabinoid receptors in the brain: from THC to  
anadamide and beyond” (2008) 13(2) Addict Biol 147, online:  
<www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18482430>. 
 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada, News Release, “Court Grants Stay Pending 
Appeal” (22 June 2011) online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/nws-
nvs/comm/2011/22_06_11.html> 
 
Reichbach, Gustin. “A Judge’s Plea for Pot”, The New York Times  (17 May 2012) A27,  
online: NY Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/opinion/a- 
judges-plea-for-medical-marihuana.html>.   
 
Robson, P. “Therapeutic Aspects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids” (2001) 178 British  
Journal of Psychiatry 107.  
 
Rocha, Machado et al. “Therapeutic use of Cannabis sativa on chemotherapy-induced  
nausea and vomiting among cancer patients: systematic review and meta- 
analysis” (2008) 17 Eur J Cancer Care 431. 
 
Russo, Ethan. “Cannabis: From Pariah to Prescription” (2003) 3 Journal of Cannabis  
Therapeutics 1. 
 
Schnelle, Martin & Florian Strasser. “Anorexia and Cachexia” in Franjo 
Grotenhermen and Ethan Russo, eds, Cannabis and Cannabinoids: 
 Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential (New York: The  
Haworth Integrative Healing Press, 2002) 153. 
	   	  
	  
140	  
 
The Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs, “Final Report: Cannabis: Our  
Position For A Canadian Public Policy”, online:  
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/371/ille/rep/repfinalvol1part5-
e.htm#Chapter%209>. 
 
Solowij, Nadia & Brin Grenyer, “Long-Term Effects of Cannabis on Psyche and 
Cognition” 299 at 301 in Franjo Grotenhermen and Ethan Russo, eds, Cannabis 
and Cannabinoids: Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential (New 
York: The Haworth Integrative Healing Press, 2002). 
 
Stern, Ruth & Herbie DiFonzo. “The End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marihuana  
in the New Century” (2009) 27(4) Quinnipiac L Rev 673. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2011, UNODC, 2011,  
online: < http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR- 
2011.html>. 
 
Vandrey, Ryan & Margaret Haney. “How Real is the Risk of Addiction?” in Julie  
Holland, ed, The Pot Book: A Complete Guide to Cannabis (Toronto: Park  
Street Press, 2010) 189. 
 
Vaughn, Chris & MacDonald Christie. “Mechanisms of Cannabinoid Analgesia” 89 in  
Franjo Grotenhermen and Ethan Russo, eds, Cannabis and Cannabinoids:  
Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential. (New York: The Haworth 
Integrative Healing Press, 2002). 
 
Ware, MA et al. “Cannabis use for chronic non-cancer pain” (2003) 102(1-2) Pain  
211. 
 
Wingerchuk, Dean. “Cannabis for Medical Purposes: Cultivating Science, Weeding  
out the Fiction” (2004) 364 The Lancet 315. 
 
Woolridge, Emily et al. “Cannabis Use in HIV for pain and other medical symptoms”  
(2005) 29 Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 358.  
 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 19 December 1988, online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997af90.html >. 
UNODC, World Drug Report 2011 (United Nations. Publication, Sales No. E.11.XI.10), 
online: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html>.
	   	  
	  
141	  
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
Carolynn Conron 
 
Education 
2011-2012 LL.M. Candidate, University of Western Ontario 
2011 Admitted to Ontario Bar, Law Society of Upper Canada 
2010 Admitted to British Columbia Bar, Law Society of British Columbia 
2006 – 2009 Juris Doctor, University of British Columbia 
2002 – 2006  Bachelor of Arts (Honours), McMaster University  
Majors:  Philosophy & Communication Studies  
Minor: Psychology 
1996-2002 A.B. Lucas Secondary School (Honours) 
 
Presentations &  Publications 
Presenter, University of British Columbia 17th Annual Interdisciplinary Legal Studies 
Graduate Student Conference (May 10-11, 2012). 
 
Rodman, G. & Adler, R. & Sévigny, A. Understanding Human Communication, 
Canadian Edition, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Career Experience 
Barrister & Solicitor, Community Legal 
Services 
London, ON 
November 1, 2011 – July 31, 2012 
• Criminal defence work at Western University’s Legal Aid Clinic 
• Represented individuals charged with criminal offences ineligible for Legal Aid 
• Responsible for file management, interviews, researching law and representing clients 
at trial 
 
Articled Student, Michaels & Filkow 
Richmond, BC 
August 31, 2009 – May 28, 2010 
• Sole articling student at a boutique criminal defense firm, specializing in impaired 
driving 
 
Articled Student, UBC First Nations Legal 
Clinic 
Vancouver, BC 
September 2008 – December 2008 
• Responsible for file management, client interviews, researching law and appearing in 
court on behalf of First Nations clients  
 
